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# Near East/North Africa Report

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

LEBANESE CRISIS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PLO DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1348, 3 Sep 82 pp 35-38

[Interview with Khalid al-Hasan, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of Fatah's Central Committee, by 'Adil Malik: "Khalid al-Hasan Reports on Meetings Held in al-Ta'if and Washington: 'We Will Fight with the Phalangists To Get Israel out of Lebanon;' " in Kuwait, 16 August 1982]

[Text] "Our revolution is 'a revolution that will go on till victory; it is not a revolution that will end in suicide;' we warn some regimes against laying a hand on some of the organizations."  
"After the battle of Beirut the Palestinians will turn 60 percent on the Arabs and 40 percent on Israel."

Mr Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Fatah's Central Committee played a major role in numerous political and diplomatic stages that accompanied the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. He took part in the meetings that were held in al-Ta'if and in the communications that were initiated from al-Ta'if and sent out to various directions. He also traveled to Washington with the Arab delegation that included Saudi Arabia's minister of foreign affairs, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal and Syria's minister of foreign affairs, 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam. Although much has been written about that period, Abu Said has maintained his silence about it, but AL-HAWADITH [persuaded him] to break his silence, so he talked with our magazine as a prelude to a forthcoming lengthy and analytical article. He talks here about numerous aspects of that phase, and he sheds light on many matters..

This is the text of the interview with Khalid al-Hasan that took place on 16 August 1982. The interview began with a request from AL-HAWADITH to go back to the beginning in the sequence of events and to follow the sequence of events up to this stage.

[Answer] After the scope of the Israeli attack became evident, after it became clear that its objective was not just south Lebanon, and after the invasion of Lebanon spread deep into Lebanon's interior and reached the outskirts of Beirut, the crisis in Lebanon turned from being an ordinary attack, like previous Israeli attacks, to something that was much bigger. The outcome of that crisis would determine the future of Lebanon and the future of the Palestinian question as a whole. The Israelis' barbaric attack had thus made the Palestinian question the

foremost question in the world and linked it with the future of Lebanon. As we know Lebanon has a special standing in the world. Israel's attack also forced decision makers in international politics, especially in Europe, in the socialist bloc and in the United States to consider the Middle East area and the possibilities for developments in the situation. Due to the nature of matters it was inevitable that attention turn to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since it is considered the country that is most qualified to play a special role regarding this crisis. This is due, on the one hand, to its relations with the United States and the influence it has with that country, and it is also due to its responsibility as a dominant country in the Islamic world, considering that King Fahd is currently the president of the Islamic Conference. Besides, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does have a role to play and it has its standing in the Arab world. Consequently, I received orders to go to al-Ta'if. The purpose of my being there was to coordinate the course of events between Beirut and King Fahd with regard to what is required and what had to be done. I was actually in al-Ta'if for about 2 weeks.

There were further developments while I was in al-Ta'if, and the siege on Beirut was intensified. Water, electricity and food were withheld from the city which was being brutally bombarded as well. At the same time the mission of U.S. envoy Philip Habib regarding the crisis of West Beirut was becoming more complicated. And here the kingdom of Saudi Arabia found itself face to face with events. Herein lay the importance of the coordination that took place in al-Ta'if. I don't know whether what I will say now is something that should be said now or at a later date. But the tone Saudi Arabia assumed in its discussions with the U.S. government did [not] change until King Fahd sent a letter stating that unless the Israelis stopped their raids, he would have to give up his role as mediator between the United States and the PLO, and he would call for an Islamic summit. He said Saudi Arabia would abide by the resolutions that would be issued by that conference. I observed that there were daily communications between the Saudi monarch and Washington. These were either with the U.S. government or with the Saudi ambassador to Washington. Suddenly, Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned and George Schultz became [the U.S.] secretary of state. Saudi Arabia's role became more influential and more effective, not as Zionist propaganda states because of Schultz's relations in the area, but rather because Schultz's relations gave him a better understanding of the area. Schultz understood the reality of U.S. interests in the area much better than Haig did. Schultz was also not the one who had made an agreement with Israel to attack Lebanon. Accordingly, he was not committed, at least not in any elaborate way, to the requirements of this attack or to the details of its scope, particularly with regard to the Israeli attack on West Beirut.

The coordination between Beirut and al-Ta'if was taking place around the clock. We often woke up His Majesty King Fahd, and he would call Washington. In most cases he was able to put a stop to many things. The process continued to fluctuate between Saudi pressure, relative U.S. compliance and relative Israeli rebellion in the massacre that Israel carried out basically in Lebanon with the coordination and support of the United States. The six-member committee of the Arab League had been scheduled to meet during that period, and the meeting was convened to implement the decision that had been made by the Arab League in Tunis: to contact the permanent members of the Security Council and to discuss

with them what action should be taken to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Naturally, however, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon cannot be separated from the siege of Beirut, and the siege of Beirut cannot be separated basically from the Palestinian question.

It was during this period that the French role began to become evident, and the Egyptian people began to assume a positive role that took the form of demonstrations and protests. Then these demonstrations and protests stopped and the Egyptian government began playing a political role in this matter. However, there was a main difference between the Egyptian role and the Saudi role. The matter of priority for the Saudi role had to do with the Israeli occupation and the siege of West Beirut. The Saudis wanted to reach an agreement that was consistent with the wishes and requirements of the Palestinian Revolution to ensure the safety and dignity of the withdrawal process which the leadership of the Resistance would not have agreed to had it not been for the present inability of Arabs to deal with this rare opportunity for opposing this attack on Lebanon. If the Arabs had been able to oppose that attack, they would have been able to trap the Israeli army and to turn this war into the best and the least expensive war they had fought. The Saudis also wanted to preserve the safety and dignity of Lebanese and Palestinian citizens living in West Beirut in a manner that would be consistent with the heroic, honorable and undefeated steadfastness of the Palestinian and the Lebanese people in combat. Neither Israeli forces nor other forces were to enter West Beirut so that what happened in Sidon, Tyre, al-Damur and al-Nabatiyyah would not happen in West Beirut. And while the Saudis considered this a priority matter, they did not forget in coordinating with Beirut to link all these matters with the future of the Palestinians. This is because the Palestinian withdrawal from Beirut had to end with a political decision that would be a positive one for Palestinians, a decision that would put them on track for achieving their national goals. The Palestinian withdrawal from Beirut was not to turn into another migration because if such matters were to continue, their continuation would bring about an eruption that would affect the entire area.

The matter of priority for the Egyptians was the political question. Ever since the beginning the Egyptians were convinced that it was imperative that the question of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut be linked with the step-by-step political solution to the Palestinian question. But the Egyptians could not ignore the siege of Beirut or the subject of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. It was this that brought about some kind of integration [in their position]. This was not enough, however, and it was necessary to link all these efforts with the European position. A European summit was convened, and decisions were made that were more advanced than any that had been made in the past. France adopted these decisions, and it was decided that Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani in Cairo would be charged with pursuing the matter. Thus, the French-Egyptian process of coordination produced the French-Egyptian plan that was presented to the Security Council. But it was evident from the beginning that the United States would veto that plan. It was within this framework of political and diplomatic action that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Europe, represented by France, took part. Britain played a positive but an unpublicized role. As a result of several factors that we will refer to later, the pro-Zionist media in the United States was trying to focus on two points:

First, what Palestinians say is not credible. They are scheming people, and what

they say cannot be counted on. Hence, one cannot negotiate with them and talk with them about the subject of Lebanon and Beirut.

Second, the Palestinians are a group of terrorists, and terrorism must be eliminated. It follows, therefore, that no one may talk with terrorists.

If we link all these factors together, it becomes evident that there is a possibility for action falling under conflicting goals. If such action succeeds, then the planned Zionist propaganda campaign in the United States will have been foiled. The failure of that plan would expose the U.S. administration which had always relied on the claim that its policy on the PLO was one that complied with U.S. public opinion which it cannot go against. If this public opinion is changed, the U.S. administration will not be able to use this as an excuse for its conduct. Consequently, U.S. pressures would become more effective, and the U.S. administration, if it actually wants to, would be able to prove its good intentions and change its position or at least part of its tactics. For the United States a strategic change is absolutely not imminent in this regard. But pressure can be kept up, and changes can be made to save Lebanon and to protect the gains of the heroic struggle of the Palestinian Resistance, which should be prevented from making new and useless sacrifices in the wake of the Arabs' fatal inability to act. Palestinians have established their ability to stand up to the enemy with honor; and the Arabs have established the fact that they have liberated themselves from the illogical considerations of their regimes, and they turned from impotent people to heroes. The capability of Arabs to give [a cause its due] once they are liberated from their executioners and once they have a leadership that is willing to fight has been established.

[Question] Now we come to another important part of this interview: your visit to the United States. Your visit was the subject of much discussion wherein conflicting remarks were made. There was an "official" denial of your presence in Washington, and there was talk about the fact that this visit had failed because it had not achieved its minimal objectives. It was said that the talks you had with U.S. officials were aborted for a variety of factors. So far you have been silent about everything that has been said. We are asking you what did you do in Washington, and what concrete results did your visit produce? Did your visit involve some sort of dialogue in any form between Palestinians and Americans?

[Answer] First of all, this was not a personal visit. The visit took place as a result of an Arab League meeting that was held in al-Ta'if. I was a member of an Arab League delegation which consisted of Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal and 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam. But the U.S. administration refused to receive the delegation with me as a member. Consequently, I traveled as an adviser to that delegation. There was no intention, at least at this stage, to abort the delegation's visit; rather, its success was required. Accordingly, the priority here was not in what capacity I was to be received as much as it lay with what we were to do. Accordingly, my public presence beside the delegation amounted to the fact that Palestinian political ideas were being proposed in Washington. I believe that this was carried out well.

Regarding what has been written about this visit, I regret to say that what Arab journalists wrote [about this matter] was essentially incorrect. Many of the references they made to matters of form and procedure were incorrect, and all of them were mistaken on the political substance of the visit. Not only did they

make a mistake concerning the Palestinian position, but also concerning me personally. But this is not the time for blame; matters will soon become clear, and everything will emerge in its true light.

I do not at all regard the visit as a failure. The visit was successful, but it could have been more successful had it not been for some inadvertent errors which were referred to in the articles that were written about the visit. These errors were particularly in the media and pertained to the scope, not the level, of the meetings that had to take place. When I arrived in Washington, I was faced with a vitriolic Zionist campaign that was intended to raise this legal question: "How can we have a terrorist in the United States?" Accordingly, the matter [of my visit] would be shifted from a political domain to a legal one, and the Department of Justice would be forced to intervene and to look into the legality of my presence or my absence. Then there would be an attempt to get me out of Washington because I was a "terrorist." This campaign did not succeed for several reasons. Among those reasons was the conduct that was used. Another reason was the fact that I followed the advice of numerous friends, Arab and Palestinian brothers and even some Americans, and I kept a low profile in the media. Therefore, we made the Zionist position in the United States miss this opportunity. We must say, however, that this commotion created obstacles which prevented us from holding some meetings that should have taken place. Although this is not basic to the matter, Dr Nabil Sha'at is doing in the area of communications what the circumstances I referred to prevented me from doing.

[Question] If we were to set aside the negative factors that accompanied your visit to Washington, and if we were to focus on the positive aspects of the visit, can we talk about a new American view or a new American "understanding" of the Palestinian position?

[Answer] Without being too optimistic, I can say that there is a change in priorities in the United States. It is known that when Alexander Haig became secretary of state, he defined the priorities of U.S. policy and made U.S. opposition to the Soviet threat the number one priority. Now I can say that the State Department under the new secretary of state has rearranged those priorities: the Middle East problem has become the number one issue in U.S. foreign policy, and the Palestinian question is the first item in the question of the Middle East.

But we must be fair here and say that this was not so much an American choice as it was a situation that forced this change on the United States. Why is that? Among those matters that have become [established] facts, which Israel's defense minister Ariel Sharon threatened he would publicize, is that the invasion of Lebanon had been carried out according to a U.S.-Israeli agreement that even included the details of the invasion between Haig and Sharon. It is true that Sharon exceeded the boundaries of the agreement he had with the Labor party in Israel and with the United States when he went as far as Beirut and surrounded that city, but this invasion could not have taken place and these excesses could not have occurred without there being "a full agreement" between the United States and Israel about the invasion of Lebanon.

The basic elements of this invasion from the common U.S. and Israeli point of view are as follows:

First, the elimination of the Palestinian Resistance.



Second, the restoration of stability to Lebanon by means of "having a friend," Bashir al-Jumayyil, in the position of the president. These two objectives were linked with the timing process. According to the plan that had been drawn up, the operation was to have been completed in a minimum of 72 hours and a maximum of 1 week. Beirut was not part of this agreement.

When the Israeli attack began with 65,000 soldiers, it was met with an opposition that neither the Americans nor the Israelis had anticipated. The Israelis suffered losses which they had not anticipated either. The success of the Resistance in inflicting losses [upon the Israeli army] created a state of confusion in the ranks of that army's supply line, in the transportation of casualties and in the timely effectiveness of the attack. The reason for that was simple: the Israelis were fighting with the mentality of a conventional army, and they were confronting children and old men as well as a group of young men who were using guerilla tactics in their fight and doing so with superior heroism. As a result, Israeli forces were reinforced with more troops, and the number of these troops came to 125,000 Israeli soldiers and officers. This invasion did not end within the period that had been set for it. Hence, reactions from all over the world began to emerge and to grow.

The second point is that this invasion took place in Lebanon. Had it taken place in Syria or in Jordan, the uproar throughout the world would have been much less. It cannot be said that Lebanon was a leftist or a communist country. Lebanon is perceived in Europe and throughout the world as a western oasis in the Arab world. It was for this reason that the invasion of Lebanon had this major effect in arousing public opinion. We also discovered that the Lebanese are highly organized in the United States. [In fact], we can talk about the existence of a strong "Lebanese lobby" that is made up of all Lebanese factions: the Phalangists, the group [that is affiliated with] Brig Gen Raymond Iddih and other groups. There is a strong and a conspicuous Lebanese lobby.

The fact that a long period of time has elapsed since Israel's invasion of Lebanon has helped awaken world public opinion to what is taking place. In addition, there were other positive factors that confronted the picture all the way. These are:

1. The joint steadfastness of the Palestinians and the Lebanese in battle against this Israeli war machinery that included the air force, the navy and land troops was unexpected. According to a U.S. official, the fighting was so fierce that it caused obvious losses in the ranks of the Israeli forces. This official estimated those losses in the first 3 weeks of the invasion to be 45 percent of what Israel's losses were in the October 1973 war on both the Egyptian and the Syrian fronts.

2. With their staunchness, their tenacity and their steadfastness Palestinian and Lebanese fighters commanded admiration and awakened the conscience of neutral people who were not committed to the Zionist position. These circles were shaken, at least out of fear for the Israeli army.

The third point here has to do with Lebanese and Palestinian unity. There was no split between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, and there was no military or political split among the Palestinians. There were also no disagreements over positions among Palestinians in Lebanon and abroad. Everyone obeyed the command



[in Lebanon], and this was normal. It indicates that in times of crises the body of the Resistance can take action through one, effective leadership behind which stand the people of Palestine in the occupied land, on the battleground in Lebanon and in the remaining parts of the world.

The fourth point in this context is the fact that this war took place under conditions of absolute inequality of power between the Israeli side and the Palestinian-Lebanese side. The results that ensued that were in favor of the Lebanese and the Palestinians. Amidst all these factors and in this context Abu 'Ammar demonstrated a clear political ability. He was able to appear unshaken and smiling in every picture that was shown of him. Accordingly, he emerged with political positions that may be described as flexible and intelligent so that in the eyes of the world, and especially the United States which is fond of power and efficiency, the Palestinian command was no longer a united military command, but it had rather become a united and strong political and military command. All this commanded the respect of U.S. public opinion, of the shapers and movers of public opinion [in general] and of politicians and military men in the world as a whole.

Then comes a significant political point; it is a point that thrust itself on U.S. thinking: Lebanon's political problem had to be tied to the Palestinian problem. This point revolves around the following: if the matter were only that of the Palestinians' departure from Lebanon, and if the matter were to end there, what would be the conduct of the Palestinians after that? The situation made it evident that in this case the world would be placing the Palestinian people on the brink of despair and the world would then see the other side of the Palestinians: the Palestinians who know no mercy and who would resume the struggle underground. Sixty percent of their efforts would be directed against the Arab world and Arab regimes that did not stand by them, and 40 percent of their efforts would be directed against the Zionist enemy and western interests and peace in the area. Furthermore, if such non-caring conduct were to occur in the international community and in the United States in particular, a political vacuum would be created in the area. And in the material world there can be no vacuum. That vacuum would have to be filled, and it would be filled by the violence of the Palestinian struggle and by an underground Palestinian war. It would also be filled by all the underground movements that reject Arab impotence and reject the international policies regarding the Palestinian question. These movements would join forces particularly since the area is rapidly approaching [what is tantamount to] radical cultural changes. The area is returning to its roots and rejecting what has been forced on it during the periods of colonialism. It is also rejecting all vestiges of the past.

[Question] Amidst all these changes that have taken place and all those that are expected to take place, where does the Palestinian question stand now? Has the Palestinian Resistance gone backwards? Has it been destined to start a new phase of its struggle in a new manner, as it is being asked today to resume political action?

[Answer] The answer must be divided among the active political scenes that have to do with the Palestinian question.

First, on the American scene. It was the reasons which I referred to that forced the reordering of priorities, placed the question of the Middle East first among

those priorities, and placed the Palestinian question as the first item of this priority.

Consequently, the United States can no longer separate what is happening in Lebanon from the future of the Palestinians, no matter how the United States handles this matter. We must not trust U.S. policy. The war in Lebanon proved that if we do not force something on the scene, we will not get anything.

As far as the camp of the immediate enemy is concerned, which is Zionism, we notice that for the first time there are vertical divisions in the makeup of Israel. The Peace Now Movement has been able to organize a demonstration against the war, and more than 100,000 persons took part in that demonstration. In addition, a large number of soldiers and officers have submitted petitions protesting the war. A large number of soldiers fled from the battle during the war or suffered nervous breakdowns because of it. Some people have resigned because of this war, and some people declined to volunteer to fight. Jail sentences were issued against those who declined to fight because of their refusal. Some Israeli senior officers and wounded soldiers have related accounts about the heroism of Palestinian fighters and young Palestinians, and they have shown their clear resentment of the orders that were issued to them during the invasion. All these things are happening in Israel for the first time.

Jewish communities in Europe and the United States have clearly rejected this war and condemned Menahem Begin's policy--even though they are still devoted to Israel. We can therefore say that the division has affected the World Zionist Movement inside Israel and abroad. This division was such that it led Nahum Goldman, Mendes France and Klutznick to declare the well-known tripartite statement. All these actions converge on the opinion which states that it is necessary to come to an understanding with the Palestinians and to comply with their national demands. Even Shimon Perez, who supports the Israeli war in Lebanon, emphasized that it is necessary to solve the Palestinian question. Otherwise, there will be no peace in the area.

On the European scene there is no doubt that Europe is affected most by the unrest in the Middle East. Accordingly, the position of European countries was more progressive than previous positions. France assumed a leadership role, and Britain's public position changed quite clearly. Unfortunately, the German position, because of the domestic situation and because of U.S. influence on Germany, regressed considerably. However, for the rest of Europe the changes in attitudes were much better than what had been expected. Japan assumed a position that would appease both sides. It issued threats to appease the Arabs, but it did not carry out those threats so as not to provoke the anger of the United States and Israel. However, Japan did abandon its silence for the first time, and it issued threats. For the first time Japan suggested that it would grant the PLO full recognition. Until now, however, it has not done that. But this is the mentality of the Japanese: a commercial mentality that bargains and does not give anything unless it finds itself compelled to do so. I wish the Arabs can understand the capitalist and western mentality and deal with it on that basis.

The Arab masses are enraged by Arab impotence. Consequently, Arab regimes are being forced to link the matter of Lebanon with the political question of Palestine.

All these factors tend to make the outcome of the war in Lebanon, despite the high and exorbitant price that has been paid and the astonishing number of lives that have been lost, a primary political victory for Palestinians that will lead them to a political victory in the future. However, like any other event, this victory may fade or erode if we do not use the situation well. The danger here comes from two sides: from inside and from outside. The outside danger lies in our inability to continue mobilizing foreign forces so we can utilize this political advancement in world public opinion in favor of the Palestinians. Accordingly, if we stop mobilizing these forces, the progress that has been made will be quietly set back.

Second, Arab impotence may force some Arab countries to attempt to take the PLO under their wing and to assume control over a number of leftist Palestinian organizations that were not able to act freely anywhere but in Lebanon and under the protection of the PLO. What I fear most is that these organizations may prefer their own interests to those of the cause and fall into the trap of being taken under the wing of any Arab country. It would be here that Arab-made Palestinian problems would begin. If this happens, it would destroy the political factor in the Palestinian question. I hope, I appeal and I beg every Palestinian who is in a position of leadership to place the unity of the Palestinian position, the independence of the Palestinian decision and the utilization of Palestinian gains produced by the heroism of Palestinian and Lebanese fighters in Lebanon in a primary position and to place the public interest above the interests of a commander or an organization regardless of who that commander is and what that organization is.

[Question] What about the dream of a Palestinian state? Has that become a mirage and has the idea of establishing a Palestinian state or homeland faded?

[Answer] To wrap up everything I referred to in this interview, if my understanding of these matters is accurate--and I hope it is--I believe that the door that would lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is about to be opened. This does not mean, of course, that the process is going to be simple and easy or that it will take place tomorrow. All indications, however, point in that direction. This requires that the unified Palestinian struggle be sustained. It requires that diplomatic and media action continue so that everything that has taken place at this stage can be put to good use. This requires that any intervention by Arabs or any attempt on their part to keep the Palestinian question under their control be rejected. All statements claiming that the Palestinians have no right to make decisions because the question is a national question are to be rejected. Those who wish to speak about nationalism have to practice it first, for a person cannot be a nationalist and a non-nationalist at the same time. Accordingly, Palestinians who want to be more nationalistic than others, have to become nationalists themselves. Using the question of [Arab] nationalism to gain control over the Palestinian question is something that we reject, and we do so absolutely.

If the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can [sustain] its current course of political action and intensify its effort and investment, since the problem requires greater potential than has been previously utilized in the kingdom, and if Egypt maintains its position of suspending the autonomy talks and insisting on self-determination [for the Palestinians], on the

establishment of a Palestinian state and on the fact that no one can talk on behalf of the Palestinians, we will have been able to unite the Arab rank at least on everything that has to do with the Palestinian aspect of the question. I believe that optimism has to give way to pessimism. This optimism, however, has been slow in coming because it is our destiny that our course be comparable to that of one who is using his nails to dig through rocks.

[Question] You were among the first people to warn against the effect that the failure of the Fes summit meeting would have. Today there is new hope that the Fes summit may be resumed. Do you see a glimmer of hope in the Arab summit meeting that is supposed to be held soon? Will a new Fes summit be an alternative that will remove the effects of the previous Arab failure?

[Answer] To me the failure of the Fes summit was not a Palestinian failure. My understanding of the failure at Fes is that the leaders of the Arab nation have lost the legitimate justification for their existence and their action. Those who cannot make decisions, no matter what those decisions are, lose the justification for their leadership because leadership means making decisions. The time has come for Arabs to stop equivocating. They must stop showing themselves to the world with more than one face. Hence, if Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal succeeds in his efforts with some Arab countries that have the power to disrupt or not disrupt the Fes Conference--in the sense that these efforts would lay the basic foundations for an investigation, and I am not saying a decision, in the hope that some decision may be reached--then Fes will become a new point of departure. But if the tragedy of Fes is repeated, it will actually be a re-confirmation of the fact that Arab leaders collectively have lost their legitimacy. Accordingly, I appeal to all those who are interested in the future of this nation to work for a new legitimate leadership.

[Question] Some analyses--and there are many of these analyses these days--conclude that everything which has happened and is happening in Lebanon will lead to a curious contradiction. These analyses conclude that the events will spell the beginning of the end in some way for Israel. Unfortunately, they will signal a turning point for Lebanon as we know it. But there will be a new beginning for the Palestinians. Do you agree with such analysis and how would you comment on it?

[Answer] I do not think that what happened in Lebanon is the beginning of the end for the Palestinians or for the Lebanese. It seems to me that what happened in Lebanon is the real beginning of an uphill Palestinian revolutionary struggle, which is closely united with the Arab masses as never before. It is our duty now to step back and maintain some distance between us and Arab regimes so we can regain the affection of the Arab masses in an organized manner and not in an arbitrary manner. And here I would like to refer to the advice that was given to some leaders of the Resistance, and Yasir 'Arafat was among them, by al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwait's minister of foreign affairs. Al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad said, "Your power among the Arabs does not lie in your guns, but rather in the affection the Arab masses have for you. Your power lies in the fact that the masses rally around you, and this prevents anyone from taking any action against you."

What happened in Lebanon has provided a wide open opportunity for action in this area. It has shown the greatness of the Palestinian and Lebanese people, and

it follows from that, the greatness of Arabs when they are liberated from their executioners, when they can exercise their will to fight and when they have their intellectual freedom. What the Arabs have done has astounded the world. Furthermore, the propensity of Arabs to give [their cause its due] is evident in a material and convincing way which had not been evident heretofore. It needs no philosophy and no theories.

The ability of the Palestinian leadership at this stage to insist on its independence has never been stronger than it is now. In view of what we've seen as their inability to act, no Arab regime has the right, the ability or the justification to outmaneuver the Palestinian position either from a short distance or from afar. To those who called upon the Palestinian Revolution to commit suicide so that the Palestinians would become martyrs and thereby become a dynamic and a revolutionary force for future generations, we say that our slogan is "Our revolution is a revolution that will go on till victory; it is not a revolution that will end in suicide." No one kept them from fighting with us and practicing their theories of struggle on our battlefield.

As far as the Lebanese situation is concerned, the problem of the Lebanese people is a complicated problem because of their actions. The time has come for the Lebanese people to have a sense of their nation and to put that sense into action to confront the problems of Lebanon. What I am referring to here is not whether or not Lebanon is affiliated with the Arab world. What I am saying here is that the Lebanese people have to put an end to their subordination to Arab and non-Arab embassies. Lebanese writers have to put an end to their subordination to Arab and non-Arab embassies. Educational curricula in Lebanon are no longer to be subject to the courses of the western cultural invasion which is contrary to the nature of Lebanon and its Arab, historical cultural heritage. Whether it wants to or not Lebanon is a geographical part of the area. Lebanon cannot move and go to Monte Carlo or any other country. Its location and its history are part and parcel of the Arab world; its future also lies with the future of the Arab world. When the Lebanese people accept that, there will be no longer any reason for disagreement in their midst except about the means that would lead to the preservation of Lebanon's unity and its ability to contribute to its heritage which is part and parcel of the area's history. Lebanon's actions are part and parcel of its future. The Lebanese people who fought against the Zionist enemy, whether they fought on this side or the other, deserve to live a life of honor and prosperity.

The tragedy for the people of Lebanon must be that of regenerating [Lebanon], not eliminating it. Consequently, if Lebanon is destined to pay the price that it has paid for mistakes that everyone made, Lebanon, with the dynamic quality of the Lebanese people, will be able to rebuild itself and become a model for the Arab world. (In Lebanon one must look for innocent parties, not for those who made mistakes because everyone made mistakes, and those who didn't are rare.) The Lebanese people will rebuild Lebanon this time in a manner that is more progressive than the manner of the past. Lebanon will not be the playground for the Arab world, and it will not provide a chaotic freedom for Arab writers. Lebanon will be committed to freedom and independence so it can become an example to be followed by the Arab world which is committed to the process of forging the Arab future by continuing to make contemporary Arab history. But in the other Arab world, however, and I say this with all its implications, Arab regimes will have to reconsider themselves and their material world. They will have to

understand that it is not altogether unlikely that what happened in Lebanon will not happen to them. I am not only referring to a Zionist and a foreign threat. I am referring to the intellectual and cultural interactions that have begun acting on Arabs in view of their anguish over the inability of Arab regimes to act. This was caused by the fragmentation and disunity of those regimes in facing up to what happened in Lebanon. Consequently, these Arab regimes are standing at a crossroads.

But for the Palestinian Revolution and Lebanon, the road is wide open and the progress forward is increasing.

[Question] You are a Palestinian fighter who is now leaving Beirut. What do you have to say about that?

[Answer] With the simplicity and spontaneity of an ordinary person I would say, "Thank you," to the Lebanese citizen who endured with us what he endured, who fought along with us and whose devotion to the crisis was like ours. I would tell him that Israel did not come to Lebanon to rescue anyone, but that it came to Lebanon to turn Lebanon into a satellite state; to subordinate it; to take south Lebanon and the waters of Lebanon; and to control Lebanon's parliament, democracy, presidency and army. I would tell the Lebanese citizen in general, including the Phalangists, that when this Lebanese Phalangist citizen discovers that the Israeli invasion was more dangerous to him than it was to us and when he wishes to take up arms to fight against the Israeli occupation, he will find us by his side with our weapons, ready to fight along with him in order to bring about Israel's departure from Lebanon. We promise him in advance that we would leave Lebanon after the Israelis depart from it.

I emphasize that in doing so we would be first doing our duty to Lebanon to show our gratitude to all those who stood by our side and fought against the Zionist enemy in Lebanon. It would also be a demonstration of the fact that Palestinians are now able to tolerate the Arabs, including those who wronged us in Lebanon, with their errors and sins. This tolerance will wipe out these mistakes and sins through forgiveness; it will purge the soul and open prospects for cooperation on every level and in every area. Those who fought and are fighting for the preservation of the dignity and honor of Lebanon and of the Arab nation cannot harbor resentment toward anyone. Forgiveness, affection and cooperation are the foundations upon which [Palestinians] deal with [other Arabs]. It would be inconceivable for me to fight and to die for your sake and then to resent you. This is what our religions and our cultures taught us, and this is the way for building our future, and the future of Lebanon is part of that future.

8592

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SRI LANKANS SOLD AS SLAVES BY PLO IN LEBANON

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Aug 82 p 6

[Article by Meir Hareuveni: "The IDF Tries To Solve the Problem of Sri Lankans Who Were Slaves in Lebanon; Recruited in Sri Lanka by the PLO, They Refused to Join Terrorists and Were Sold As Slaves"]

[Text] The IDF has contacted international welfare organizations to help Sri Lankan citizens who worked as slaves to return to their country.

The Asian workers had been recruited by a PLO officer from Sidon, who headed an agency for procuring cheap labor for rich southern Lebanese merchants. At this time, they are caught in a trap: according to the contract they have signed, their employers hold their passports until their term of employment is up (usually 5 years). Hundreds of such workers have been stuck since the war without sustenance, many without a roof over their heads. Called "slaves" by the Lebanese, they do not have passports or money to return to their country.

A group of Sri Lankans recently contacted the IDF in Sidon with a request for help in returning to their homeland. One of them, Fera Abas, age 27, who had turned the PLO officer who had brought him to Lebanon over to the IDF (identified as Samir Haydari), told reporters about the slave conditions under which he lived in Lebanon:

Hundreds of unemployed Sri Lankans were brought to Lebanon by a PLO officer; they hoped to save enough money to return to their country and live comfortably. On arriving in Lebanon, they were pressured to join the PLO. Those who refused were turned over to employers, who made them do hard, humiliating jobs up to 16 hours a day. To prevent them from escaping, the employers took away their passports and only paid them one-fourth of the promised salary (\$75 instead of \$300 per month). They were told the money was kept for them in a bank so that they shouldn't spend it. Abas's wife, Indira, age 27, was employed at a hospital in Sidon along with other Sri Lankans doing hard labor from 4 am until 11 pm. Another Sri Lankan woman worked for a dentist in Sidon under slave conditions. Her employer kept beating her and did not pay her salary for months. He even threatened to take away her food if she did not perform the difficult tasks assigned to her.

IDF officers have so far been able to locate several passports of Sri Lankans who worked in Sidon, but the most difficult problem preventing the Sri Lankans from returning home is the lack of money for a return flight.

9565

CSO: 4423/210



ISRAELIS ANALYZE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PALESTINIAN CAMP

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 20 Aug 82 Weekend Supplement pp 1, 25

[Interview with Lt Col Tzvi Lanir (Ret), Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies, by Eytan Haber, date and place not specified]

[Text] All rivers flow to the sea and all the roads in recent months have led to Beirut. Lebanese names have become part of our reality: Galerie Sema'an, Burj al-Baranjinah, B'abda, Jumayyil, Sarkis, Phalangists. Only a few, it turns out, have turned off the road leading to Beirut.

One of them was Dr Tzvi Lanir, a retired lieutenant colonel who had served with IDF intelligence and the Foreign Ministry's political center. During the war he did reserve duty with the IDF public relations unit. With a colleague, Lanir has been conducting a study of the Rashidiyah refugee camp.

[Question] Dr Lanir, let us start at the end. What do you think the reader ought to conclude from what you have found out?

[Answer] That many of the stereotypes you and I and the rest of us in Israel have been taught all these years regarding the Palestinians are inaccurate.

[Question] How did you arrive at this conclusion?

[Answer] A friend of mine, also an IDF officer, and I spent 2 weeks in the Rashidiyah refugee camp near Tyre and together we have conducted a sociological study of the history of the camp since the first wave of refugees arrived in 1948. We chose to interview the simple folk, not the politicians. We spoke to school teachers, housewives, the UN director of the camp, who of course is also a member of the PLO, and Tova, the Jewish woman who has gotten a lot of publicity, whose husband is a member of Hashomer Hatza'ir as well as the PLO. We went over to neighboring Tyre and talked to the Shi'ites and Christians and the important families in the area, checked to see how Tyre looked from the vantage point of the camp and how the camp looked from the vantage point of Tyre, and finally, with permission of the IDF spokesman we investigated Rashidiyah residents who are in terrorist detention camps and completed the study with the testimony of soldiers who took the camp in this war, especially NAHAL soldiers.

[Question] Why Rashidiyah?



[Answer] Because the camp is in effect a microcosm of the whole Palestinian affair. Why? Because it has a large concentration of Palestinians. Two refugee camps, with a good background of what the PLO wanted to accomplish with the "Palestinian revolution." These camps are the closest ones to the Israeli border. They have been used as a base of operations by the PLO against Israel. Here, by the way, is where the famous cannon used against Nahariyah was placed.

[Question] Who came to Rashidiyah?

[Answer] The first refugee camp was established here in 1948. Most of the residents came from the Arab villages around Acre and Nahariyah. The UNRWA built homes for them here. When they arrived here in 1948 the area was barren. Some of the land, low in value, belongs to rich southern Lebanese families. Those families were interested in the refugees because they provided cheap labor. Over the last 30 years, the Palestinians have turned southern Lebanon into a blossoming area, similar to the western Galilee along the coast. The same banana plantations, orange groves. They have replicated the western Galilee around Tyre.

[Question] Why did the Palestinians need the rich Lebanese?

[Answer] The Lebanese landowners gave them two things, without which it would have not been possible to exist in Lebanon--leadership and protection. Real protection. The Lebanese Government prevented the Palestinians from forming any leadership of their own, thus creating good conditions for such local families around Tyre as the Khalils.

#### Getting Rich

[Question] How could one family provide protection to a large refugee camp?

[Answer] Every important family has its own private army, especially for self-protection. This army also protected the Palestinians. It was a good arrangement all around. The fact is, they have good memories about that period. Both parties benefited from the arrangement.

[Question] And so they continued to live under the rich Lebanese?

[Answer] Yes, but something important happened. The Palestinians were industrious and they began to make money. After a relatively short period they became wealthier than most of their Shi'ite neighbors. How did it happen? Besides the fact that they worked hard, they also made money from the food rations they received from the UNRWA. Those rations were large compared with the food obtained by the local Shi'ites, who did not have enough food.

[Question] And so they could get rich from those rations?

[Answer] Yes, among other things. The Palestinians had other privileges the local people did not have. For instance, hospitals. There are no public hospitals in Lebanon, only private. The Palestinians were able to establish good hospitals. Although they received free health care, the local people had to pay a fortune. Also the schools in southern Lebanon are inferior,

whereas UNRWA established reasonably good schools for the Palestinians. Many of the graduates were able to obtain scholarships and study abroad. In short, good social conditions created a new social class that has made the local population envious and continues to upset it.

[Question] And this is how life went on at the camp?

[Answer] No. The 15,000 residents of the camp caught on quickly and stopped working. Not all, but many. Why? Because they had accumulated surplus food from their UNRWA rations. The food came from Europe and was better than the local food. They did not report changes in their families. If someone died the death was not reported and the extra rations became a source of income.

[Question] And the UNRWA people did not interfere?

[Answer] Later on they did. Those refugees who arrived in later years did not get the same benefits. A food card dating back to 1948 is worth a lot more; it actually has economic value. Be that as it may, as a result of the prosperity the camp ceased to be a refugee camp. It no longer looked like a refugee camp but started to resemble a prosperous Arab village in the Galilee. People began to feel a sense of belonging. They felt they had a future, life made sense. As a result of selling their food surplus, they began to make inroads in Tyre, and some bought stores on the main street. Some of those stores have now been destroyed, not by the IDF. I will tell you later.

[Question] What did the terrorist organizations do in Rashidiyah?

[Answer] Until 1970 they were hardly allowed inside the camp. They were kept out by the Lebanese authorities, and the local residents had no interest in them either. They were economically well off and they knew they stood to lose by letting them in.

Poor and Rich

[Question] What changed and when?

[Answer] In September 1970, (Black September of the terrorist organizations in Jordan), after the massacre in Jordan, thousands of Palestinian refugees came to Lebanon, by way of Syria. At first, the old refugees did not want to allow them to settle in the camp and great tension was created between the "monied nobility" and "sword nobility," the '48 people and the '70 people.

[Question] Why "sword nobility?"

[Answer] Because those who came from Jordan were armed. They argued that the '48 people had no national conscience. At first they settled in the orange groves outside the camp, and then they began to settle in the camp. They had the weight of numbers. There were quite a few of them. Gradually they took control of the UNRWA institutions and the UNRWA workers began to work for them. They got rid of the camp commander, who had been appointed by the Lebanese, threw out the police and took control of the camp, despite the wishes of the old residents, the local Shi'ites, the rich Lebanese land-owners and the Lebanese Government.

[Question] How did they settle in the camp?

[Answer] The oldtimers did not let them in, so at first they built their own camp on the seashore. It is called the new camp. You can still see the old, upper camp and the new one. Unlike the camps in the Gaza Strip, for example, here the camps are better built and cleaner. Within 3 years, everything changed. The residents of the new camp who came in 1970 became richer than those of the old camp, whose economic condition did not deteriorate, but compared to their new neighbors they were now poor. The "sword nobility" won against the "monied nobility."

[Question] How?

[Answer] For example, a Palestinian farmer in southern Lebanon makes 50 Lebanese lira per day and works an average of 20 days per month. The sons also work, and so a Palestinian family can earn up to 3,000 lira during a season. In agriculture there are "dead months," when one does not earn anything. As soon as the 1970 refugees came here they began to pay well.

[Question] How much?

[Answer] A head of family received approximately 1,000 lira per month, depending on the organization. Women received 650 lira per month as a Palestinian mother, and each child born as a Palestinian received 25 lira at birth and the rate went up as he grew up. At age 16, as a member of Ashbal (PLO youth organization), he could make 650 lira. In other words, without even working and by receiving the UNRWA food rations, one could make more from the "Palestinian revolution" than from farming. Moreover, since they had also taken control of the UNRWA institutions and other aid agencies, they began to favor their own people. PLO members got a great deal more than others.

[Question] This is how they got rich?

[Answer] The ones who really got rich were those whose homes had been hit by the IDF from air, sea or land. A local compensation committee studies the damage and gives high compensation. The more one was involved in the PLO the more he received.

[Question] What about those in the upper camp who did not want to join the PLO and tried to support themselves as farmers?

[Answer] They had a problem. It was getting harder and harder to make a living. Why? Because the Palestinian terrorists would enter the orchards in the area and set up their bases of operations there. The orchard owners began to neglect the trees and the fruit, the Israeli Air Force would raid the orchards and it became dangerous to go there. They were caught between the air force and the terrorists and found it difficult to go to work. Each organization, and there were at least nine, would set up its own barriers on the roads. They made life miserable. It became impossible to live, let alone work, if you did not join the PLO. Life became even worse when we began our bombing. It became impossible at that point not to belong to one of the organizations.

## The RPG Children

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because the only way to survive at the camp was to have a bomb shelter. The bombings were severe. Now, the organizations came along and offered to build a bomb shelter for free. A shelter is very costly, and building one meant expanding the house as well. A shelter became a life and death necessity, as well as a way to live better. When we came in we found out that next to each home in the upper camp there was a shelter. Those shelters were relatively better than the ones in, say, an Israeli kibbutz in northern Israel.

[Question] And so, in time, all the families in the camp joined the PLO?

[Answer] Correct. In the lower camp, the 1970 refugee camp, there were also bunkers and ammunition dumps. But this is not all. In effect, the Palestinian organizations began to take charge of all social functions in the camp. They provided employment for the young. They built sport clubs with the latest sporting equipment in the world. For young women they organized sewing groups, folk dance classes, first aid. Each terrorist organization had its own youth organization designed, of course, to recruit members. The boys were trained with weapons...

[Question] This is how the "RPG kids" were born?

[Answer] The "RPG kids" is a myth invented by the media. There is no such thing. What did happen is that they took 10-, 12-, and 14-year old children and taught them how to use arms. Not military training. Not individual training or unit training. They dressed them in a uniform, gave them weapons and made them feel proud. Their main activity was parades. Yasir 'Arafat and others used to come here. They would gather the residents on both sides of the street and the children, with banners and emblems and loud slogans, would march by and salute the leaders.

[Question] Were those children local?

[Answer] The more established families were afraid to let their children join at such a young age. Many of the joiners were what you might call marginal youth, mostly orphans from Husayn's massacre in 1970. For those children, this pretend militarism was an outlet. It prevented them from becoming criminals. But I must reiterate that all the youth, or nearly everyone, belonged to the sports organization of the PLO, or to Ashbal, a paramilitary youth organization.

[Question] Nevertheless, those RPG kids who according to you do not exist did fire on IDF soldiers and hit some of them?

[Answer] Very few. The whole thing only lasted a minute. They fired once, threw down their weapon and ran away. You should bear in mind that a 12-year-old is not afraid.

[Question] What were those youngsters taught at the camp?

[Answer] Two things mainly: First, return to the Land of Israel. The adults in the old camp, by the way, no longer thought in those terms. Many of them have accepted the fact that they are not going back to Israel. At the most, they wanted to go back to visit their relatives. They had already established themselves in Lebanon.

[Question] And the second thing?

[Answer] Perhaps not as important as the first. They did their best to portray the Israelis as demons or monsters. They described the Palestinian revolution as a liberating terror, the only way to deal with Israel's repressive policy. Each raid by the air force corroborated their theory. I hasten to add that their first encounter with IDF soldiers in this last war was a liberating experience for them, especially the adults. They were surprised by the personal, humane attitude.

Huge Mass

[Question] From your description, it seems that it was definitely beneficial to be a member of one of the PLO organizations.

[Answer] Exactly. From their standpoint, the PLO did good things. It sent their children to study abroad, in the best universities. It provided good health services and several of the organizations, such as the PFLP (Habash), organized some kind of a labor union. They did not allow the rich landowner to exploit the workers. But who worked? The NAHAL soldiers who entered the camp were surprised to find no work tools, no farming tools, nothing. They did not find new American refrigerators, stereo sets and a television antenna on every roof.

[Question] As well as a great many weapons.

[Answer] Only in recent years, since the Litani operation. After that operation, the PLO decided, contrary to all theories, to conduct its war of liberation in its own bases, and not, as is taught, in the land to be liberated. To this end, it began last year a tremendous arms buildup.

[Question] How did the PLO reach such a decision?

[Answer] Because they had concluded that each time the IDF attacks them it uses greater power--a platoon, a regiment, a brigade, air force, navy. They decided that even if they did not win militarily, they could emerge each time stronger politically and in terms of propaganda.

[Question] Why was the Litani operation a turning point?

[Answer] Because from their standpoint the IDF failed in its main mission in the Litani operation, namely, to uproot the terrorists from their bases. They maintain that the IDF used a huge mass and only killed a few terrorists. They say that the more force the IDF uses the greater their victory. They have names for it....

[Question] For our wars against them?

[Answer] It is interesting to note what they call their wars. It's the thinking of a nation. The Karamah operation they call the One-Day War. The big operation of the IDF against them in 1972 in Fatahland they call the Four-Day War. The Litani operation they call the Eight-Day War. To them it means that they held out against the IDF for 8 days, hence a huge victory. Why? Because all of the Arab states were only able to resist the IDF for 6 days in 1967. The war of attrition in the north a year ago they call the Two-Week War. They maintain, rightly so, that it was the first phase of the all-out attack.

[Question] Why did they have to establish a regular army if they wanted to go on fighting guerrilla warfare?

[Answer] Their financial power, and the fact that they controlled large parts of southern Lebanon, prompted them to organize as a regular army they also established the military concept of fighting the IDF from their guerrilla bases in Lebanon. They believed they could cause operational problems for the IDF. But they knew they could not resist it. Yasir 'Arafat said in a press conference before the war that he needed to stall the IDF for 10 days to inflict heavy losses on the Israelis and cause them to become bogged down so that they could not achieve all their operational objectives. 'Arafat said that within a few days the international community would start putting tremendous pressure on Israel, and although the war might be a military success, it would turn into a total Israeli defeat.

[Question] But isn't it hard to beat the IDF with Kalashnikovs?

[Answer] True, but with thousands of Kalashnikovs one can turn the refugee camps into hornet nests. Anyone who tries to enter would be greeted with fire from every house, door, window, dugout. There would be a fight for every inch of land.

#### Monstrous Image

[Question] And so they fought well....

[Answer] Not so. 'Arafat suffered a first-rate strategic defeat. The operation against the PLO did not succeed in creating even one operational problem for the IDF. Most serious from 'Arafat's standpoint was the fact that the Palestinians did not take part in their own war of liberation. We make a mistake talking about the "awesome fighting" of the PLO. No such thing. According to my study at the Rashidiyah camp, we had 2 dead and 27 wounded and during the takeover only 7 wounded. We only found 12 bodies of PLO fighters carrying a Kalashnikov.

[Question] What happened to the rest?

[Answer] The adult Palestinians did not want to fight.

[Question] What do they think of us?

[Answer] I have told you that for years the PLO tried to portray us to their people as monsters. The NAHAL unit that took the camp set an example of good behavior. All the residents have said it. They are full of praise. They told me that during the occupation they tried to test the NAHAL soldiers. They had been sent to the seashore, and so they asked to be allowed to go back to camp for some blankets. In effect they wanted to go home to find out if anything had been stolen. They found that nothing was missing. They were deeply impressed.

[Question] Has anything changed?

[Answer] A great deal. The camp was not destroyed in battle, but each day when I went there I saw IDF demolition units blowing up houses. They started with the lower camp and went on to the upper. I asked them why they were doing it, and they told me they had been ordered to blow up every house that had a bunker. It turned out that to them every shelter was considered a bunker. I told them every house had a shelter.... Sure, there were bunkers with weapons. But there were also nonmilitary shelters, not used for fighting. And here they are blowing it all up. Imagine, even the house of that Jewish woman, Tova, was blown up. Another serious matter is the detainees from the camp.

[Question] Those who are kept in the prisoners' camp in Ansar?

[Answer] Yes. Most of them are not terrorists. They are local residents who were on the PLO payroll. The army is not willing to set them free because it is not a priority and the civilian authorities are not aware of the matter. So now, instead of the positive image of the NAHAL, we once again appear to them to be monsters.

The Palestinians are telling us, you have suffered and we have suffered and you are the only ones who understand us. You don't have to let us go back to our homes in Israel, but at least you have to protect us in Lebanon. We have already mentioned that without protection, leadership and arms one cannot exist in Lebanon. Now the State of Israel is arming all the other groups, the Phalangists, the Haddad people, leaving the Palestinians to their own devices. Even the members of the Khalil family have received weapons and uniforms from the IDF. This rich family, rather than the IDF, is the one who has destroyed the stores of the Palestinians on the main street of Tyre for plain selfish economic reasons. They say they want to put a public park in that place, and in the meantime foreign correspondents come by and think the IDF has done it. And what do the Palestinians say? You have destroyed our homes, you do not release our men, you have given weapons to all the others. What about us? Who will protect us? And now I read in the papers that Minister Meridor wants to remove them from here, farther away from the 25 mile zone. They have become settled here. This is their home, albeit destroyed. They say to me, if you don't take care of us, if you uproot us, if you let others massacre us, a new PLO will arise, much more terrible than the present one.

9565

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BACKGROUND OF RECENT OMANI-PDRY AGREEMENT ANALYZED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 128, 24-30 Jul 82 pp 29-30

[Text] The agreement concluded recently between the Sultanate of Oman and South Yemen ending the 12-year rift between them may be an important indicator of probable political developments in the Arabian Peninsula in coming years. Questions heard in political observers' circles center mainly on the repercussions of this development (that is, the Omani-PDRY agreement) on the future political balance in this region.

The dispute between the two countries, which both border on strategic straits (the Strait of Hormuz--Bab al-Mandab) was one of the unpublicized obstacles facing attempts by the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] to provide a form to preserve security and stability and lessen rivalry and fighting among the various powers of the region. These attempts were thwarted by strategic alliances by both countries (Oman-PDRY) on the international level and reciprocal doubts about the intentions of the other side.

Against this political and security background, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and Rashid 'Abdallah, minister of state for foreign affairs in the UAE, were commissioned by the GCC to mediate between Masqat and Aden. They made a number of shuttle trips between the two capitals to encircle the dispute and contain the political effects resulting from it.

For a full year (June 1980-July 1981) the channels of communication were open among three capitals (Masqat-Aden-Kuwait) to urge the two parties to begin negotiations to settle their chronic disputes. For a full year also, the two parties traded accusations of "offering facilities to the major powers," but it seemed that the Gulf pleas to settle the dispute had borne fruit last May. Kuwait Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad announced on 25 May upon his return from quick visits to Riyadh, Aden and Masqat: "There is Saudi-Yemeni-Omani interest in the security of the region and in agreeing to remove tensions," adding that he "came to terms with Yemeni and Omani officials on limited views." A week later he also announced that arrangements were being made to hold a meeting between officials from South Yemen and Oman in Kuwait on 5 June. He expressed optimism, as usual, but at the last minute Aden backed out under the pretense that the level of representation of the Omani delegation was not in accordance with the agreement which had been reached.



The Omani delegation was headed by the director of the political office in the Omani Foreign Ministry, while the Yemeni delegation was headed by the deputy foreign minister, but this excuse evoked angry reactions in the Gulf capitals, as expressed by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad when he said: "We are awaiting a convincing explanation of these events." The Yemeni president sent delegates to the Emirates and Kuwait in mid-June in an attempt to "explain the background of the Yemeni position" and prevent aggravation of the situation in a way which would affect its developing relations with the Gulf states. The meeting held in Kuwait last week (3 July) was tantamount to a response to the repeated Gulf request for a solution to the dispute. However, sources close to the negotiations believe that these negotiations are only a small step toward solving the deep-seated dispute between the two countries. It is expected that cabinet-level meetings will follow to make final decisions on points of dispute.

These sources feel that "it is impossible at present to make comments, as they might not agree entirely with the facts." These sources prefer to "wait until the basic agreement which has been concluded takes its course on the practical level. It may develop on a larger scale to serve the security and stability of the region."

These terse replies reflect a general desire in official Gulf circles to prepare a suitable atmosphere in which to benefit from and develop the agreement. This also explains the great secrecy which surrounded the negotiations throughout the 5 days. The negotiators issued no statements, and the Kuwaiti press had to content itself with publishing the official statements of the meeting without going into any details. However, there are questions linked to the future of Yemeni-Gulf relations. It is clear that the dispute had prevented the development of these relations in a peaceful manner, and events have demonstrated that these relations have practical advantages for the Yemenis. The events of the floods which hit South Yemen 2 months ago may have been positive proof of the validity of this statement. At the same time that Radio Aden was broadcasting messages of consolation and solidarity from the "comrades in the socialist camp," the Saudi and Kuwaiti airlines were unloading shipments of food in Riyan airport without fanfare. The matter is not limited to this narrow angle and this emergency situation but goes beyond it to include the Yemeni Five-Year Plan. This plan suffers from lack of resources to finance it, and the "Soviet allies" can supply only a very small part, which cannot be compared with the aid of the Gulf states. If tangible results are achieved by the Omani-Yemeni agreement, these states can participate successfully in financing Yemeni development plans, especially since there are calls for lessening the development disparity between the Gulf states and those on the edges of the Arabian Peninsula.

All of these factors are of an objective nature to put pressure toward reaching an agreement between Masqat and Aden. However, this development cannot take place apart from internal processes in both countries which have played a part to one degree or another in moving them to accept the facts of the situation and do away with former documents about the political environments. When speaking of these processes, it is not easy to disregard the widespread reforms carried out by Sultan Qabus since he came to the Sultanate as a successor to his father in 1970. They caused the armed opposition, which had

enjoyed in the early Seventies. These reforms offered fiscal possibilities by increasing the petroleum production averages and raising petroleum prices radically in 1973, so that the regime was able to take in a large part of the educated citizens who had gone abroad. Even those who were opponents of the regime were convinced to abandon this course, and some of them now hold responsible positions (ministers-undersecretaries--general directors).

Last year the Omani authorities created an advisory council to offer advice and guidance to the government, and this is a form which no doubt represents an attempt to allow the Omani citizen to participate in running the internal machinery of government. It can be described as "a political opening for educated citizens" who have expanded their social base in recent years. There is no doubt that these facts were present in the minds of Yemeni negotiators, since the Front which they had supported had become a "dead skeleton" which could not be revitalized in any way. Political analysts believe that "the signing of an agreement between Masqat and Aden means in a word that issuance of a death certificate for the Popular Front and its total exclusion from the table of political negotiations between the two sides." In return, corresponding changes were taking place quietly in Yemen without the clamor which usually accompanies any changes in the framework of authority in the Arab states. The powers of 'Ali 'Antar, now minister of local government and deputy prime minister, were decreased. He is considered a radical personality whose political behavior bears a military stamp, and alliance with him was the basis of the coup attempts in Aden during the past 3 years (the elimination of Salim Rubay' 'Ali--Salimayn--and 'Abd-al-Fatah Isma'il). He had headed the Ministry of Defense for the past 5 years, but he was divested of this post last year in an attempt to preclude his taking advantage of his position as head of the military leadership to impose his political views. 'Ali al-Bayd was also removed from his political and party posts last year (he held the posts of prime minister and member of the political office) on the pretext that he had violated social laws. Both men had been backing military undertakings in the North and in the Sultanate.

These changes in leadership of the political authority in Aden were accompanied by economic difficulties which led to shifts such as this in the Yemeni position. However, it is the view of some political analysts that "the Yemeni position cannot be isolated from the political patronage of the Soviet Union in the Gulf region, as the Russians are making persistent efforts to break through the barriers of isolation imposed on their political relations with the five Gulf states." It is well-known that Aden has been linked with the Soviet Union for 20 years by a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and Western reports talk about regular visits to Yemeni ports by Soviet naval units.

#### Points of Agreement

The points of the agreement concluded between Masqat and Aden are contained in four articles, two of which are formulated with a warning. The first calls for non-intervention in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty in discussing the question of borders. It should be noted here that discussion of the border file may be postponed until future meetings in a desire to untie the "great knot" which is binding relations between the two countries.

The absence of marked borders between the two countries has played a part for a long time in the infiltration of weapons and supplies from the "Jawf" region opposite the province of Dhofar, which has been used as a base for armed operations against the Sultanate.

It is believed that postponement of the "border file" is linked with the progress of negotiations between the two countries in the future. The second article arouses interest, for it concerns the "dangers of foreign presence and foreign military bases." There is no mention of the two countries' links through agreements with the major powers, but officials of the Sultanate several times have expressed their wish to sever the facilitations agreement with Washington if they were assured of Gulf ability to deter Soviet penetration attempts in the Gulf which have used Aden as their main penetration attempts in the Gulf which have used Aden as their main base. It appears that the level of the two delegations most probably is not sufficient to be authorized to settle such a subject, which is linked with the foreign policy options of the two regimes. As for the other two points, they concern "exchange of diplomatic representation, and stopping propaganda campaigns."

These points form a basis for any future negotiations between the two countries and end a political crisis which has cast heavy shadows over political relations among the states of the region. The central question is: Has agreement actually been reached, or will its fate be that of a number of agreements signed between Arab states? The coming days will give us the answer to this question.

7587

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## EXTENT, DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES EXAMINED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 29 Jun 82 p 6

[Text] Despite the passage of 2 years, the government of Babrak Karmal is still dependent on the Russian Army for its survival, and according to some embassy estimates, the Soviet Union is spending 3.5 million pounds sterling a day for its protection. Two years ago the USSR sent 100,000 soldiers to Afghanistan. Now their number has increased to 120,000 while the number of Afghan forces has been reduced from 100,000 to 30,000 since Karmal came to power. It is estimated by foreign embassies in Kabul that the total strength of Afghan security forces is not more than 50,000. Of these, 18,000 are police and 5,000 belong to paramilitary forces.

Russian domination over Afghanistan is revealed by the fact that Defense Minister Maj Gen Mohammad Rafi, the deputy defense minister, the commander of Kabul garrison, the chief of logistics and the chief of the air force, visited Moscow a number of times in the past 2 years for higher training. They were away when their countrymen were fighting tyranny at home. Close observers feel that the affairs of Afghanistan are in the hands of 25 Russian generals. And they are being directed by the first deputy minister of defense, Marshal Sergey Sokolov. For all practical purposes, the Afghan Army has become defunct. Last summer, when an effort was made to draft people under 35, it was a failure. The Karmal government wants to increase the number of draftees to 200,000 but no sooner was the order for a general draft issued than draft-age people went into hiding. Young people working in the embassies went to the mountains to hide. The American Embassy lost 20 people in 1 month. And this, even though the Karmal government tried to tempt people by raising the pay from 400 to 5,000 in addition to providing free food, lodging, medical care, uniforms and family care. Soldiers who wanted to continue in service were offered 10,000 starting the second year. Still, there were not many takers. Soldiers who had completed the period of their service last December were not relieved for fear that they would join the freedom fighters and use their training and skills to fight the Russians. Russians do not trust the Afghan Army and they have taken upon themselves the protection of the Karmal government and the maintenance of law and order. Twelve Russian divisions in a "Y" formation are stationed in Afghanistan. If the analogy of a tree is used, then the trunk of the army would be in Kabul, Jalal Abad sector, and its branches would fan out from Haryatan to Hirat and Torakhandi in the province of Rakhandi. Of these 12

divisions, 10 are motorized infantry and 2 are airborne. According to the latest reports, these divisions comprise the 16th Motorized Division in Gandwasawar Mazar Sharif, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Jalal Abad, the 305th Motorized Rifle Division in Gurdez, the 360th and 225th Motorized Rifle Divisions in Kabul, the 357th Motorized Rifle Division in Kandhar, the 275th Motorized Rifle Division in Gazni, the 54th Rifle Division in Hirat, the 66th Division in Sandand and the 103d Motorized Rifle Division in Bakram. Of the two airborne divisions, the 105th is in Kabul and the 104th is in Bagram. According to reports, enemy divisions consist of 10,000 soldiers. The balka airborne division has 8,000 soldiers. Altogether, there are 120,000 soldiers; according to some analysts, there are 110,000, and the U.S. State Department estimates the number at 90,000. Military experts believe that Russian infantry is well trained and is equipped with T-59, T-62, T-72 and "Bridge Link"-type tanks and BTP-BMD type armored cars. The airborne division has Mig-21 and -23 and SU-17 aircraft, gunship helicopters and AN-12 and -22 transport planes.

Whatever is left of the Afghan Army is being kept active in 14 divisions. It is divided into 11 infantry and 3 armored divisions. The 7th and 8th Divisions are in Kabul. The 12th Division is in Gurdez, the 11th in Jalal Abad, the 14th in Gazni, the 25th in Khost, the 15th in Kandhar, the 9th in Chogha Sarai (Balkh), the 19th in Hirat, the 18th in Zar Sharaif and the 20th in Nehrin and Balkan. Of the armored divisions, the 4th and 5th are in Kabul and the 7th is in Kandhar. There are 2,500 soldiers left in one division who are hardly combat-ready. There are no arrangements for their training. Their morale is low and they desert whenever they can. It is reported that even officers lack discipline and mutual confidence. Therefore, the main burden of fighting the freedom fighters is on the shoulders of the Russians. It is the belief of military experts that Russians are dividing themselves in small groups that can easily be transported by planes and helicopters for quick, surprise attacks. The way things are now, the moment big Russian armies come into motion the freedom fighters make short work of them from their mountain hideouts.

9859

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## GUERRILLA LEADER RECOUNTS BATTLES WITH RUSSIANS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 29 Jun 82 p 8

[Text] Afghan guerrilla commander Ubaydullah Naizi is from the Bagram region in the Province of Parvan. He is regarded as one of the top commanders in Afghanistan. Asked when he started the resistance movement in his region, he responded by saying that earlier he was fighting in the Provinces of Baktia and Kantar, because it is in these very regions that the resistance movement began.

"For 6 months I participated in various raids and when the resistance movement began to spread I returned to my province." According to Commander Niazi, the resistance movement was started by only 13 fighters in Parvan Province. Under Commander Niaz, one night at 8 o'clock, these fighters raided government buildings in the subdivision of Najrab. They killed 30 and took an equal number of the government force prisoner. In another action, they set free 40 innocent prisoners and acquired a cache of 150 rifles. Because of their successes, many people joined their group. The arms cache was divided among the new people and the group proceeded towards the county of Tagab, 40 miles from Najrab. After a small skirmish, they brought this new area under their control. Here they found an additional arms cache. Now, since they were better organized and equipped, they liberated the areas of Ulti and Kuhestan from the government forces. "After consolidating our occupation in these areas, we proceeded towards the region of Wari. Here we found a large quantity of ammunition. They government forces fled," indicated the commander, "leaving behind a large number of their dead."

Now the activity of the raiders' army was everywhere. Soon they liberated many other regions. Skirmishes take place every day, said Commander Niazi in response to a question, but there have been about 300 battles worth mentioning in a period of 2 years. When asked what some of the more mentionable battles were, he responded: "In January 1980 we planned to destroy an air force field 4 kilometers from Bagram valley. Two thousand freedom fighters gathered and under cover of darkness moved to encircle the airport and the surrounding community. At this time, there were many aircraft at the air base which were being guarded by armored vehicles and tanks. But before they could be alerted, we started firing rockets, and as was learned later, we destroyed 24 aircraft. On that day, attacks were made by us on many

other fronts so that government forces could not get reinforcements from elsewhere. We wanted to occupy this airport but we suffered defeat in the end. It was not their firepower but their use of a gas that subdued us. They fired at us a large number of gas shells that made it hard for us even to breathe. We retreated, with our eyes watering and burning, but we managed to destroy tanks and armored vehicles, in addition to the aircraft, with the help of rocket launchers. Following our many successes, the Russians have adopted a new technique--the surprise attack.

"Such a surprise attack on us occurred in January 1982. They surrounded the areas of Bagram, Kuhestan and Koh Bani. A large Russian force flanked by armored vehicles and tanks suddenly appeared. It seemed that their objective was to crush the guerrillas. They surrounded us and the siege lasted 10 days. Gradually they narrowed the noose of encirclement. Although the number of freedom fighters in the area was 20,000, not all of them were there at the time to face the Russian force. The freedom fighters continued to fight and escape via safe and known routes. On the eighth day, when the noose became very narrow, a bloody battle took place in which 90 enemy tanks were destroyed. The freedom fighters escaped annihilation from the enemy bombardment by hiding in the trenches."

When asked how the raiders could escape such an organized encirclement, Commander Ubaydullah Niazi responded: "First of all, we knew routes that were not known to the Russians. Next, we always chose the routes that were the least guarded. We fought our way through. Gradually, we began to get help from fighters from such areas as Ozbund, Bakhrab, Tagab and the valley of Panj Sher. They attacked the Russians from the rear. This gave the freedom fighters an opportunity to escape. But 80 fighters who remained encircled continued to fight until their ammunition was completely exhausted. They were taken prisoner, but not before they buried their weapons. It is remarkable that these fighters risked their lives to secure their weapons from the Russians: 121 of our people died. It is hard to estimate the losses of Russians but it is certain that it was several times ours.

"After occupying the area, the Russians set up 50 military posts. They left, leaving behind a few sentries. In a matter of a few weeks, the freedom fighters blew up these posts and killed or forced to flee the enemy soldiers. A force consisting of 20 tanks and armored cars was sent by the enemy in response, but it had to withdraw after 7 tanks were destroyed.

"There is one more battle that is worth mentioning," Commander Niazi said. "In the last week of March 1982, Russian troops attacked the areas of Najrab and Laghab simultaneously with hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles. They had air support as well from planes stationed in Kabul and Bardan. The purpose of the attack was to flush the freedom fighters out and force them to fight. But they did not come out and continued to fight from their hideouts. In an intense 3-day battle, the Russian troops advanced only 3 kilometers. When they returned, they found resistance fighters on both sides. The freedom fighters restrained the Russians for 3 days and in the skirmish many tanks were destroyed and thousands of Russians were killed.

"In the first week of April, the Russians launched an attack on Bagram that was thwarted by the freedom fighters under the leadership of Mohammad Jan. Enraged, the Russians returned to avenge this defeat with 12 helicopters. While six continued to hover over the town, six landed and the occupants quickly surrounded the house of Commander Mohammad Jan. They could not find Mohammad Jan, but they killed 12 townsmen through indiscriminate firing. Boarding their helicopters, the Russians quickly left. This operation lasted 10 minutes.

"We have made plans now to deal with such incidents," said the commander. "And, God willing, they will not succeed in such attacks in the future," he added. As he finished his comments, a sense of relief was apparent on his face.

9859

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## SITUATION OF EGYPTIANS IN IRAQI ECONOMY, DEFENSE FORCES EXAMINED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 21 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Jamal al-Ghitani: "Egyptians in Iraq: What Is Truth of Egyptians Who Have Volunteered for Popular Defense Army?"]

[Text] At Cairo airport, the character of the passengers has changed in recent years. The airport is crowded nowadays with farmers and craftsmen emigrating in search of work. Most of them head for Iraq. In the departure area, a man from the village of Awlad Tawq Sharq in the heart of Upper Egypt came toward me, carrying in his hand a leather purse from which protruded his Egyptian passport and an airline ticket. He asked me how to get to the plane leaving for Amman and I replied: "The plane is about to take off. Didn't you hear the final call?"

Signs of confusion appeared on his face and I hastened to lead him to the departure gate so that he could catch his plane. He will get to Amman and from there he will take a car to Baghdad. A car covers the 1,000-kilometer trip in 16 hours. There wasn't a single vacant seat on the enormous Jumbo jet. Most of the passengers are Egyptian farmers and workers, some leaving for Iraq for the first time and some going back after a visit to their relatives. Confusion is apparent on the faces of the farmers boarding the plane for the first time--fastening their seat belts amid the grumbling of the stewardesses. They then show resignation. Two people sit next to me. The first is Mahmud Wahhab, nearly 30, from Port Said. He got his degree in business and worked as a plumber. He then decided to go to Iraq. Some of his friends wrote to him and he has their address, like every passenger. I said to him: "Plumbing is a profitable business in Egypt. So why are you going abroad?" He said that he wanted to try his luck. However, I noticed that he had a one-way ticket with no return. The other passenger had settled in Iraq and owns a restaurant in the Iraqi city of al-Hillah. He comes to Egypt every year to spend the summer and then returns to Iraq. He has left his family in Egypt. He seems satisfied with his life in Iraq. He says that he is in [word illegible] and that the Egyptians are engaged in all kinds of activities there now that a large number of Iraqis have been conscripted in the popular army and the Iraqi Army.

## Students

I met a large number of Egyptians at the Meridian Hotel. Fu'ad Kamil, the coffee shop manager and a man with long experience, used to work at the Ramsis Hilton but then left for Iraq. He is a master of his profession and has become well-known to the Iraqis. His smile and his good manners never leave him. As soon as he finishes his work, he goes up to his room on the third floor, where he lives, to read the papers or watch television. This is how he spends his vacation days, dreaming of returning to Egypt and opening a kindergarten in al-Ma'adi area.

At the same hotel, I met 'Atif Shafiq, a well-known [word illegible], who works as a chamber manservant. His salary is nearly 200 Iraqi dinars a month. He is a graduate of a business college. He doesn't know exactly what prompted him to emigrate. He has no specific plans for the future, and he doesn't believe that he will stay in Iraq long.

At a Baghdad-style coffee shop adjacent to the hotel, where I have become accustomed to smoking my water pipe, I met with eight Egyptian youths, four of them university students who come here during the summer vacation and work from 10 am to 11 pm. One of them serves tea, the other serves cold drinks and the third serves water. They sleep at the same coffee shop and each earns 5 dinars daily. Al-Marba'ah area on al-Rashid Street is almost totally occupied by Egyptians, with ta'miyah and Egyptian kabab shops and molasses-sweetened tobacco shops. Al-Rashid Street hotels are completely and constantly filled by Egyptians. In Umm al-Burum Square in al-Basrah, everybody you see is Egyptian. In the town of al-Mahmudiyah, 30 kilometers south of Baghdad, the eye sees nothing but the attire of Upper Egypt consisting of a turban, a shawl and a wide-sleeved robe. This is a gathering center for Egyptians from Upper Egypt. In coffee shops, factories, government offices and in the streets, you meet tens of Egyptian youths. In the street, you meet many youths carrying Polaroid cameras that do not require much skill to use. Most of these youths are graduates of the middle-level schools of agriculture. Most of the youths I have met are graduates of these schools. Some of them sell Pepsi-Cola or cigarettes or take pictures of pedestrians. You find Egyptians in every Iraqi village. In Zakhu, the Iraqi village closest to the Turkish border, there are Egyptians. Egyptians are found in all of the northern areas where the majority of the population is Kurdish. I asked an Egyptian residing in the city of al-Sulaymaniyah: "How did you solve the language problem?" He said: "Each of us has solved it in his own way. Some of us have learned Kurdish."

I asked him about relations between the Kurds and the Egyptians and he said:

"Relations between us and the Kurdish people are excellent, insofar as the ordinary people are concerned. However, some of the Kurdish forces opposed to the Iraqi revolution are against the presence of the Egyptians in the northern areas. But this view has no tangible influence on the ordinary man in the street."

There are Egyptians in all of the southern Iraqi cities. In al-Najaf, the Egyptians run laundry shops, work as [house] painters and manage restaurants and bury the dead. In remote parts of the desert, I have met youths graduated from Cairo and Alexandria Universities doing manual work that has nothing to do with what they learned through many years of study. I asked [myself] with

surprise: If Egyptian youth agree to live in such a forsaken place and under such harsh conditions and do such work, then why don't they accept the same in Egypt and why don't they emigrate to the Sinai and to the New Valley? I don't think the blame falls solely on the economic crisis being experienced by our country. This is a deeper phenomenon that must be studied at all social, political and psychological levels. An Iraqi friend has told me:

"Were it not for the presence of the Egyptians, many of our activities would come to a halt. Our men are on the front and the Egyptians are the ones "carrying the country."

What has surprised me is that the city of al-Basrah, which is within range of the Iranian artillery, is swarming with Egyptians. During 4 days I spent in al-Basrah, I had the impression that the Egyptians outnumber the Iraqis there.

In al-Basrah

Sayyid Mahmud has been living in al-Basrah for 12 years. He is now a partner in a night club and has become known in al-Basrah by the name of al-Sayyid al-Basrawi. Originally, he got a diploma in electricity and started as an electrician. In time, he became manager of the night club and then a partner. Sayyid has mastered the daily routine of life in Iraq. Among more than 200 Egyptians I have met, he is the only Egyptian who brought his family with him several years ago. He lives in a big house and says that the shelling doesn't scare him because he has gotten used to it.

Sa'id is a young man of approximately 30 years of age. He worked in Libya but couldn't stand life there. So he came to Iraq. In Libya, he had learned the skill of reinforced concrete construction. In al-Basrah, he agreed to build somebody's roof. He was paid one-half his wages in advance but when he finished the job, the man refused to pay him the rest. Sa'id says: "Since then, I have learned to collect all my wages before I start any job." But Sa'id holds more than one job. In the morning, he works as a contractor. At noon, he works at a restaurant and in the evening, he works at a hotel. This is a characteristic that I have noticed among the Egyptians generally. An Egyptian [in Iraq] works in more than one job. In most cases, he works in jobs that he did not learn in Egypt but has learned for the first time in Iraq. Sa'id has the qualities of the courteous Egyptian. He receives any Egyptian newcomer, lends him money and secures lodging for him.

Sa'id says: "If any Egyptian dies [here], we collect money and send him to be buried in Egypt."

In al-Basrah, I also met Sayyid. His father is a prominent merchant in (Wikalat al-Balah). Sayyid has been living in Iraq for 4 years. Why did he emigrate? He says that he wanted to prove to his father that he could make his future by himself. Sayyid is a partner in a restaurant that was formerly owned by a Yugoslav. When the war broke out, the Yugoslav left. All foreigners fled al-Basrah. Only the Egyptians have stayed. Sayyid says: "We have gotten used to the shelling and the battles. What reassures us is that al-Basrah is surrounded by a very strong defense belt set up by the Iraqi army." Sayyid

makes more than 50 dinars a day and spends it all. This is another observation. Many Egyptians spend as much as they earn. Naturally, the majority saves a part of its earnings. The goal of this saving is to buy a home in Egypt or to get married.

At a coffee shop in al-Basrah, I met Rif'at al-Sayyid, who is from Alexandria. Rif'at got married 18 months ago and they had a baby. He lived with his family. But then problems developed and he wanted to rent a single room. The building owner demanded 2,000 pounds. So he came to al-Basrah to work at a restaurant. His goal is to save 2,000 pounds. But by the time he saves the money and returns to Egypt, will the sum demanded be the same?

On Shatt al-'Arab Corniche, I met al-Mazz Muhammad al-Saqqa, who has a diploma in agriculture. He sells Pepsi-Cola and lives in the same booth where he sells his Pepsi. Ibrahim Dawud, also from al-Saqqa's village of al-Mahmudiyah, was with him. Dawud also has a diploma in agriculture. At this point, I pause to think of the education policy in Egypt. Why isn't a comprehensive study conducted on the conditions of this large number of people with degrees in agriculture and why aren't our educational needs defined? In the town of al-Samawah, I met Mahmud 'Ali Husayn from al-Sharqiyah. He was a farmer working in the fields but has come to Iraq to work as a cleaning man at a hotel. Doesn't this represent a loss for both sides, the country exporting the labor and the country importing it? In al-Basrah, you hear the Iraqis speaking about the manager of the modern Qal'at al-Salam Hotel, which was opened 2 months ago during the war. It is an ennobling example. I also met Samir in al-Basrah. He volunteered for the popular army and spent 3 months at the front lines.

I asked him: "Why did you volunteer?"

He said: "Iraq is at war. My volunteering means participating with the country we have chosen as a second homeland. Do you want it to be said here that we came only to work and not to participate in defending the country in which we live?"

I asked him: "Were you subjected to any pressure?"

He said: "Absolutely not. I volunteered of my own free will."

I asked him: "How much do you get in return for volunteering?"

He answered: "Last week, the pay was 75 dinars. But President Saddam Husayn has issued a decree raising it to 90 dinars. For your information, I can earn such a sum in 3 days in my free-lance work."

At this point, I had compiled numerous questions to ask, and I decided to go with them to Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraqi first deputy prime minister and commander of the popular army.

#### First Deputy

In a lengthy interview at the popular army headquarters, the first deputy prime minister dealt with various aspects of the situation. However, I will cite here the part concerning the status of the Egyptians.

I asked him frankly: "What precisely is the issue of the Egyptians fighting in the popular army ranks?"

He smiled calmly and said: "When the war and the counter-offensive started on 22 September 1980, hundreds of cables began to arrive in the first week, not to say on the first day, from Egyptians in the governorates offering to volunteer. At the same time, we noticed that a number of Egyptians had begun to gather their belongings to return [to Egypt]. At the command, we decided to tackle the positive aspect, namely, the first aspect. Hardly a few days had passed when the sight of passengers carrying their suitcases disappeared. I remember that we received 7,000 cables at the time. We issued a statement thanking all those offering to volunteer. Two months later, a number of Arab volunteers arrived in the country. Some of them, of different nationalities, came to the training camps. The media started to talk about these volunteers. We heard some kind of censure from the Egyptian brothers and were told that this meant that there was discrimination [between Egyptian and other volunteers]. We felt hurt as soon as we heard those statements, and we began to respond to the wishes of the volunteers and summoned them. They came to halls and camps, and we said to them: "We thank you for your expressed sentiments. If any of you are not ready now, we thank them and we will not ask them about their circumstances. Whoever says he is ready, we will register his name anew. We will not compel those whose circumstances don't permit them [to volunteer] because they may have only wanted to emphasize a position. From the outset, we wanted the Egyptian volunteers to understand two things: First, that not volunteering has nothing to do with their residence and, second, that those who volunteer will get no privileges."

"A volunteer recruiting campaign started in Iraq 8 months ago. It started from the top levels to the bottom levels of the command. We found that some Egyptians were asking if it was compulsory. At this point, we issued a command decision banning the distribution of volunteer applications among the Egyptians to prevent embarrassment and so that it may not be thought that the distribution of application forms implied a kind of obligation. We will take no position against whomever does not want to volunteer. I can say that the Iraqis' love for the Egyptians intensified after the volunteering. Moreover, this volunteering will help to strengthen the ties between the two peoples as it will strengthen the pan-Arab spirit. Imagine the Egyptian fighter who in a few years will tell his children about his fight along with the Iraqis. On the front, you will find operational sectors called 23 July, Ahmad 'Urabi and Egypt's Nile."

I asked the first deputy: "If the Egyptian volunteer is martyred, what do you offer him?"

He answered: "We apply to him the same conditions applied to an Iraqi volunteer in the popular army, including a compensation paid to the family, a (pension) and transportation of his body to Egypt."

I asked: "How many Egyptian volunteers are there at present?"

He said: "From 9,000 to 10,000. They represent half of all Arab volunteers. This is a good number, and we are pleased with it."

I asked: "What about Egyptian labor in Iraq?"

He said: "We have a fundamental principle in labor that is tied not so much to our need as it is to our pan-Arab view. In recent years, we have focused on the influx of Egyptian labor to Iraq. We could have used cheaper foreign labor, such as Korean labor. But we do not view the issue from a purely economic standpoint. The pan-Arab view is what motivates us and we now feel pleased with the influx of Egyptian labor. Iraq and Egypt were far apart until the 1960's because of the geographic distance and other factors. Now we have become close. At the popular level, there is love and friendship despite all the attempts made to undermine the experiment.

I said: "But I have noticed that the influx of Egyptian labor is characterized by chaos and the absence of organization."

He said. "We have not concluded contracts with a state. The doors are open and some specializations come in greater numbers than we need. For example, there are now many agricultural engineers. Scientifically, streamlining is correct. But thousands of people come in and if we tell the border posts to prevent the entry of agricultural engineers, then this right will be misused. We are trying to get certain specializations, such as drivers, engineers and electricians. But we have more agricultural engineers and graduates of art and philosophy schools than we need. However, we only say this and we are not translating it into instructions. We will give any agricultural engineer who comes a piece of land and he will definitely succeed in managing it. We will lay down bases compatible with the qualifications of these people."

#### Scientific Symposium

I went to the Research and Data Center, which is controlled by the Revolution Command Council and which is one of the most active scientific research centers in the Arab world, to attend a scientific symposium on "Egyptian labor" in which a number of Arab Labor Organization experts, Iraqi university professors and union leaders participated. The working paper was prepared by Amin 'Izz al-Din, manpower expert with the Arab Labor Organization. Numerous discussion sessions have taken place and the symposium is still in session.

The plane nears Cairo and the passengers look out of the small windows. When the lights become visible, sighs, expressions of longing and words of spontaneous admiration gush out.

"Look, it is a jewelry box."

"God, it looks as if it is ornamented with frill."

And I remembered the thousands of faces I saw in Iraq, participating in building this fraternal Arab country. I don't know why my memory lingered over a dark, medium-built youth with a law degree who carries his Polaroid camera and works as a roving photographer. After inquiring about his name and asking him to let me take his picture, he asked with concern: "Why do you want to know my name?"

I said: "Because I am a journalist and I want to know how you live and what your problems are."

He paused a moment and then said: "Does this mean that I can return to Egypt without fear and that nothing will happen to me at the airport?"

At this point, the plane was touching down and we had landed safely at the airport of our beloved Cairo.

8494

CSO: 4504/493

GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF PLOTTING TO STIFLE OPPOSITION IN PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Aug 82 p 1

[Article: "A New System Invented by the Government to Remove the Opposition From the People's Assembly"]

[Text] These days the National Democratic Party government is conducting a study dealing with inventing a new system for carrying out People's Assembly elections according to a method called the "incomplete election lists" method. The purpose of this election method is to stifle its opposition and transform it into merely being a means of "completing the [required] number of deputies" [in the People's Assembly]!

Mukhtar Hani, the minister of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs, told AL-AHRAR that the new system would permit the government party, during the People's Assembly elections, to submit a list which includes a number of candidates which corresponds to the size of the party and the number of its members--a number which is slightly less than the number of deputies required to be elected in each district--and this would restrict the role of the opposition to that of completing the list, set up by the National Democratic Party, by adding to it the remaining number of candidates required to be elected in each district.

In order to clarify the idea behind the method of the "incomplete election lists," Mukhtar Hani gave an example, using an election district which requires the election of eight People's Assembly deputies. In such a district, the National Democratic Party would submit a list of six candidates, and the parties of the opposition would submit a list of two candidates--in order to complete the required number of candidates from the district to be elected to the People's Assembly.

This system, in addition to stifling the parties of the opposition, is also more like a system of making appointments rather than one of holding elections. The voters are presented with a list which contains the candidates of the various parties rather than with a number of competing lists, each of which contains the candidates of a particular party--from which voters choose the list which they want.



Mr Hani said that, with regard to independent candidates who belong to no particular party, the new system would not allow them to be candidates unless their candidacy is submitted for nomination via one of the existing political parties. The minister went on to say that this is considered to be tantamount to application of Article 5 of the Constitution which has restricted the application [of the system] to political parties rather than individuals.

The government has already invented the system of "complete lists" and conducted on the basis of it the Consultative Council elections which were boycotted by the opposition--with the exception of the Liberal [Socialist] Party. The point of view of the liberals was that their entry into the election campaign would confirm the fact that the complete list system was sufficient to stifle the opposition. This view of matters on the part of the Liberal [Socialist] Party turned out to be true, and none of its candidates succeeded in being elected to the Consultative Council.

What is the position taken now by the parties of the opposition with regard to the new method of conducting People's Assembly elections which is called the "incomplete election list" method?

9468

CSO: 4504/451

PROBLEMS CONCERNING GERMAN LOANS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Aug 82 p 9

[Article by Usamah Ghayth, sent from West Germany: "How Do We Deal With the Delay in Utilization of the Loans?"]

[Text] How do we utilize the 1.256 billion German marks loaned to Egypt?

Who is responsible for the fact that [our] enterprises and machinery have been idle and are not being used for production?

The discussions dealing with economic cooperation between Egypt and West Germany, which concerned the problems encountered by this cooperation as well as the results achieved by it, began with officials of the German Development Bank in Hamburg. These talks ended in the building of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation in Bonn, and were described by a German government official as "diplomatic" discussions.

There definitely are problems which are an obstacle to Egypt's economic and financial dealings with the other nations of the world. West Germany provides an example of Egypt's dealings with foreign nations, and when one becomes acquainted with the problems of dealing with West Germany, this provides some indicators of the basic problems which require that a policy rapidly be adopted in order to deal with and solve them. Periodically during the last few years exhaustive discussions have been conducted in efforts to discover solutions which would guarantee the rapid utilization of foreign economic aid, loans, and their inflated funds which are calculated as being in terms of billions of Egyptian pounds. The importance and significance of the problem is attributable to the fact that it simultaneously represents the other side of the coin of an extremely important economic problem. This is the problem of tardiness in implementing the projects of the economic and social development plans as well as the problem of [not completing] the numerous projects which are still in the process of implementation. As a result of this, the enterprises associated with these projects, years later, still have not entered the production phase and this means that production capacities are idle and investments are not yielding the returns expected from them.

In order to indicate one of the aspects of the problem, it is sufficient to refer to the total value in German economic loans and aid which had not been utilized by 31 December 1981. Official statistics show that since 1973 German loans to Egypt have totalled 2.194 billion marks. Of this total figure, only 1.220 billion marks--that is, 56 percent--have been used. This means that there are funds totalling 974 million marks--or 46 percent [as published] of the total loans--which have not been utilized so far. If we add to this the current year's loans and aid, the value of which totals 282 million marks, the total amount which has not been utilized so far becomes 1.256 billion German marks!

In order that we not lose perspective concerning the facts, we should mention that Egypt is not the only country which suffers from problems concerning the utilization of foreign loans and aid. This is a phenomenon which is found in all of the countries of the Third World. In most cases, they are unable to implement projects in accordance with plans which have been made and time-frames which have been set. This becomes dangerous because of the rising costs of the projects whose implementation is delayed as a result of domestic and international inflation and because these projects then must deal with new problems associated with their need for more foreign loans and more local currency in order that they be completed. In many cases the provision of additional domestic and foreign loans for the purpose of completing these projects means that there is a delay in beginning some new project, and this has negative effects on the development plan and program.

What are the complete dimensions of the problems of economic cooperation with the outside world, as seen via the pattern of Egyptian-West German [economic] integration? How can these problems be solved? Which are the aspects [of the problems] which can be solved rapidly and which are associated with procedures and transactions, and which are the other aspects of the problems which are tantamount to real problems faced by the Egyptian economy and which need to be solved by means of decisive steps which must be taken for the benefit of our development and so that it experiences an upsurge in the future?

#### The Statistics and the Sectors

The industrial sector is of prime importance as far as German loans to Egypt are concerned. This sector has received total allocations of 618.8 million German marks. The important thing to note here is that there has been a noticeable decrease in utilization of the loans. A total of 261 million marks has been spent, and the current balance totals 357.8 million marks. The sugar plant has 95 million marks which have not been totally utilized, the iron pipe plant has 75 million marks, 90 million marks are still available for operations engaged in by the iron [and steel] plants in Hulwan, and the Industrial Development Bank still has 25 million marks.

The sector of electricity and power has received a total of 311 million marks in loans. Of this amount, 158.9 million marks have been utilized and the current balance totals 152.1 million marks. Most of the investments involved in this sector are extremely vital because they are associated with meeting Egypt's steadily increasing demand for electric power.

The sector of transportation and communications has been allocated loans totalling 544.9 million marks. Of this amount, 261.4 million marks have actually been utilized, and the current balance is 283.5 million marks. These loans involve important sectors of the national economy--communications, transportation, ports, the Railroad Agency, and programs for developing and supporting these facilities!

Another important remark concerns loans made to the sector of agriculture. In spite of the importance of this sector and in spite of the fact that our development plans and programs have concentrated on agricultural projects, the rates of utilization of the loans allocated to this sector have been very low. Loans to this sector have totalled 54.7 million marks, but only 3.9 million marks of this amount have been utilized, and the current balance is 50.8 million marks. The sector dealing with providing a supply of clean drinking water has been afflicted by the same phenomenon. It has received a total of 137.5 million marks of loans, but only 36.4 million marks have been utilized, and the current balance is about 100 million marks.

Another remark which we would like to make is the fact that the commodity loans which have been allocated--and which do not involve projects--have been fully utilized. A total of 507.5 million marks worth of commodity loans has been granted. Of this total, 500.8 million marks have been utilized, and only a very small portion--6.9 million marks--has not been utilized. This is a phenomenon which deserves a quick economic assessment on our part. Although there has, in fact, been near total utilization of the commodity loans, it has, on the other hand, turned out that that actual rate of utilization of loans for projects has, on the average, been less than 40 percent of the total loans allocated for this purpose, and in the case of the sector of agriculture, for example, the rate of utilization has been only about 7 percent.

These statistical indicators require some analysis and study by various appropriate government agencies in various sectors in order for us to critically examine the negative effects [which this non-utilization of funds has had] on our development plans and in order for us to discover means and methods of preparing appropriate solutions.

#### Urgent Problems to Be Studied and Solved

How do German experts and officials view the nature of the problems which constitute an obstacle to rapid utilization of the economic aid and loans provided to Egypt?

By means of reviewing the projects as well as the programs and plans of cooperation between the two countries, we discover that the problems are principally the following:

1. Problems connected with the operations of building and construction associated with the projects and the fact that the programs are behind schedule as far as the time-frames set for the projects are concerned. This is a problem which is associated with the [lack of] efficiency of the contracting and construction sector in Egypt and with the fact that this sector does not

observe the deadlines as far as implementation of its contractual obligations are concerned. The Germans point out two examples in this regard. The first one has to do with the cement industry project. In spite of the fact that this project is vital and important as far as the Egyptian economy is concerned, implementation of the program is 2 years behind schedule. There is also the Suez electric power station project. It is also 2 years behind schedule. A contractual agreement was made concerning [importing] the machinery and equipment for these two projects, and they have all actually arrived in Egypt. However, they have remained idle and unused in their crates, and have not been used in production. The result of this has been that the costs of the two projects have now gone up and they are now in need of new loans and investments. (The solution suggested by German experts implies that the German government does not wish, in the future, to incorporate any project into the economic cooperation program between the two countries unless agreement has been reached concerning a definite schedule for the implementation of such a project--a schedule which will be strictly adhered to.)

2. The fact that many government bodies and ministries are responsible for the projects which are to be implemented. Complicated problems arise here when you have changes in supervisory responsibility and subordination of the projects [to different project heads] among the various bodies and ministries from time to time. This occurs because of government reorganizations, the merging of ministries, and other types of reorganizations which, during the last few years, have regularly occurred in Egypt and which are evidence of a phenomenon of instability and lack of permanence in the formation of Egypt's public and government apparatus.

3. Problems associated with providing projects with basic utilities and services such as roads, electric power, communications, water supply, sanitary drainage, etc.

4. Problems associated with the lack of a skilled and trained technical work force. Furthermore, the projects are in need of highly-qualified technical and administrative experts, and [at present] do not have them.

5. Problems associated with the instability of the work force and technical and administrative experts. Often they are trained within the framework of programs of technical cooperation between the two countries, but then they do not remain in the projects. Many of them have gone to work in other countries. In such cases, the projects do not utilize them and when they go to other countries to work this causes a decrease in the [projects'] work and operation efficiency.

6. Problems associated with economic studies made in connection with the projects. As far as the Germans are concerned, the projects are not complete in terms of economic feasibility studies. This makes it necessary to have a period of preparation of as long as 2 years before it is possible to begin to utilize the loans allocated, and if the Egyptians prepared complete and fundamental economic feasibility studies, this could help to more quickly utilize the loans.

The German experts also point out problems associated with not providing the necessary local currency for the projects, delays in providing the land necessary for the projects, and lengthy and complicated administrative procedures between the various government bodies.

What about future trends as far as economic cooperation between Egypt and West Germany are concerned?

Officials in the [German] Ministry of Economic Cooperation state that there has been a change in the concept of economic cooperation with the outside world in the future. According to this concept, economic aid and loans will basically be channeled to infrastructure and public utility and service projects as well as strategic projects, whereas the concept [of economic aid] has had the priority of channeling loans to industrial projects and projects which basically contribute toward the creation of new employment opportunities. In addition to this, restrictions have been introduced concerning the utilization of the loans after it had not been a condition that they, in turn, be utilized for the purpose of importing machinery, equipment, goods, and commodities from the German market. At present an exception is being made to the general rules--which has linked the utilization of loans allocated for economic feasibility studies and loans dealing with ships and trains to the necessity of making contractual agreements with German companies--in view of the problems faced by these industries at the present time and in view of the government's desire to subsidize them.

Concerning next year's loans to Egypt, expectations are as follows:

1. Continuation of the volume of economic aid and loans at this year's level, that is, a total of 282 million marks worth of loans and aid.
2. Continuation of the provision of loans guaranteed by the German Export Insurance Agency, to the tune of 400 million marks, for the purpose of financing Egypt's imports from the German market.

One last thing needs to be said. It is necessary to work to close the ever-increasing gap in Egypt's balance of payments with West Germany and to use all possible means to encourage Egyptian exports to Germany. This must be done so that, during the next few years, we will be able to begin to pay the installments of the loans which will be payable to West Germany without subjecting Egypt's balance of payments to further pressure in terms of its available foreign currency!

9468

CSO: 4504/451

## TRANSFERS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 2 Aug 82 p 1

[Article by Salah al-Din Isma'il: "Permission to Transfer Employees From One Ministry and Governorate to Another, and to Transfer Job Categories From One Governorate to Another"]

[Text] Public Authorizations for fiscal year 1982/83 include authorizations dealing with employees in the government's administrative apparatus and local administrative units. The following constitutes the most important basic information concerning the areas dealt with by these authorizations:

### Coordination of the Work Force

The authorizations include permission to transfer employees and appropriations from the headquarters offices of ministries to the governorates and the service branches in them, and vice-versa. They also permit the transfer of job categories and appropriations from one governorate to another or among service branches, whether within a single governorate or between governorates. The purpose of this is to coordinate the movement of the work force between the headquarters offices of the ministries and the governorates in view of the fact that the governorates are the administrative divisions which actually are the competent authority when it comes to rendering all of the services on the local level, and the purpose of this is also to restrict the role of the ministries to that of planning and doing follow-up work. The governors will be given the authority to coordinate the work force among all of the governorates as well as among the service units within a single governorate or the various governorates.

### Organization of Job Slots

The Public Authorizations have given the ministers and governors the right to utilize funds allocated for higher job categories--whether they are transferred from public establishments or are in excess of the needs of the authorized plan--as well as [funds allocated for] lower job categories--with the exception of categories involving initial appointments--for the purpose of financing other job categories which the government body concerned needs to fill.

## Standardization of Procedure Regarding Special Rules and Personnel Regulations

Article 15 of the Public Authorizations includes a ruling which stipulates that all national, service, and economic public [government] agencies that have their own special rules or personnel regulations for their employees submit these rules and personnel regulations to the Central Organizational and Administrative Apparatus in order that it review them in preparation for having them authorized by the appropriate authority. [They shall also submit] their organizational charts and modifications which are to take place in them so that they may be reviewed and authorized.

The budget this year includes an overall appropriation, to be distributed, which will be the financial source for what has been stipulated by Article 16 of the Public Authorizations. The purposes for which this appropriation has been made have been delineated. This appropriation is for correcting conditions which occur during [this] fiscal year. It will not be possible to wait till the next fiscal year [to spend the funds] unless there is an urgent need which requires withholding [budget] funds meant for this appropriation.

9468

CSO: 4505/451



# NEW SYSTEM OF MINISTERS' DEPUTIES INAUGURATED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Aug 82 p 1

/Article by Muhammad al-Shamma': "A Single Deputy Minister without Financial Grades in Each Ministry To Work as the Minister's Assistant"/

/Text/ The Central Organization and Administration Agency has issued the decrees and executive rules for amendments to the employees' law concerning the elimination of the titles of first deputy minister and deputy minister and amending higher management position charts.

It has been decided to create a single deputy minister's position as one of the higher management positions in each ministry, provided that that not be made equivalent to a financial grade. The person occupying the position will help the minister exercise his jurisdiction. The first deputy grade will be replaced by the grade of excellent, the first deputy minister's position will be replaced by the position of chief of sector, and the grade of ministry deputy will be changed to a high grade.

With respect to the ministries that have deputy prime minister grade positions, the deputy ministers are to exercise the jurisdictions assigned to them in accordance with the law. In the event there is a single first deputy grade in the ministry's organizational chart, its designation will be changed to chief of sector of the ministry's general office at excellent grade.

The executive rules on the amendments stipulate that it is necessary that a minimum of credentials be present for occupying the positions of the excellent, high, and director general grades. The rules spell out the scope of positions at these grades and their duties and responsibilities, which are to help the minister engage in his jurisdiction or perform higher management planning, organization and work coordination and followup tasks.

## Higher Management

The general definition of the specific group of higher management positions is to be replaced by the following definition:

These include all positions whose duties and responsibilities are to help the minister engage in his jurisdiction or perform higher management tasks in the form of

planning work programs, organizing, coordinating and monitoring activities, and guiding individuals. The positions in this group will start at the grade of general director and will rise gradually in accordance with the evaluation of positions in the authorized chart.

They also include a single deputy minister's position in each ministry, without financial grades.

#### The Grade of Excellent

This grade includes all positions which are held by people who under general administrative guidance head up a government unit or supervise one or more of the activities of a ministry general office chief, or chief of an agency given the title of a sector consisting of a number of internal subdivisions which are given the name of central departments. The duties of the positions in this grade include the approval and definition of policies, general plans and major goals of the unit, and followup of the attainment of the goals. The people occupying the positions in this grade will also make contacts to represent the unit and make contacts in its name; the people occupying the positions of this grade will have broad freedom to act and the power to issue decrees related to policies and decisions dealing with the general policies and goals of the unit, as well as work programs and plans, and to issue final approval of activities.

#### The High Grade

This grade includes all positions which are occupied by people who under administrative supervision head up a government unit or department or supervise the activities of a major function of a complex or diverse nature exercised by an organizational subdivision that is called a central department and consists of a number of internal subdivisions which are each called general departments.

The duties of the positions in this grade include participating in setting out the unit's general policies, general planning, coordination, and followup of application within the internal organizational subdivisions belonging to it.

People occupying the positions in this grade also conduct contacts with the objective of representing the unit or speaking or making contacts in its name.

People occupying the positions in this grade have great freedom of action in dealing with issues, and they have the powers to issue decrees and approve actions. Mistakes by people occupying this position could result in damage to the interests of the entity, the republic or the government.

#### Credential Requirements

The minimum level of credentials required to fill positions in the grade of excellent requires that in order to occupy these positions it is necessary to have:

Educational credentials in accordance with the stipulations of the position card and category in the approved organization chart.

Completion of an interim period of at least 1 year in a position at high grade.

Completion of training courses in the administration field which the unit provides.

An exceptional ability to guide, lead and draw up policies and objectives.

The minimum level of credentials required to occupy the positions of high grade requires that in order to occupy these positions it is necessary to have:

Educational credentials in accordance with the stipulations of the position card and category in the approved organization chart.

Completion of an interim period of at least 1 year in a position of director general.

Completion of training courses in the administrative field which the unit provides.

A great ability to lead, guide and set out and monitor plans and programs.

11887

CSO: 4504/472

## NEW MEASURES FOR PROTECTING EXPATRIATE WORKERS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 16 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by 'Izzat Sami: "Swindlers and the Dreams of People Who Travel abroad To Work!"]

[Text] The Egyptian workers lined up before airline offices in Cairo have become a phenomenon: who of us has not seen it? These naive people's imaginations are beguiled by dreams of traveling and working abroad for years, later to return with thousands of pounds with which they can change the style of their lives and their families' lives, perhaps become the owners of real property, projects, and so forth. In any case these are legitimate dreams and aspirations!

But are all the dreams realized?

The undesirable fact is no. How much is published in the papers about swindlers' offices that sell the illusion of traveling to work abroad to these workers -- offices which police agencies are actively cracking down on, now that numerous workers have fallen prey to them!

### The Swindlers' Market

Some scoundrels have learned about workers' aspirations to travel in order to work abroad and have learned how to exploit this phenomenon by swindling these workers on the pretext of facilitating their travel and bringing them work contracts in exchange for amounts of money which on some occasions come to 1,000 pounds, which the naive workers are compelled to provide by selling their wives' jewelry, if any exists, and perhaps selling or pawning the furnishings in their homes. Aren't they traveling to work abroad for exorbitant wages which come to more per month than they would receive in Egypt for years?

Thus they fall into the trap. Let us review some of the tricks to which the hapless workers are exposed.

### Libya -- in Aswan

For example, one swindler managed to make fools of a group of naive laborers by making them imagine he was sending them to Libya; after taking commissions and expenses from them, making them pay passport expenses, and so forth, one thing

requiring another, the car took them to Cairo airport on the promised date, they boarded the plane, and then disembarked more than an hour later, imagining that they had reached Libya -- only to discover that they were at Aswan airport. The swindler had just exploited their naivety!

#### They Locked Them up in Saudi Arabia!

Another example concerned a group of workers who traveled to Saudi Arabia to work for what they considered were reasonable wages, 1,000 riyals a month apiece. When they arrived and discovered that this wage was insufficient, not enough for the necessities of life, they rebelled and stopped working. The employer complained about them to the authorities, who herded them into prison, on grounds that "the contract is legally binding on those who make it."

However, the Egyptian labor attache there intervened, along with embassy agencies, until he managed to get them going and send them back to Egypt after months of torture, suffering and lost savings!

#### A Scandal in Malta!

Why should we go far afield, since the scandal of the agricultural workers, which occurred last August in Malta, is still fresh in our minds?

Swindlers managed to persuade a number of agricultural workers to travel to work in Libya for high wages. Airplanes took them to the capital of Malta, Valetta, where they found no one waiting for them and filled the streets with their vagrant spirits. This reflected badly on Egypt, and a group of Ministry of Manpower and Ministry of Foreign Affairs experts immediately proceeded to rectify the situation and bring these workers back to national territory.

And so on. The record is full of swindling cases to which our naive workers have been exposed in their effort to realize the dreams of working abroad. This matter has become a phenomenon that officials, foremost among them those from the Ministry of Manpower and Training, have become inspired to cope with.

#### 3 Million Workers abroad

That does not mean that Egypt prevents our workers from traveling to work abroad, especially in fraternal Arab countries. By the latest estimates, there are about 3 million Egyptian workers in Arab and foreign countries helping to bring about development through their expertise and strength. Among them there are about 700,000 workers in Iraq, 600,000 workers in Saudi Arabia, 350,000 workers in Libya, 250,000 workers each in Kuwait, Jordan and the Gulf countries, and about 50,000 workers in European countries, Syria, Lebanon and other Arab states.

#### Protecting Workers from Swindlers

However, the issue is, how can we protect our workers from falling into the clutches of swindlers -- people with illusory offices for employing workers abroad?

The government took a number of measures in this regard through the Ministry of Manpower when it established the experts' office which is in charge of reviewing labor contracts in Arab countries just to reaffirm that contracts are serious and are not issued by brokers or suspicious or fraudulent offices, and to reaffirm that the wages stipulated in the contract are not lower than the minimum in the wage bill in the country where the worker is traveling to work, so that the worker will not be surprised to find that his wage is lower than what is stipulated in that country's laws. The experts' office also confirms that the invitations to visit that employees in the government and the public sector submit to obtain leaves of absence from their places of work are serious, in order to prevent fraud regarding trips to look for work in Arab countries.

#### No Restrictions on Travel

Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, the minister of state for manpower and training and chairman of the General Federation of Workers' Unions, asserts that the experts' offices place no restrictions on Egyptians' travel to work in Arab countries. They are only concerned with protecting Egyptian workers from any inconveniences that they might confront upon traveling. They have nothing to do with giving permission for travel for certain fields of specialization and refusing others, because that is the task of the job entities, in accordance with their own circumstances.

#### Facilities

In order to provide facilities for people who want to travel to work abroad, the jurisdictions of the experts' office have been distributed among branch experts' offices in manpower departments in the governorates, in order to make matters easy for citizens and enable them to avoid the hardship of traveling to Cairo.

#### The New Draft Law

In another area, the Ministry of Manpower and Training has finished setting out the draft of a new law regulating the travel of Egyptian workers to work abroad, guaranteeing that they are protected from succumbing to the deceptive practices of illusory travel offices.

The draft sets forth rules on travel and restrictions on the offices sending workers abroad, compelling them to provide bonds and be subject to Ministry of Manpower inspection, so that no workers will travel except in accordance with a labor contract meeting all legal conditions and guaranteeing workers' rights.

This draft is to be presented to the People's Assembly at its next session so that it may issue a new document to be appended to the Labor Law 137 for 1981 amending Law 33 for 1972. AL-'UMMAL, in the last issue, published the details of this draft.

## Minimum Wages in Arab Countries

Until this new draft is issued, workers will continue to travel to work abroad. However, they are requested to confirm that the labor contracts presented to them are fair and legal by referring to the experts' offices in the manpower departments. For example, we will herewith present examples of the wage classes that are in effect in some Arab countries:

In Iraq, the minimum wage is 90 dinars for people with higher credentials, 60 dinars for people with intermediate credentials, 80 dinars for tradesmen and 50 dinars for ordinary workers.

In Kuwait the minimum wage is 200 dinars for people with higher credentials, 110 dinars for people with intermediate credentials, 140 dinars for tradesmen and 80 dinars for ordinary workers.

In the emirates, the minimum wage is 2,000 dirhams for people with higher credentials, 1,500 dirhams for people with intermediate credentials or tradesmen, 1,400 dinars for drivers and 700 dinars for ordinary workers.

In Saudi Arabia, the minimum wage is 4,000 riyals for recently graduated doctors rising to 7,000 riyals for specialized or people with experienced physicians, 5,000 riyals for beginning instructors, rising to 10,000 riyals for professors, 3,000 riyals for starting engineers, rising to 4,500 riyals for experienced engineers, 2,300 riyals for recently graduated people with higher credentials and 1,800 riyals for beginning persons with intermediate credentials.

## An Office in Service of the Workers

These minimum wages in some Arab countries prevailed at the start of this year. The Ministry of Manpower in turn is informed of all changes that occur in them by Egyptian labor consultants who are distributed among a number of Arab and foreign countries to look after Egyptian workers in those countries.

The ministry has established a number of labor attaches' offices in the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and Malta.

The labor consultants in these countries monitor developments in their labor markets and in turn inform the ministry of them. They also look after the interests and protect the rights of Egyptian labor.

## To Realize Dreams

Finally, do these naive people lined up before airplane offices in Cairo to travel to work abroad know all these things?

That is the question!

If they all did, these illusory offices which the police are cracking down on would not exist.

The cases of fraud and deceit to which many of our naive workers are exposed would not occur, and many people would not be failing to realize their life's dream, which they are seeking through a hope known as travelling to work abroad!

# OVERLAP BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROSECUTORS' OFFICES EXPLORED

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic No 313, 15 Aug 82 pp 32, 33

/Article by Muhammad Najm: "Who Will Resolve This Overlap? Four: Office of the Administrative Prosecutor and the Office of the Public Prosecutor"/

/Text/ With this report, the study we have made on the phenomenon of the legal overlaps among various judiciary agencies is ending. Here, we will deal with the jurisdictions of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor and will examine whether there is duplication between that and the Office of the Public Prosecutor.

The first thing which draws one's attention in the existence of this near-duplication are the actions which public employees commit that constitute an administrative violation and a criminal offense at the same time, giving both the Office of the Public and the Administrative Prosecutor the jurisdiction of investigating these incidents.

The Office of the Administrative Prosecutor is an independent judiciary authority which is subordinate to the minister of justice. At its head is a counsellor with the rank of minister. It includes a suitable number of deputy ministers and prosecution chiefs and it has the jurisdiction of conducting investigations into administrative and financial violations and investigating complaints on violations of law or negligence in the performance of professional duties submitted to it by the competent chiefs or any official body. It also files and initiates disciplinary cases before disciplinary courts in the Council of State. In these areas of competence, its jurisdiction differs from that of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, which is essentially concerned with investigating criminal offenses.

This was underlined by Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi, the former public prosecutor, who said that disciplinary cases are under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor and criminal cases are under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and that the investigation by either in reality is to complete or reveal elements of the cases submitted to them. When the Office of the Public Prosecutor investigates them, it has the goal of unearthing the bases of criminal offenses, while the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor has the goal of unearthing the bases of disciplinary violations. The meaning of this is that each of them carries out its investigations apart from the other; therefore the word "duplication" has arisen, although in reality each of them performs its own duties and engages in its own jurisdictions as the law provides.



Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi went on to say, "In reality I, as a public prosecutor, in the course of my long work in the Office of the Prosecutor, observed that disciplinary violations continued to be investigated for a long time, then that investigations would reveal the commission of a criminal offense, and the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor would send papers to the Office of the Public Prosecutor to conduct its investigation; then we would find an obvious discrepancy between the statements the witnesses made before the latter, after that long period, and their statements before the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor."

The public prosecutor added "The Office of the Public Prosecutor often finds, because time has gone by, or because long period has elapsed since the commission of the crime, that the evidence on it is shaken because of discrepancies in statements by witnesses. This might prompt the office to file away the papers because the evidence is insufficient, and sometimes it considers that it should settle on subjecting the accused person to a disciplinary trial or imposing administrative punishment on him."

Counsellor Sahib Hafiz, public attorney with the Office of the Higher Prosecutor of Ill-gotten Gains, also raised the observation that the plan of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor in this regard led most of the time to delays in the Public Prosecutor's Office's initiation of its investigations in regard to the suspicions of crimes, which had the effect of delaying the influence and force of the evidence that existed--not to mention the effect that the passage of a long period of time after the incident would have on its significance and the difficulty of conducting an investigation into it, with the vicissitudes or changes that would impose on the professional responsibilities of the people in charge of it.

Here we might review one of the cases in which a difference existed as a result of investigations by two offices, those of the administrative and higher prosecutors, to illustrate this notion. A former minister of religious endowments asked the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor to investigate the former secretary of the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs, who was a contemporary of his, regarding the violations ascribed to him. These included the appropriation of council funds on the pretext that that was a bonus he had earned for his supervision of the editing of an Islamic magazine and a series of Islamic books (although these activities were part of the duties of his job as a secretary general of the council), in addition to some other violations such as the misuse of the power conferred on him in distributing a sum of 23,000 pounds which had been set aside for reconstruction of private mosques in a governorate and the fact that he had singled out people from his electoral district for appointments to supervisory positions over shrines, thus violating various bills.

After the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor investigations concluded by sending him and others to disciplinary trial, the Office of the Public Prosecutor was informed of the commissions of crimes that certain acts had entailed, and the higher disciplinary court issued a verdict transferring him to retirement and levelled other penalties in the case of the other people committing the violations, whereas the Office of the Public Prosecutor, after its investigations, concluded by administratively detaining the papers and questioning the other accused persons. It was stated in the office of the prosecutor's memorandum that on 9 May 1979 the

counsellor and public prosecutor, Anwar Abu Sahli, decided to disregard the allegations made against the accused and to hand the papers over to the administrative bodies some of the accused belonged to, so that they could be questioned about incidents that were discussed in the Office of the Public Prosecutor's investigations!

There is no doubt, as former public prosecutor Salah al-Rashidi said, that every criminal offense a government employee commits also constitutes a disciplinary violation at the same time, since, in accordance with the Employees' Law, he must pursue sound work practices on his job, and the violation of this work duty could constitute a criminal offense.

For this reason, Dr Fathi Surur, head of the Criminal Law Department in the Cairo Law Faculty, said, "In cases where both criminal and disciplinary cases exist, there is no room to conduct two types of investigation. A duplication of investigations will result in discrepancies in witnesses' statements in both, and that will have an effect on the proper course of the investigation. Therefore, if at the first instance it seems that the incident constitutes a disciplinary violation and a criminal offense, it is necessary that a single body assume charge of investigating it; at end of the investigation a disposition will be made whether to file only the criminal suit, the disciplinary suit, or both suits together, or to disregard them. In this matter, the decision must lie with the Office of the Public Prosecutor, because that represents the society as a whole and is the guardian of all its interests, while the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor represents a specific kind of interests, which are administrative and disciplinary. Therefore, if in the incident conveyed to the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor, there appears to be a suspicion of a criminal offense, the papers ought to be handed over to the Office of the Public Prosecutor at once, before they are investigated." Dr Fathi Surur added that there was nothing blameworthy in that; the Law on Criminal Procedures gives the Office of the Public Prosecutor the authority to present disciplinary cases before the judiciary seizure official. In addition to that, it is necessary to give the Office of the Public Prosecutor the authority to file disciplinary cases with respect to incidents that constitute criminal offenses and disciplinary violations at the same time. He pointed out that the Penal Code has made disciplinary punishment a form of criminal punishment. In the amendment issued to Law 63 for 1975, the penalty of suspension from work and banishment from positions is made tantamount to a criminal punishment. In addition the codifiers of criminal legislation see no harm in placing disciplinary penalties in the category of punishments. In the same context, it would be necessary to think of seeing no harm in handing the power to file disciplinary cases over to the Office of the Public Prosecutor.

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi recommended that coordination take place between the Offices of the Public and Administrative Prosecutors. Through such coordination, it would be possible rapidly to eliminate all obstructions to the smooth flow of criminal cases; therefore, having the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor take the initiative of sending papers to the Office of the Public Prosecutor whenever a criminal offense is discovered is essential if the Office of the Public Prosecutor is to be able to engage in its investigation quickly.

The general attorney for the Office of the Higher Prosecutor of Ill-Gotten Gains demanded that in order to prevent these abovementioned obstructions, an agency be appointed within the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor which would enjoy an adequate level of judiciary competence so that it would be able to evaluate whether or not the papers in the stage of notification entailed the suspicion of a crime, and, if they did, to send the papers to the Office of the Public Prosecutor to initiate the investigation of them, so that it could make its statements regarding the suspicion of a crime. If the lack of such suspicion seemed apparent to it from papers, it would have to return them to the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor so that it could adopt the measures it considered appropriate on the administrative violations, in view of the importance with which criminal occurrences are distinguished, which is greater than the importance of administrative violations.

What, now, does the person in charge of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor have to say? Counsellor Budayr al-Alfi began his statement by saying that the judiciary agencies were all operating in accordance with the provisions of the law, which gave them specific areas of competence, that the agencies' goal, first and last, was the public interest, that they cooperated for the sake of attaining this goal, and that any attempt to usurp the jurisdiction of a given body would mean an increase in burdens, for which there was no justification. Every body was basically weighted down with its own burdens.

The judges in the higher administrative court of the Council of State, in 1975, reached agreement that criminal and disciplinary cases were independent, since disciplinary violations started with employees' violations of the duties and requirements of their positions or the dignity and standing of the positions, while criminal offenses were violations against the society by the accused employees, as prohibited by the Penal Code and criminal laws. The independence certainly existed, even if there was a connection between the two sides.

The director of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor added that it had been established, in the annual reports on the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor's activities, that the public crimes presented to the Office of the Administrative prosecutor of which the Office of the Public Prosecutor is informed, did not exceed 3.5 percent of the total cases the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor investigated a year. It was established by the last report, for 1981, that the cases of administrative and financial violations the prosecutor's office ventured to investigate totalled 16,622, while those of the above which constituted public crimes of various kinds came to 589. Therefore overlap was not at issue at all, except in the case of this small percentage of the total cases the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor investigated.

As regards the suspicion that was raised regarding duplications in investigation, Counsellor Budayr al-Alfi went on to say that, in this small percentage of cases, that was nullified by the conclusion which the administrative and disciplinary judiciary arrived at, that the two cases were independent of one another. That is, in accordance with the law establishing it (Law 117 for 1958), the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor assumed charge of investigating the administrative and financial violations of which it was informed.

If the investigation determined that there had been a criminal offense, the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor would submit the papers to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, which would take charge of the disposition of the investigation from the criminal standpoint; the discussion of disciplinary responsibility would be delayed until the criminal disposition was completed, if it was not feasible to rule on the elements of this disciplinary responsibility through the investigation, because the two responsibilities were interconnected.

The director of the prosecutor's office referred to one case as an example of the foregoing--the case bearing on the chairman of the board of the Canal Marine Installations Company in Port Said. He was charged with appropriating 48,000 pounds in transfers disbursed in the name of foreign experts working on company contracting activities, speculating with the company's money and borrowing money from banks at interest rates of up to 15 percent on the claim that he was establishing projects from which it did not appear that the company had any revenues; in addition, there were no documents related to these projects, and he also was charged with forging data on the company budget, and discrepancies in data on a contract the company had made to erect a floating dock with a contractor.

The Port Said Office of the Administrative Prosecutor concluded that since these violations constituted criminal offenses which were punishable by the Penal Code, it considered that it should inform the Office of the Public Prosecutor, since the jurisdiction of the Office of the Public Prosecutor extended to foreigners who committed crimes on national soil, and postponed the examination of the criminal responsibilities. It informed the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the incident in December 1981. It has not been disposed of yet, and the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor has not received any information on the conclusion of the investigations.

For this purpose, the public prosecutor issued a bulletin in which he requested the members of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor of the results of the disposition of criminal cases with the objective of establishing cooperation between the two judiciary bodies on the disposition of these cases.

Counsellor Budayr al-Alfi said that, however, in the cases in which the act was at the same time a criminal offense and a disciplinary violation and it was possible to separate them, the bylaws of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor issued by Republican Decree 489 for 1958 required the member of the prosecutor's office to specify the financial and administrative responsibility and to investigate that without waiting for a final disposition of the criminal case. For example, if a public official was arrested in a house which was being run as a brothel and was caught in the act, here a total separation would be evident between the two responsibilities, and therefore the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor had to exercise its responsibility regarding the official.

In this area, the higher administrative court has judged that accusing an official of a crime, specifically one such as that in the above example, was the most serious thing that could befall a public position and damage its reputation and it was

necessary to proceed to rule on the disciplinary case without waiting for a finding on criminal cases for the sake of the interest of the job and the public interest.

The director of the prosecutor's office said, "We have tried to extend the period of investigations involving criminal offenses by drawing up special provisions for the relationship between disciplinary and criminal cases in the new draft law on the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor, which the Prosecutor's Office has prepared and sent to the Ministry of Justice. The purpose of this amendment is to eliminate the duplication of procedures that arises and to avoid extending the time period of the investigations. This regulation is carried out on the following basis: first, the investigations by the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor have the same status and effect as the investigations of the Office of the Public Prosecutor as far as it deals with occurrences that constitute criminal offenses. The investigations of the Office of the Public Prosecutor will have all the effects which are derived from investigations by the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor, as far as disciplinary cases go, since both prosecutor's offices are supplied with the investigations of the other and take charge of disposing of them in their proper place or after discharging them, if it considers that there is a justification for that, with the objective of preventing a repetition of procedures and in the urge to accelerate the disposition of investigations.

"Second, the principle of the independence of criminal offenses from disciplinary crimes, which the higher administrative court has reached agreement on. The gist of this is that both the Offices of the Public and Administrative Prosecutors must adopt their measures in their proper places to determine their own responsibility with regard to them. It is not inevitable that progress in the investigation or trial of either criminal or disciplinary offenses makes it necessary to stop the progress being made in the other offense. Rather, each is independent in terms of its own progress and its own measures, and this leads to efficiency in the investigation of both cases.

"Third, the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor may decide to avoid informing the Office of the Public Prosecutor of criminal offenses of little importance which are unearthed in its investigations, and settle for specifying the disciplinary responsibility for them, in codification of the work that has actually been done on that in the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor, to alleviate the burdens on the Office of the Public Prosecutor which usually resorts to this measure when criminal cases are of little importance. Above and beyond that, this measure does not mean the disposition of criminal cases and it does not tie the hands of the Office of the Public Prosecutor in disposing of them."

Counsellor Budayr al-Alfi concluded his statement by saying that the Offices of the Administrative and Public Prosecutors were working within the fields of their respective jurisdictions in order to cope with public criminal and disciplinary offenses, and there was no conflict between the two bodies. Rather, there was cooperation for the sake of the public interest, and the obligation was for the two judiciary bodies to cooperate in investigating the numerous cases which were a burden on both of them.

Finally, Article 17 of the Law on the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor ordered that the Office of the Public Prosecutor be provided with the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor's investigations if the investigation revealed the presence of criminal offenses and to dispose of the investigation in the light of it, or carry it out, if there were circumstances that made that mandatory. That is, investigation by the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor saved the time of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, and if it considered that that ought to be completed it ought to do so and dispose of it, on condition that that be done speedily.

The study we have performed on the phenomenon of the overlap between the two laws is hereby concluded. Our objective in it was to reveal duplication among judiciary bodies as represented by the proliferation of investigative and trial bodies dealing with a single act. We are presenting this to the minister of justice, in his capacity as the person who has the jurisdiction to recommend the amendments of laws, to the People's Assembly, which is the legislative body that approves the laws, and to the body to which supervision of the application of these laws is assigned--namely the higher council of judiciary authorities--in search of an answer to the basic question: who will resolve this legal overlapping?

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CSO: 4504/468



## SPECIALIZED COUNCILS PRESENT REPORT ON FOOD PROBLEM

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 17 Aug 82 p 6

/Article: "An Important Report to President Mubarak on the Strategy for Self-Sufficiency in Food"/

/Text/ Dr 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim, the general supervisor of the specialized national councils, has presented President Husni Mubarak with the complete report on the activities of the National Council for Production and Economic Affairs. The most important of these is the strategy for self-sufficiency in food which basically is linked to agricultural production in order to bring about maximum self-sufficiency and fill the deficit in food within a realistic framework in terms of our national resources.

In the realm of industrial strategy, the report put emphasis on a number of principles, most important of which is developing the public sector by separating management from ownership. It stated that industrialization policy has the goal of enabling domestic industry to fulfill local needs and export to foreign markets, while linking import policy to the goals of industrial development plans in order to protect local production and give priority to the correction of problems facing certain sectors which serve industry, in particular the construction, electricity, transport and communications sectors.

### Coping with the Imbalance

The report includes the need to cope with the foreign trade imbalance by following non-traditional development policies to help establish a productive structure possessing an internal equilibrium which will be founded on a broad base of diverse sectors and activities, in the context of stable legislation and economic decrees, stable structures in the agencies carrying them out, and the grant of priority to the completion of replacement, renovation and expansion projects in the production of intermediate and basic commodities, while coordinating and integrating various financial, tax, monetary and sugar-related economic policies.

### Domestic Production

The report determined the general context of tourist strategy; this includes tourist buildings as a major source of national income and the confrontation of

obstacles impeding tourist development through specific short range and also intermediate and long range recommendations and proposals.

In all these strategies, consideration has been given that they should arise from Egypt's special circumstances by concentrating on, developing and supporting domestic production and having it depend fundamentally on its intrinsic capability and resources to guarantee independence in the development process.

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CSO: 4504/472



## PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 1 Aug 82 p 3

[Article: "The Problems of the Private Industrial Sector"]

[Text] During the last speech given by President Husni Mubarak, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the July revolution, he stated that the government was committed to eliminating the problems and obstacles which confront the private sector and to providing the private sector with an opportunity to effectively participate in Egypt's economic development and national economy. This is perhaps what impels us to discuss the problems of this important sector and to become acquainted with both the view of the Federation of Egyptian Industries and the position taken by the Ministry of Industry.

AL-SIYASI interviewed a large number of people who represent the private sector and the Federation of Egyptian Industries which represents the owners of 6,700 privately-owned factories. A great many of these people agreed that the private industrial sector is facing stiff competition from foreign goods which are pouring into the country either as a result of the system of importing without currency conversion or because some joint ventures, before beginning their production, are permitted to import finished goods which are similar to the products manufactured by the [Egyptian] private sector. This latter action is undertaken on the pretext of acquainting consumers with them, but then the joint ventures turn around and continue importing them for long periods of time. In the final analysis this has a negative effect on similar products which are locally produced, makes it difficult to market them, and paralyzes the capital invested in them.

#### Customs Duties

Sulayman 'Abd al-Fattah, owner of a textile factory, said that these imports should be studied within the framework of a general plan for importing and that permission to import such goods should be granted only by the authorities in the Ministry of Trade who are responsible for importing.

He then brought up another issue, which was the fact that customs duties on goods required for production are sometimes higher than the duties leveled on the same commodities when they are imported as finished goods.

The head of the Federation of Egyptian Industries demanded a decrease in the customs duties on raw materials, spare parts, and goods required for production, the value of which amounts to as much as 40 percent of the value of the [subsequently finished] goods. He added that the private industrial sector also suffers from the fact that laws and decrees concerning foreign trade are continually being issued. He demanded that these laws be made permanent ones so that issuing them will not constitute an obstacle to the work being carried on by this important sector.

In order for the private industrial sector to experience an upsurge in business, it is necessary to set aside a portion of the tax on commercial and industrial profits for the purpose of lowering the interest rate on the financing provided to small industrial companies, and it is also necessary to provide areas in the new cities, at nominal prices, for the establishment of integrated industrial complexes.

In 1980 the value of industrial production, both public and private, totalled about 7.865 billion Egyptian pounds, and this represents an increase of 16 percent over 1979. In spite of all of its problems and obstacles, the private sector's share in this total was about 1.648 billion Egyptian pounds, that is, about 21 percent of this total production figure. Also, this sector accounts for 750,000 workers, and this figure equals 57.6 percent of the total number of workers in the public sector installations. Furthermore, exports by the private industrial sector totalled 72 million Egyptian pounds.

#### The Role of the Development Bank

In view of its belief in the importance of the private industrial sector, the Industrial Development Bank has set up training courses for the owners of private sector factories in order to provide them with training concerning with the production of machinery.

'Abd al-Hamid Qabudan, head of the Industrial Development Bank, said that if the private sector helps to produce the equipment and machinery which it needs, this will accomplish two goals: 1) the production of this machinery will involve production by other industries, and 2) this will save the hard currency which is being spent to import such equipment.

The Industrial Development Bank also encourages young growing industries--for the purpose of lightening [Egypt's] balance of payments burden, training [Egypt's] work force, and providing various forms of technical aid to all of those who do business with the bank.

#### Supporting Economic Development

The head of the bank went on to say: "In spite of the rise in the interest rate on bank loans in foreign currencies, the bank--in view of the fact that it is a government establishment--is a non-profit institution. The bank supports economic development and stimulates industrialization in our country in view of the fact that it is the real basis for the revival of our economy.

In view of this, the bank has issued a decree that the interest rate not go above 11 percent, so that our citizens will not refrain from investing in the various areas of industry."

#### Method of Development

But how can the private sector be developed?

Dr Ra'fat Shafiq, professor of industrial planning at the Institute of National Planning, said: "The private sector should change over from being interested in consumer industries to being interested in investment industries and industries which produce intermediate goods. In line with this, it is necessary to pass legislation which favors people who invest in these latter types of industries over those who invest in consumer industries. Furthermore, it is necessary to encourage the private sector which works in the area of consumer industries to come out of the sphere of [merely concerning itself with] the domestic market and meet [Egypt's] export needs."

"The key to the growth of the private sector depends upon clarity of vision as far as the strategy of industrial development in Egypt is concerned. My opinion is that there is a lack of such strategy. We must have vision concerning the future in order to define the role to be played by Egypt's private industrial sector and the role to be played by the joint private sector."

"If these roles are defined in the form of a program for industry which will be pursued for a period of, for example, 5 years, then it will be possible to eliminate many of the private sector's obstacles."

#### The Role of the Ministry of Industry

The Ministry of Industry, in turn, has undertaken the preparation of a new plan to bring about an upsurge in business for the private industrial sector. The plan includes increasing the funds allocated for the Industrial Development Bank for the purpose of meeting the demands and needs of the private sector.

Mahmud Hilal, the first undersecretary for commercial and economic affairs in the Ministry of Industry, said: "The ministry will hold semiannual conferences in which the Federation of Egyptian Industries, the Federation of [Egyptian] Chambers of Commerce, and all other chambers [of commerce] will be participating in order to discuss means of stimulating the private sector, become acquainted with each of the difficulties faced by this sector, and attempt to overcome these difficulties."

"The ministry will also organize by owners of private sector factories to a number of the more advanced countries in order that they become familiar with everything new there that is going on in the field of modern industry."

## NATIONAL RAT-ERADICATION CAMPAIGN DISCUSSED

### Preparations for Campaign

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 Aug 82 p 6

[Article: "National Rat-Control Campaign as of 1 September; Experiment in al-Fayyum To Protect Cats; 100,000 Workers and 50,000 Agricultural Engineers Take Part in Campaign"]

[Text] A national rat-control campaign will begin in Upper and Lower Egypt Governorates as of 1 September.

Preparations for the campaign were begun yesterday in the governorates of al-Qalyubiyah, al-Daqahliyah and al-Sharqiyah by dredging the drainage canals, eliminating weeds, removing dirt from atop drainage canals and bridges, cutting off bamboo and using conventional (Andrinin and zinc phosphide) pesticides as well as localized varieties of pesticides supplied by the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank.

A central operations room has been set up at the Ministry of Agriculture under the chairmanship of Engineer Bahjat 'Amru, the ministry's undersecretary for pest control affairs.

The central operations room includes the delegates of 15 ministries and government agencies represented in the national rat-control campaign, including the Ministries of Health, Local Government, Religious Trusts, Defense and Information.

### Rewarding Wages

Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture, has stated that it has been decided to pay daily wages ranging from 150-400 piasters to all participants in the control campaign, depending on the wage levels in each governorate. The number of workers taking part in this campaign amounts to nearly 100,000. A reward equalling a 20-day wage will be paid to each of the agricultural engineers taking part in the campaign, numbering altogether 50,000 engineers in the various governorates.

#### 4.5 Million Pounds for Pesticides

Engineer Bahjat 'Amru, the undersecretary of agriculture for control affairs, has stated that a total of 6,000 tons of (Clearat, Comafin and Tomorin) pesticides valued at 4.5 million pounds are being currently imported from England and France.

Transports coming from abroad are being currently unloaded at the work sites in the governorates with the help of the armed forces.

The campaign will last 30 days and will be followed by maintenance operations at the sites already cleared.

The campaign will be repeated every 6 months for 3 years to come.

#### Rat Incineration

Engineer Bahjat 'Amru has asserted that the effects of the new variety of pesticides to be used in the intense campaign will show on the rats 5 days after the pesticides are used. The [dead] rats will be then incinerated immediately to prevent the outbreak of diseases.

The ministry is currently following up hour by hour the arrival of transports loaded with pesticides so that they may be unloaded immediately and so that the pesticides may be transported to the governorates directly in preparation for initiating the intensive campaign on 1 September.

#### Four Governorates in November

The rat-control campaign in the four governorates of Asyut, Aswan, Qina and Sawhaj will begin at the beginning of November after the crops are harvested.

A delegation from the FRG, which is financing the project with 16 million marks, will arrive at the beginning of next month to discuss the executive steps for initiation of the project.

The Ministry of Agriculture has secured the needed pesticides, especially in the governorates of Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. The agricultural engineering divisions will provide farmers and housewives with instructions on how to use bait inside homes.

#### Eradication Plan

The Ministry of Agriculture's control plan, which has been conveyed to the provincial agriculture directorates, is based focusing on collective eradication, on continued control, on the application of the proper pesticides, on devoting attention to safe storage [of crops] and on training people charged with eradication on the use of pesticides.

An agricultural engineer, assisted by workers hired to cover a 200-feddan area, will perform the eradication operations.

The plan calls for the rat-control agency in each governorate--agencies which it has been decided to form and to represent at the level of districts and villages--to measure the rat population density every 2 weeks to determine the eradication status and the proper time to intervene with pesticides. It has also been decided to form a subsidiary operation room in each of the governorates under the chairmanship of the engineer concerned. The Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Supply, Religious Trusts and Information will be represented in these centers to follow up on plan implementation, to overcome obstacles and to keep the central operations room informed daily.

The popular organizations in each governorate will participate to enlighten the farmers of the importance of the work and to follow up on implementation of the plan.

#### Purging Armed Forces Camps

The armed forces personnel will carry out rat-control operations in their camps after being supplied with the pesticides and after the individuals selected by the military units are trained.

#### Farmers Take Part in Campaign

The farmers will be present in their fields while the campaign is being carried out to notify of the presence of any rat holes, of the areas where rats are found in large numbers and the areas where crop damage is extensive due to rat infestation.

#### Pesticide Application

Pesticides will be applied in areas adjacent to village buildings, in rat holes found all along roads, on culverts built over irrigation canals, in drainage canals, on dirt piles resulting from [canal] dredging, on manure piles, in fallow areas of land located between cultivated areas, in abandoned irrigation canals, in cinderblock kilns, in haystacks and stacks of dry stalks, in poultry pens, in sheep and cattle paddocks, in crop granaries, between stacks of gunnysacks, tomato and pumpkin patches, orchards, date palm trunks, reed growth areas, under bridges, next to canal locks, in shacks found in cultivated lands, in straw and dried clover heaps, fodder and feed storehouses and in cemeteries.

The agricultural engineer will then check the baited areas to determine the prescribed amounts of pesticides, especially in areas where pesticides are overconsumed.

#### Ministry of Health Plan

The Ministry of Health has prepared a complete plan to participate in the national rat-control campaign. Dr Ahmad Taha stated that the campaign will be carried out in all Lower Egypt governorates which have been divided according to the so-called agricultural subdistrict map which includes both the agricultural and population (jurisdictions).

The health affairs directorates in all these governorates have been supplied with the necessary pesticides and the equipment needed to apply the pesticides.

It has also been decided to set up an operations room in each of these governorates to follow up on the situation and to send daily reports to the operations room at the Ministry of Health.

The ministry's tests on all the pesticides used in this campaign have proven the pesticides to be successful and highly effective.

The ministry has trained 4,000 health inspectors and agricultural engineers on eradication work this year. The ministry also trained 6,000 health inspectors and agricultural engineers last year.

Dr Wafiyah Mahmud, the head of the rodent research and control section of the Ministry of Health's Entomology Research Institute, stated that the ministry is participating in the campaign side by side with the ministries concerned and is engaged in rat-control activities in village, district and city houses in the various governorates and in the installations in these governorates.

The campaign includes four phases:

Preparation phase: The ministry conducted a comprehensive survey in the governorates scheduled to undergo rat-eradication work to find out the characteristics and type of rats existing in them and to make a full count of the workers involved in rat eradication and of the number of traps, tools and equipment necessary and to designate sites for setting up fixed pesticide stations.

The ministry also trained the workers, including both health inspectors and agricultural engineers, on eradication operations and on follow up and maintenance work after the eradication campaign with the aim of preserving the situation after the eradication work. Permanent pesticide stations will be set up for the purpose of continued control.

The ministry has further prepared a health education plan for citizen participation with the agencies in the campaign, for training the citizens on control efforts and for enabling the citizens to understand the health and economic aspects of the problem.

Second phase: This is the phase of carrying out the eradication plan which differs in cities and villages.

Insofar as villages, hamlets and houses adjacent to cultivable areas are concerned, the control teams will inspect all houses and place the poisons, baits and pesticides in rat holes, especially between ceilings and walls so that they may be out of children's, poultry's and livestock's reach.

Insofar as districts and villages are concerned, they will be divided into the following:

Sites with a high rat population, such as slaughterhouses, markets, barns and quarters with high population density and poor environmental conditions: These

areas will be surveyed fully and then treated with pesticides under the supervision of the people in charge of the campaign.

The relatively rat-free areas, such as houses and civil buildings, which will be supplied with pesticides, depending on the level of rat infestation in them.

Maintenance phase: This phase is designated to insure a low rate of rodent propagation in order to be able to wipe out the rodents with the smallest effort possible after the campaign by setting up permanent pesticide stations.

Then follows the control-evaluation phase. This evaluation is made by laying traps in the [treated] areas to find out the decline rate of rat propagation.

Dr Wafiyah Mahmud, the head of the rodent research and control section, said that the pesticides used in this campaign are of the multi-dose and coagulation-preventing variety.

In Kafr al-Shaykh

Governor of Kafr al-Shaykh Muhammad Naji Shatlah issued a decision forming an operations room in the governorate to follow up the rat-control campaign under the chairmanship of Engineer 'Ala' al-Din al-Sunbati, the head of the agricultural sector, and with the assistant security director, the health director, a representative of the armed forces and a representative of the Popular Council as members.

The armed forces will take part in rat control, especially along the irrigation and drainage canals, by torching rat holes and weeds.

Each agricultural engineer or assistant agricultural engineer has been assigned an area of 100-150 feddans in which to apply the rat pesticides.

Engineer 'Ala' al-Sunbati has stated that a complete survey has been made of the drainage and irrigation canal bridges and of the railroads which are among the rats' favorite places.

The Directorate of Health will carry out the control work in the villages and the cities. Moreover, all hospitals and ambulances will be equipped to deal with any case of poisoning among the citizens as a result of the pesticides. The directorate will also immediately gather and clear away dead rats and will spray the sites concerned with disinfectants.

Engineer 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Nahas, the general director of agriculture in Kafr al-Shaykh, has stated that the Directorate of Agriculture workers, the agricultural guides, the heads of the local units and all the popular representatives will take part in the campaign.

Vehicles have been prepared to transport pesticides to any spot immediately and as quickly as possible.



## Financial Incentives

The governor has announced that financial incentives and appreciation citations will be awarded to whomever performs a positive role in the campaign.

## Experiment in al-Fayyum

In al-Fayyum, Engineer Yasin Muhammad 'Uthman, the head of the agriculture sector, warns that as a result of the use of poisons to eradicate rats, the number of their natural enemies, such as cats, has begun to decline because they eat these poisons. This has beset the natural balance between rats, which multiply at a high rate, and their enemies and has turned this balance in favor of the rats.

Engineer 'Uthman calls for focusing on the use of two kinds of pesticides, namely: Zinc phosphide which kills rats immediately. The problem with this pesticide is that it alerts the rats and they refrain from returning to the site in which they first consume the poison. This is because rats organize themselves in groups and send one of the group members to explore the site in which they plan to feed. If the advance member does not return, the group backs away from the site.

Another fault with the zinc phosphide is that it kills livestock which consume it because it spreads in the fields. Some peasants use this pesticide at times to poison livestock and enemies and this is why the ministry has curtailed its use.

The second kind of pesticides causes thinning of the blood [decoagulant] and has two advantages: It kills a rat over a long period of time and makes it difficult for [other] rats to detect the fatal poison.

Experiments have proven that rats are abundant in the districts of Sinnuris and Tamiyah. Thus the eradication campaign was begun in them. But we have noticed that the number of rats increased after the campaign subsided because the remaining rats gain a degree of immunity. The law of nature calls for increasing the offspring of any species after an eradication campaign. The other three districts in al-Fayyum are in better condition insofar as the rat population is concerned. Rat population rates in these districts are smaller than in the other two districts.

Therefore, a balance must be established between rats and their natural enemies and rat-control efforts must be carried out to the extent which insures this balance.

He also said: "We recently consulted (Drane Runce), a British Ministry of Agriculture expert, who advises that control efforts be carried out when the land is fallow in the months of June and October. Personally, I am fully convinced of this and we will implement it in al-Fayyum.

"We are currently preparing for a governorate-level campaign to have the farmer take part in the rat-control effort by supplying him with pesticides which

he will apply with his own knowledge in the sites that he chooses so as to keep his livestock away from these sites. This will also be coupled with an intensive information campaign which has been approved by Tharwat 'Atallah, the governor."

Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture, is keeping this experiment under consideration. If the experiment proves successful, he will apply it in the other governorates, bearing in mind the special conditions of certain governorates.

#### Comment on Campaign

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2828, 23 Aug 82 pp 10-11

[Article by Dr 'Ali al-Din Hilal: "Rats and Egyptian Policy"]

[Text] The manner in which the government has dealt with the rat issue is an example of the method of administration and policy characterizing the government's tackling of issues. Policy is not only what the United States, Russia and Israel do. Nor is it just the speeches, movements and actions of the head of the state. Policy is fundamentally the manner in which the government faces the citizens' problems and in which it tackles their issues.

This method is characterized by three things:

#### 1. The absence of planning and the short-term viewpoint.

By virtue of the rapid cabinet changes and considering the fact that the average lifespan of the cabinet did not exceed 8 months in the 1970's, a minister is no longer concerned with long-term issues which are usually the more important issues. The minister's main interest lies in avoiding a catastrophe during the months he expects to stay in the cabinet and to have the largest number of ceremonies inaugurating this or that project held during his term. Due to the shortness of time, the minister's attention is focused on projects which can be completed in a short time.

Due to the absence of a general national plan, the plan changes with the change of ministers and due to the absence of long-term government programs, the minister pays no attention to the early danger signs or to still beginning and developing problems which can be sowed by smaller efforts at this stage. But according to the prevalent view, as long as the problem is not evident, then it is not necessary to bring it up and "let sleeping dogs lie," as the proverb goes.

One of the rules of this method is to disregard the warnings of journalists and writers who point out what problems may develop in the future if not dealt with under the pretext that journalists and writers are not specialists (an example of this is that the Ministry of Agriculture, despite the warnings of certain governors, has continued to declare that the situation is not serious).

What we must know without avoiding the issue is that no problem emerges overnight and that the rat problem, like the issue of illiteracy eradication, the

issue of the weakness of the educational standard and like the economic crisis, had its early signs and indicators, that no attention was paid to this problem at the outset, that it was underestimated, or exploited, until it intensified and until it was no longer possible to conceal it from the public opinion.

Naturally, the readily available excuse to justify this negligence is the lack of resources and the meagerness of the appropriations.

2. Exaggeration of the problem: To conceal the faulty planning and the failure to deal with the problem at its outset, the officials resort to evoking the interest of the public opinion by exaggerating the problem and citing it as a threat to the country's economic or social future. Suddenly, it is said that rats are the main danger threatening the Egyptian agriculture, that they are more serious than the cotton pest and that they consume crops valued at \$1 billion or more than one-half the U.S. aid (8 October 1981).

Some of the statements appearing last week are similar to military communiques and bring back to mind the memories of the October war. A prominent official of the Ministry of Agriculture told AKHBAR AL-YAWM (7 August): "We are conducting a detailed study in this regard with the armed forces and the local governments. The army will cover the entire republic with its flame throwers to wipe out weeds in irrigation and drainage canals."

The Governor of al-Sharqiyah said (AL-AKHBAR, 9 August): "We will start by attacking the holes to which rats retreat in the bridges of irrigation and drainage canals and will spray drainage canals and lakes with napalm. We tried napalm in al-Sharqiyah in the past 2 years but it did not succeed in wiping out rats. Perhaps the armed forces' plan will be beneficial in this respect."

Thus, the public opinion becomes convinced that we are facing a ferocious enemy, that we are using napalm and flame throwers to fight it and that the armed forces are preparing plans to destroy this enemy now that the civilians have failed to do so. The officials also speak of the high intelligence and resourcefulness of the rats and of the various Norwegian, Sa'idi [reference to Upper Egypt] and mixed-breed rats. All that remains is to accuse a foreign country of being behind this "rat invasion."

To create an awareness of the difficulty of the problem, there is no objection in this regard to suggesting the need to invite foreign expertise to take part in finding a solution to the problem. This governmental logic no longer surprises me now that a foreign firm has taken charge of cleaning Cairo Airport.

One of the open-door economy companies has exploited the occasion to sell Japanese devices that kill rats with supersonic waves!

3. A false sense of accomplishment: Under such circumstances, special budgets are allocated, the papers laud the control efforts and the valor of the state agencies, a false sense of accomplishment and success develops among us and the officials expect the state to honor them in appreciation of their efforts.

But there are questions that nobody raises:

Who is responsible?

How did the problem develop?

Why was it not dealt with in its early stages?

What are the mistakes, and results, of the previous control campaigns and what is the reason for the shortage of financing and resources?

Moreover, why haven't we heard of any minister or high-ranking official resigning due to the lack of resources in the face of a danger which he believes to be posing a threat to the country's economy?

Frankly, the justifications cited in the article of the minister of agriculture in AL-AKHBAR (21 July) are not convincing--justifications such as "the piling up of garbage in the cities and of field leftovers in the villages, the abundant weeds growing along irrigation bridges and the primitive method of crop storage." These problems have existed among us for many years. So what is the new development that has led to the increased danger of rats?

If we truly want to start correctly, then "accountability" must regain its place in our life. Accountability does not only mean punishment for embezzlement, theft or graft because such punishment is normal and is regulated by the law. Accountability also means failing the responsibilities of the public service job with which society has entrusted the high-ranking officials.

The starting point is to bring the ministers to account for what they did or what they promised during their term in office. This constitutes a guarantee for the public interest and protects the ministers themselves from irresponsible rumors or accusations that may be raised against them.

I don't know why the People's Assembly, for example, has not begun examining and investigating the statements made by the ex-deputy prime minister for economic affairs, the rosy picture he painted of the Egyptian economy and the reasons that urged him to do so because he still clings to his opinion and insists on its correctness!

Why hasn't the Assembly formed a fact-finding committee to deal with the issues of financial and administrative corruption and with the corruption cases reported nearly every day by the press in order to find out their causes and motives and to reveal the circumstances that have led to these cases so as to develop a responsible public opinion hostile to them?

Let us understand that only a weak society conceals its shortcomings and faults and lets them grow until they intensify and explode whereas a strong and capable society faces such faults frankly and clearly and tackles its drawbacks without shame or fear and without gloating or vengeance. Society's real solidarity lies in its confronting itself in times of misfortune.

If rats are causing us all this struggle, how will we face the challenges of the 1980's and the world in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon?

8494

CSO: 4504/489

## BRIEFS

PROMINENT AUTHOR DENIES INTERVIEW--The well-known author Khalid Muhammad Khalid yesterday issued a statement in which he denied that he had given an interview to the newspaper AL-AHALI concerning the July revolution. He said that he had not met with any of the editors of the newspaper, that no interview had taken place, and that the editor [in chief] should have observed standards of journalistic integrity. In its edition of last Wednesday, AL-AHALI published what it labelled an interview with Khalid Muhammad Khalid--taken from an interview held with him 7 months ago by the Qatari magazine AL-DAWHAH. The author had made it a condition that the interview not be published anywhere else. However, AL-AHALI published part of the interview without obtaining permission from him, without stating that the interview had been taken from another publication, and without taking into consideration the principle that a writer has the right to review anything which has been written by him some time ago. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Jul 82 p 8] 9468

NEW DEPUTY MINISTERIAL POWERS--Counsellor 'Adil 'Abd-al-Baqi, the minister for Council of Minister affairs and minister of state for administrative development, said that the deputy minister's jurisdiction in the new system would be to help the competent minister set out the ministry's general plans and policies, and that he would chair the council of heads of sectors and central departments in the event the competent minister was not present. He stated that the deputy minister would also exercise the powers the minister delegated to him, and he declared that the deputy minister in every ministry would be chosen by appointment by the heads of the various sectors in the ministry by special decree and that this appointment would not require that he leave his position as sector chief. He also stated that people to be appointed in the future to positions of central department heads or sector heads would receive the salaries and allowances stipulated by law for the positions that have been abolished, which were equivalent to those of first deputy minister and deputy minister, and there would be no reduction in the levels currently stipulated. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Aug 82 p 1/ 11887

CSO: 4504/472

EMIGRE PAPER BLASTS KHOMEYNI, CLIQUE, FOR 'MASSACRE, DEVASTATION'

Vienna MOWJ in Persian 16 Aug 82 pp 9, 11, 14

[Text] The five uncalculated attacks by Khomeyni's army for the occupation of Basra ended in defeat. The results were casualties of over 27,000 including rural children under the age of fourteen, farmers, decrepit old men and a group of unprotected soldiers. A regime which calls itself the defender of the oppressed, in over three years of inconspicuous rule, has eradicated the very same oppressed. The regime's clique is formed from a bunch of tyrant clergy, narrators of tragedies of Karbala, who have mobilized many of the ignorant rural men and children from here and there in the name of a pilgrimage to Karbala, or receiving the key of heaven and achieving martyrdom. This is done without any initial military training to fight the enemy of Iran, whose mobilization equipment is completely reinforced by the western governments.

Three weeks of war resulted in massacres, a hundred million dollar loss of war equipment, heavy human casualties and embarrassment for Khomeyni and his agents. He continues his attacks, which only causes the death of the young generation of Iran. The Khomeyni promises to occupy Karbala and Najaf and then continue to Quds and help Yasser Arafat and his terrorists, is brought to naught. The voice of the old executioner is suppressed in his throat. Another blow has been inflicted on the morale of the Iranian army.

Although the Iraqi government is the aggressor and criminal, it has gone overboard, and by starting the war, the occupied regions have become devastated, and it has caused the death of thousands of Iranians. It has caused over 200 billion dollars damage to our homeland. Thus Iraq has repeatedly requested ceasefires and declared its willingness to pay war reparations to the government of Iran and withdraw its forces. Why Khomeyni did not accept any of the Iraqi terms and with its intention to occupy Iraq, decided to attack the southern part of this country, is a question which needs deliberation and serious thinking. Here, one answer is definitely clear: Both Khomeyni and Saddam Hussein are foreign agents and both have a mission to annihilate each others natural resources and massacre most of their nation's children.

The air force of both parties have heavily bombarded the oil resources, factories, economic resources, highways and airports of each other and with revolving cannons, have devastated the cities and have fulfilled their mission. Khomeyni's attack on Iraq was to obliterate Iran's claims for war reparation and apparently to give an excuse to Iraq to claim that they were willing to pay reparation and also according to the border agreement of both parties,

to clarify the border lines. But now that Khomeyni has attacked their land, Iran's government is legally an aggressor. Therefore, Iraq will never pay any war reparation to Iran for starting the war and its military attack on Iran. Well, now that these two agents of colonialization, by demolishing the resources of the Iranian and Iraqi people have completed their mission, these gentlemen are busy strengthening the pillar of their power and renewal of their regimes and the losers are the Iranian and Iraqi people.

In the first issue of the fourth year of the MOWJ publication, the speech of the party leader at a Paris conference was published. In this speech, such a day was anticipated clearly. Now we publish a part of the original speech for our readers:

Countrymen, Compatriots!

Remember that what has happened to our nation, is based on the strategic, industrial, military and economic interests of the world powers. Right now, we must not separate the military clashes of Iran and Iraq from the object of the desires of the world powers and creators of the events of Iran's tragedy since the result of the abolishment of all our political, industrial, technological, military and national resources is the interest of the world industrial powers. In this case, only the Iranian and Iraqi people must for many long years be the heir to all this misery, war destruction and political, economic and policy confrontations. It is surprising that those who caused the mishaps and the fall of our homeland and shattered our army cruelly and played with our economy, culture, and nationality for their own desires, now are only obsessed with Iran's problems and vagrancy and do nothing about the continuation of the war between the Iranian people and Iraqi brothers. We people must be alert and identify the adversaries of these problems and confrontations and be concerned about what we have lost and are going to lose. Definitely, our share from the conclusion of such a war is nothing, but adversity, poverty, disease, devastation, economic fall, insecurity, and chaos.

This war does not only guarantee any advantages for our nation, but annihilates our young and active generation who are the firm pillars of a progressive and wealthy Iran. The colonialist powers have pursued the same goal for many years. Today by shattering Iran from all sides, this goal has been fulfilled and a desolate, weak, and shattered Iran is exploited more by the colonialists. What is not under consideration by the world powers are the people of Iran. We again bring to the attention of the adversaries of this war and brother killing, to be aware that the result of this war is nothing but abjectness and humiliation.

This anticipation of the highly educated party leaders has proved to be completely true and the nation of Iran is faced with an unprecedented crisis and a deep whirlpool. Khomeyni in the role of the nation's Imam and theocratic ruler and spirit of Islam, has inflicted such a blow to the Iranian generation, history, culture and civilization that it is unrepairable for many long years. Khomeyni definitely is a catastrophe, fallen upon the Iranian nation. He, like a dreadful tornado, flood, and burning thunderbolt,



has wiped out the Iranians. His dreadful story will be told as one of the most frightening criminal stories of history. Khomeyni's hand is bloody from the massacre of the Iranian offsprings, and tyranny and oppression is visible in his face. Definitely, human history does not recall such a hard-hearted, cruel, pitiless and reckless tyrant. His cliques have been trained in the class of such criminal teachers and to obey his orders, they will take complete vengeance on the noble Iranian people.

Should the kind eat an apple from the farmers orchard, his servants will dig out the trees from the root. When Khomeyni, in the name of leader, imam, and representative of God, does such adversity and cruelty to the people, what do you expect from his cliques? This is Khomeyni, who is directly responsible for all the slaughters, plunders, vagrancy, devastation and homelessness of the people of Iran. He and his agents must answer to all the misery they caused in four years of dictatorship and monopolistic government.

Definitely, the world is the place for retaliation and whatever one does will return to oneself. Moses sees the body of a murdered man in the road. He was puzzled and expressed amazement. He uttered: "Whom did you kill that you are killed so abjectly? Who is going to kill the one who killed you?"

We are confident that the people of Iran will rise and will get their revenge from Khomeyni, his cliques and servants for all these downfalls and historical mishaps. We are certain that we will witness the fall and disgrace of Khomeyni and his cliques.

In fact to kill an innocent is not auspicious, and a good omen for the murderer. Khomeyni is not even an idol for his ignorant partisans. They have realized that Khomeyni is nothing more than an ambitious and self-interested man. His magic and spells do not work anymore. We will soon witness the fall of the shaky adversity stricken pillars of Khomeyni and his cliques, dictatorship regime. That day, the prison doors will open and the chains will be taken from the hands and feet of the noble Iranian people. The voice of freedom of millions of Iranian nationalists in the open political space will tremble the land and sky of Iran. The Iranian sun will come out from under the black masses of clouds and will shine again and its fields and mountains will turn green again.

The Iranian fields and farms will give happy news to the farmers of a new birth and the start of a flourishing and developing era. The sound of the shepherd's flute will be heard returning home from the mountain with his flock, bringing the happy news of freedom to the active and hard working farmers.

The guns, arms and spears which were at the disposal of the village men and women for killing, will be replaced by sickles and ploughs. The whistle of the factories will indicate the revival and revival of strong workers and make us hopeful for the future. In the near future, in the cities, the innocent children, who were driven to the bosom of death before reaching maturity, will walk in the streets with their school uniforms. Finally, the Iranian men and women together and along with each other, will reconstruct Iran.



We hope of the day when we bury Khomeyni, his regime, and his trator clique and burn their shameful corpses in the blaze derived from the hearts of the people of Iran and display their ashes in the museums as criminals of the most tyrannical elements of history for the whole world. We must exhibit their shameful report card in the nurseries up to the universities for the future generations of Iran, in order that the people of Iran will never be deceived by such filthy creatures again. The people of Iran will continue their lives with honor and freedom under God's protection and will be inspired by nationalism. Iran stay alive and eternal.

9815

CSO: 4640/465

EUROPE TO BE DEPRIVED OF OIL IF IRAN'S OIL FLOW DISRUPTED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] Tehran--The unity-inspiring Friday prayers of Tehran in which the Hezbollahi masses participated were held as usual at Tehran University's campus under the leadership of the city's provisional Friday Imam, Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani yesterday.

In his first sermon Rafsanjani threw light on Islamic economic issues and spoke of the "economic crimes" of those who opposed the Islamic revolution and stressed the need for government control of economic affairs.

Directing his remarks to government employees Rafsanjani in another part of his sermon warned that it was not acceptable in the Islamic Republic for the private sector to take precedence over the government sector adding that any who preferred work in a private sector factory or office to work in a government institution cannot be considered a true Moslem.

Rafsanjani later in his sermon affirmed that the Islamic Republic was willing to tolerate various political parties depending on what the contents of their constitutions were, provided such political parties chose to abide by the law.

"We will," he continued, "provide all reasonable freedom to political parties. But if they take advantage of these freedoms to make bombs, train terrorists and indulge in espionage activities as they did before, they will then certainly be stopped and naturally other parties will have to suffer the consequences too."

On the Islamic economy, Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani said that the Islamic government had control over all borders, over exchange and foreign trade and was further responsible for providing for the needs and rights of the nation."

In his second sermon, Tehran's provisional Friday Imam referring to the martyrdom anniversary of Ayatollah Qudusi at the hands of the MKO terrorists last year said that the Islamic Revolutionary Courts and the IRGC with the cooperation of the people had forced the American agents to go into hiding.

Rafsanjani spoke on the establishment of a free university with assistance of people, saying that a communique was to be released in this connection soon which would clarify the ways in which people interested could contribute to the venture.

He then referred to "a conference which was soon to be convened in the region" and asserted that with the downfall of the ex-shah the US had faced an unbalance of forces and tried hard to recover from the blow."

"At first," he went on to say, "they tried to distort the revolution. It, the US tried to deviate the revolution using the liberals and later embarked on a coup against the Islamic regime and once again faces defeat," he said. "It was also an American plot to divert the region to war and in order to fight the Islamic Republic, the Council of Persian Gulf countries was formed," he added.

Iraq, equipped by our enemies, now once in a while makes rocket attacks on our oil installations and it is always magnified by the news agencies. Their aim is to deprive us of oil resources which bring us exchange," he said. "But we declare to the people in the West that they should know that the day we are deprived of our oil, Europe will also be deprived of Persian Gulf Oil.

"Since the outbreak of the war we have announced that we are able to provide for the security of the Persian Gulf but we are also able to cause insecurity in remoter areas with equally capability as well," he said.

Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani concluding his speech drew the attention of Iranian youth to crucial days ahead in regard to war for which we must all prepare ourselves in order to strike the enemy a final blow if they intend to turn the war into a war of attrition."

CSO: 4600/764

## TANKERS BOUND TO PORT INSURED OIL LOAD

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN (IRNA) -- The Islamic Republic of Iran will insure all foreign oil tankers bound for Iranian ports to load oil, with a rate of one percent, announced the Deputy Oil Minister Abbas Honardust Thursday. Disclosing propaganda and economic conspiracies of foreign insurance companies and those of the reactionary countries of the Persian Gulf, Honardust said journals dependent on international insurance companies have announced that insurance rates for tankers loading Iranian oil have multiplied. He said this was part of a pre-fabricated design played by multi-national insurance companies and newspapers fed by them, oil cartels and also regional sheikhs.

To prove that the rise in rates emanated from a plot, Honardust added Iran Insurance Company was ready to insure all tankers which were bound for Iranian ports to load oil with the previous one percent rate.

He declared that crude oil transportation companies could insure their tankers and

the cargo it contained by contacting the Iran Insurance Company.

He continued that the Iranian Insurance Company, a state-owned firm, was accepted at the international level. Speaking on the enemy's efforts to damage the Kharg Island, Honardust declared that the crude oil exports had not been halted even for a day, in the course of the Iraqi imposed war on Iran which was nearing two years.

Iranian oil installations and ports had maintained their capacities and potentials, he went on, and that so far more than 62 Iraqi fighters had been downed in Kharg Island by the Iranian combatants, thus turning the island into a graveyard of the Iraqi fighters.

Reminding that Iran had so far safeguarded the Kharg Island's oil installations and that it will continue to do so, Honardust said those propaganda attacks were due to Iraq's failure to stop the Iranian oil exports through propaganda.

Reiterating that the Iranian oil export shipments had

not been stopped even for a day. Honardust proclaimed the names of 14 oil tankers which had left Iranian ports last week with shipments of crude and light oil for various countries as follows:

"Sea Song" with 2,629,000 barrels for Rotterdam;

"Elpida" with 1,561,000 bls. for M. Europe.

"Golar Kansai" with 588,000 bls for Japan;

"Dolce" with 1,661,000 bls. for Rotterdam;

"Resolute" with 2,407,000 bls. for N. Europe;

"Fabine" with 2,057,000 bls. for N. Europe.

"St. Marcos" with 625,000 bls for India;

"Athenian" with 376,000 bls for Aden;

"Nikos-M" with 1,679,000 bls. for Sarass;

"M Ceyhan" with 1,500,000 bls. for Rotterdam.

"Ypatiana" with 726,000 bls for Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea;

"Arizona" with 943,000 bls. for West Germany.

"Fahir Gunari" with 619,000 bls for West Germany;

"Fahir Gunari" with 619,000 bls for Turkey.

Honardust added that these ships indicated only part of the Iranian crude and light oil exports last week as well as falseness of those propaganda.

CSO: 4600/764

IRAQ

REBEL COMMANDER RETURNS FROM WEST BEIRUT

JN112006 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1645 GMT 11 Sep 82

[Text] Comrade struggler Mas'ud Barzani has sent a message of greetings to staff Maj Gen Hasan Mustafa an-Jaqib, commander in chief of the Iraqi revolution forces, on the occasion of his return [words indistinct] with the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance forces. the commander in chief of the Iraqi revolution forces had joined the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance in confronting the treacherous Zionist aggression supported by U.S. imperialism and the local reactionaires. The great struggler [words indistinct] until they left West Beirut.

In his message, Comrade Mus'ud said that he represented us all, the various parties [words indistinct] led by the Iraqi revolution, in participating with the Palestinian and Lebanese people in [words indistinct] against the treacherous Zionist enemy.

Comrade Mus'ud Barzani affirmed our party's determination to continue the struggle until the dictatorial regime in Baghdad falls [words indistinct] from ruination and destruction. He reaffirmed the complete solidarity of our party and the Kurdistan masses with the just struggle of the Palestinian and Lebanese people and all the Arab nation against imperialism, Zionism and the reactionaries. He also reaffirmed our solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle to liberate their land, return to their homeland and establish their own independent national state on their land. He also affirmed our solidarity with Lebanon to liberate its territory from the treacherous Israeli occupation. [Words indistinct] to staff Maj Gen Hasan an-Naqib, commander in chief of the Iraqi revolution's armed forces.

CSO: 4400/493

## STATISTICAL PROJECTS DESCRIBED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 4 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Ahmad Jadallah: "Projects and Programs In the Bureau Of Statistics 5-Year Plan; Studies On Human Fertility and Of Manpower Surveys"]

[Text] Amman--AL-RA'Y--The goal of the next 5-year plan of the National Bureau of Statistics is to implement several vital projects for raising the level of statistical work in the kingdom, particularly with regard to preparing statistical models, cost of living figures and housing statistics for the villages and cities.

Some of the important projects to be implemented by the bureau are the following:

A building for the bureau and the Jordanian Statistical Training Center.

The goal of the project is to build a new building for the National Bureau of Statistics and the Jordanian Statistical Training Center on a piece of land belonging to the Royal Scientific Association allocated for this purpose. Building plans have been drawn up by the ministry of Public Works. The estimated cost of this project is 650,000 dinars.

Development of the electronic equipment center and data bank.

In 1980 the National Bureau of Statistics installed a powerful computer to ensure accurate and timely results of calculations and statistical surveys and to analyze them thoroughly. There is a need for additional electronic equipment to supplement the existing equipment. In addition, a data bank must be set up for storing all kinds of pertinent data, updating it, retrieving it, and distributing the updated data to its users on a regular basis. The cost of this project is estimated at 593,000 dinars.

### General Agricultural Surveys

The bureau implemented a program for general agricultural surveys in 1975. That was preceded by the general agricultural surveys of 1965 and 1953.

The purpose of the project is to carry out an agricultural survey for 1981 to determine the continual change in the structure of the agricultural sector,

and to gather data relating to agricultural production and food production and distribution. Its purpose is also to gather data relating to the living conditions agricultural workers and their families.

The cost of this program is estimated at 180,000 dinars, which will be spent as follows:

#### Supplementary studies on human fertility:

The National Bureau of Statistics carried out studies on human fertility in 1972, and again in 1976 as part of an international program on human fertility studies.

The bureau will implement this program in 1982 to provide on a regular basis reports on human fertility levels and trends in Jordan and the factors affecting it.

The cost of this program is estimated at 53,000 dinars.

#### Record for wages and salaries.

The purpose of this program is to determine wage and salary trends in all government and private organizations in order to devise a wage and salary policy in light of these trends in the various sectors. This study will be carried out in 1982. The estimated cost of this program will be 200,000 dinars.

#### Family survey program.

The bureau of statistics carried out a study of the family from 1971 to 1978, for various purposes.

The goal of the current program is to provide a supplementary base of economic, social and health reports and statistics on migration by applying the supplementary statistical system at the family level and by observation after developing the methodology for the study as follows:

##### A manpower survey:

The purpose of the survey is to determine the size and composition of the family; to determine the number of individuals of working age (between 15 and 64 years of age) and categorize them according to their connection with the work force; to measure seasonal effects on the workers; and to provide data on the principal professions. It will be implemented over 1 full year, during 1982. The estimated cost of the survey is approximately 297,000 dinars.

##### A study of internal migration and emigration patterns.

The purpose of the study is to determine the proportions of internal migration and emigration abroad, and the factors affecting them; to determine the number of emigrants who return to Jordan after a stay abroad; and to determine



the particulars of the emigrants and the amount of money they send back to Jordan. The cost of this study, which will be implemented between 1 January and 30 April 1983 is estimated at approximately 128,000 dinars.

A study of health and nutritional conditions:

The purpose of this study is to provide data on the predominant health and nutritional situation of people of various ages in rural and urban areas; to determine the predominant gastric diseases and where they are found; and to determine the extent of inoculation against infectious diseases.

The cost of the study, which will be implemented between 1 September and 31 December 1983, is estimated at approximately 119,000 dinars.

9123

CSO: 4404/593

## STUDY ON AGRICULTURAL CROPS SUMMARIZED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 8 Jul 82 p 6

[Article: "A Study On Rainwater Dependent Crops; Jordan Will Require 630,000 Tons Of Wheat Per Annum In the Year 2000"]

[Text] Amman--AL-RA'Y--Dr Muhammad Zaytun, of the Ministry of Supply's Office of Research and Study, has prepared a study on the supply of rainwater dependent crops in Jordan.

According to the study Jordan's agricultural resources, particularly land and water, are very limited, and their utilization is governed by changing weather conditions which overwhelmingly effect production and crops. The total Jordanian land area is 92.6 million dunams which are utilized as follows: rainwater dependent crops: 4,897,000 dunams; irrigated crops: 386,000 dunams; forests: 400,000 dunams; dry areas and grazing areas: 75 million dunams; non-arable land: 11,896,000 dunams.

### The Cultivated Area

The area of land cultivated with wheat in 1975 was estimated at approximately 1,185,000 dunams, and produced 59,250 tons; barley: 529,000 dunams, 11,638 tons; lentils: 149,000 dunams, 5,215 tons; chick peas: 36,000 dunams, 926 tons; yellow corn: 6,000 dunams, 696 tons.

The total dependence on rain in the cultivation of these crops is to a great extent responsible for the fluctuation in the areas under cultivation, and consequently in the local production and yield per dunam. It has been observed that the least area under cultivation was in 1979 when 990,000 dunams were cultivated with wheat, a 74 percent decrease in the total wheat growing area in 1978. (The area cultivated with wheat in 1978 amounted to 1,346,000 dunams). With regard to other grains, in 1980 when the average rainfall was good the area under cultivation with these grains increased noticeably, which led to increased local production.

The quantities of these grains grown locally cover no more than one-third of the requirements of the inhabitants. The number of inhabitants in Jordan in 1975 was 1.89 million, and continued to grow by 3.3 percent, reaching 2,299,000 in 1980. That is an increase of 400,000 over 5 years.

## Imports

In 1975 Jordan was compelled to import 44,824 tons of wheat, 2,628 tons of barley, 1,589 tons of chick peas, 642 tons of lentils and 34,319 tons of yellow corn at a total cost of 8,652,000 dinars, most of which was paid for by the national treasury.

In 1976 the amount of these grains imported rose to 305,369 tons at a cost of 18,642,000 dinars. The quantities of imported grains continued to rise until 1979 when they reached their highest level, 468,255 tons, at a total cost of 29,215,000 dinars. The cost of these imported grains from 1975 to 1980 amounted to 122,690,000 dinars. Through simple arithmetic we find that Jordan can use this money for reclaiming about 12 million dunams if we consider that the cost of reclamation of a single dunam is 10 dinars.

Mechanization of agriculture, agricultural guidance, increasing the areas under cultivation and finding more crop varieties suitable for our local circumstances will lead to increased local production, and consequently to easing the burden on the national treasury.

The study added that Jordan's wheat requirements will increase as its population increases. In 1981 its population required 368,590 tons. If Jordan wants to produce that much it needs 7,227,000 dunams or 7.9 percent of the total area. In 1985 Jordan's population will be 2,719,000 people, who will need an estimated 421,445 tons.

## 4 Million People

In the year 2000 it is estimated that Jordan's population will be more than 4 million. They will need approximately 650,000 tons. Thus those concerned with agriculture must, according to our preliminary calculations, reclaim 12,351,000 dunams or 13.3 percent of the total area of Jordan.

The following is a statistical breakdown of the kingdom's principal grain production:

### Wheat:

1975: Area under cultivation: 1,185 dunams; local production: 59,250 tons; quantity of wheat imported: 44,824 tons; quantity of flour imported: 59,671 tons; quantity of wheat imported: 44,824 tons.

1976: Area under cultivation: 1,375 dunams; local production: 67,130 tons; quantity of wheat imported: 132,358 tons.

Quantity of flour imported: 86,313; estimated per capita annual consumption: 145 kg; quantity of wheat imported 132,538 tons.

1977: area under cultivation: 1,265[,000 dunams]; local production: 53,084 tons; quantity imported: 173,312 tons; quantity of flour imported: 85,103 tons.

Per capita annual consumption: 153 kg.

1979: area under cultivation: 990,000 dunams; local production: 16,830 tons; quantity imported: 211,185 tons; quantity of flour imported: 78,532 tons; per capita annual consumption: 145 kg.

1980: area under cultivation: 1,332,000 dunams; local production: 133,200 tons; quantity imported: 162,912 tons; quantity of flour imported: 118,103 tons.

#### Barley

1975: area under cultivation: 529,000 dunams; local production: 11,638 tons; quantity imported: 162,912 tons; quantity of barley imported: 2,628 tons.

1976: area under cultivation: 536,000; local production: 13,400 tons; quantity imported: 14,657 tons;

1977: area under cultivation: 463,000; local production: 12,038 tons; quantity imported: 67,950 tons;

1978: area under cultivation: 524,000; local production: 14,672 tons; quantity imported: 23,452 tons;

1979 : area under cultivation: 445,000; local production: 4,865 tons; quantity imported: 44,428 tons;

1980: area under cultivation: 523,000; local production: 38,475 tons; quantity imported: 20,521 tons;

#### Lentils

1975: area under cultivation: 149,000; local production: 5,215 tons; quantity imported: 642 tons;

1976: area under cultivation: 230,000; local production: 9,430 tons; quantity imported: 1,141 tons;

1977: area under cultivation: 135,000; local production: 594 tons; quantity imported: 1,515 tons;

1978: area under cultivation: 144,000 dunams; local production: 8,352 tons; quantity imported: 638 tons;

1979: area under cultivation: 72,000 dunams; local production: 792 tons; quantity imported: 640 tons;

1980: area under cultivation: 23,000 dunams; local production: 1,702 tons; quantity imported: 1,020 tons;

## Chickpeas

1975: area under cultivation: approximately 36,000 dunams; local production: 936 tons; quantity imported: 1,589 tons;

1976: area under cultivation: 16,000 dunams; local production: 352 tons; quantity imported: 890 tons;

1977: area under cultivation: 14,000 dunams; local production: 574 tons; quantity imported: 1,180 tons;

1978: area under cultivation: 13,000 dunams; local production: 416 tons; quantity imported: 2,213 tons;

1979: area under cultivation: 26,000 dunams; local production: 416 tons; quantity imported: 7,768 tons;

1980: area under cultivation: approximately 23,000 dunams; local production: 1,702 tons; quantity imported: 6,045 tons;

The study included the following estimates of the kingdom's wheat requirements to the year 2000:

1982: approximately 381,000 tons; 1983: approximately 394,000 tons;

1984: approximately 407,000 tons; 1985: approximately 421,000 tons;

2000: approximately 630,000 tons.

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## BRIEFS

TRADE WITH TURKEY, YUGOSLAVIA--Amman--Petra--Minister of Supply Mr Ibrahim Ayyub and a delegation that accompanied him returned 2 days ago after an official visit to Turkey and Yugoslavia. The delegation included officials from the Jordanian Phosphate Company, the Central Bank and the civilian and military consumer organizations. Mr Ayyub told the Jordanian Press Agency that while in Turkey he conducted talks with the Turkish minister of trade in which they discussed supplying Jordan with 75,000 tons of wheat. The final agreement on this will be consummated in September. They also reviewed a proposal by the Turkish minister of foreign trade for establishing joint projects by the two countries. They discussed the export of Jordanian phosphate to Turkey. The Turks promised to buy larger quantities of Jordanian phosphate during the second half of this year. Mr Ayyub noted that during the talks the Turks proposed buying into the Jordanian Phosphate Company with capital from the Turkish fertilizer factory, while Jordanian phosphate would be sold to Turkey on a regular basis. He said that the delegation visited the (dwyak) and (jima) organizations for the production and marketing of consumer goods where they received samples for study. In talks with officials of these organizations they discussed the possibility of cooperation with the civilian and military consumer organizations in Jordan. The minister added that during his visit to Yugoslavia he met with the deputy prime minister and the minister of trade. They discussed the subject of exporting Jordanian phosphate to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavians promised to buy Jordanian phosphate on a regular basis. They also discussed the idea of exporting Jordanian fruit and vegetables to Yugoslavia through the Yugoslavian National Export Company. A protocol was signed with this company in accordance with which fruit and vegetables will be exported to Yugoslavia by air and Yugoslavian meat will be flown to Jordan. He noted that according to this protocol the Yugoslavian National Export Company will market these Jordanian products in various European countries for Jordan. He said that during the visit to Yugoslavia a contract was concluded for purchasing various items for the civilian and military [consumer] organizations. Mr Ayyub added that during his visit to Italy he signed contracts with several private sector companies for the purchase of certain Italian household utensils and clothes for the two consumer organizations. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 4 Jul 82 p 2] 9123

ALUMINUM PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION--Amman--Petra--The Jordanian Synthetic Fertilizer Company, Ltd began production of aluminum phosphate fertilizer in the last week of June. Dr Hanna 'Awdah, the company's chairman of the board,

sent a letter to the prime minister informing him that the company's production up to the end of this year will be about 175,000 tons of aluminum phosphate and 50,000 tons of phosphoric acid. Dr Hanna 'Awdah said that the company had concluded contracts for the sale of 90,000 tons of its binary aluminum phosphate production, which will be exported in three stages during the next four months. Shipment for export is expected to begin from the port of 'Aqabah. The company also concluded contracts for the sale of 30,000 tons of phosphoric acid, which will be shipped in special freighters before the end of this year. Dr 'Awdah noted that with the beginning of production and shipment operations the synthetic fertilizer company will have brought the project for manufacturing fertilizer in Jordan to the stage of actual production. The company thus joins the other major production companies in Jordan in helping to support the national economy, increase national revenues and make dear Jordan flourish under the leadership of his majesty al-Husayn. Dr Hanna 'Awdah praised the support the company has been receiving from the prime minister and his rightly guided government. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 7 Jul 82 p 3] 9123

STUDENTS IN U.S., USSR--Amman--AL-DUSTUR--The United States of America occupied first place among foreign countries during the last school year with regard to the number of Jordanian students pursuing their higher education abroad. According to sources in the National Bureau of Statistics 6,112 Jordanian students were pursuing their higher education in the United States during the last school year. The Soviet Union occupied second place. The number of Jordanian students there amounted to 4,500, among whom were 150 females. Romania occupied third place with 2,729 Jordanian students, among them 3 females. Yugoslavia followed with 2,717 students. Spain was next with 2,088, among them 7 females. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Jul 82 p 2] 9123

CSO: 4404/593

## LEBANON

### ISRAELI DRUZE ADVISER SEEKS TIES WITH DRUZE IN LEBANON

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Aug 82 p 21

[Article by T'hilah Ofer: "Kamal Mansur, President Navon's Adviser, Visiting Fellow Druze in Lebanon: 'Time Will Tell Who Are the Allies in Lebanon and Whom We Can Trust'; Christians Are Not Quantitatively and Qualitatively Superior"]

[Text] Kamal Mansur, President Navon's adviser for minorities, is now spending a few weeks in Lebanon to meet with his fellow Druze, both secular and religious. Before leaving for Lebanon, he told us: "I intend to get in touch with all Druze groups in Lebanon who can further the cause of unity and relations with Israel. I shall attempt to present my views as a moderate Israeli Druze regarding the problems of the community in Israel, on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon."

Mansur is particularly interested in meeting with Socialist leader Walid Junblat at his residence in al-Muhtarrah; with Majid Arslan, who served as minister of defense, now living in Khaldah near Beirut; and with the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Druze community, Muhammad Abu Shaqra, in 'Amndtur.

#### Many Missions

Mansur has been on many missions in the past on behalf of Israel and has played host to thousands of state guests. He is seeking to establish relationships with the Druze community in Lebanon and with its leaders, not as the president's adviser, but, in his words, "by virtue of his experience of communicating with minorities in northern Israel for over 30 years." He says about himself: "Behind the scenes, I have been involved with Druze affairs in Lebanon in the past as well, and they are aware of Druze affairs in Israel and my stand in these matters. Now what I have known for a long time has been verified, namely, that the Druze in Lebanon have been receiving cassettes with my speeches."

Mansur speaks with pride. He is considered a moderate Druze, and his loyalty to the state of Israel has never been questioned. He is against all extremes: "The mistake of the government in Israel should not be repeated



in Lebanon, namely, rejoicing over Druze who are called Zionists and fearing those called communists. They are both deviants. Most of the Druze are quiet and moderate and one has to understand their mentality. On the Golan Heights, the government did not show patience. It did not understand that in the Middle East you do not use a stop watch. Before they tried to force people to receive ID cards, some 450 had already obtained them, quietly. One could have shown patience. As for Lebanon, time will tell who are the allies there and who can be trusted. In Lebanon, one can make the same mistake of getting excited over uncertain allies."

He maintains that one should not impute quantitative or qualitative superiority to the Christians in general and to the Maronites in particular. As for Israel's relations with the Druze in Lebanon, "one should bear in mind the three things over which a self-respecting Druze will not compromise with anyone: a woman's honor, loyalty to the land and the right to bear arms for honor and freedom."

#### The Wadi--A Symbol

Mansur is concerned that the confiscation of Druze weapons by the IDF as an encouragement to the Phalangists may prompt the Druze to look for arms in undesirable places. "Druze weapons have never been directed against Israel and the IDF. Only against the Phalangists, for self-defense. Do we have to push them toward the Syrians?" Mansur asks.

He says: "In Lebanon, as on the Golan Heights, we have to show patience. If you try to do too much you end up doing nothing."

From the window of his handsome home in the village of Usafiyah on Mount Carmel one has a breathtaking view of the northern valleys, the Galilee and, in the distance, Lebanon and Mount Hermon. Down below is the Shomriyah Valley. "This valley is a symbol of cooperation between the Jews and the Druze, dating back to the British mandate, when illegal immigrants were brought here and Haganah weapons were hidden in the valley. And yet during the early years of the state, my fellow villagers had to obtain special permission to travel throughout Israel. You cannot get everything all at once.

#### Character Certificate

On the other hand, he is upset by the fact that even today the Druze in Israel have to prove their loyalty to the state. "More than 250 Druze have died for the security of Israel, including the Peace for Galilee campaign. This is sufficient proof. Our character certificate is signed with the blood of our sons. We have good people and bad people, just like the Jews."

As adviser to the president for minority affairs, he tries to make peace and help minorities feel part of Israel, even if they do not agree with government policies. When he is able, for instance, to organize a visit of

the president to an Arab village without demonstrations, despite a communist majority in the area, it is a recognition of Israeli sovereignty. "This takes hard work," says Mansur, and so he is not content to visit Lebanon for only 1 or 2 days, but is leaving for several weeks, to learn about the Druze and to bring them closer to Israel.

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## LEBANON

### DRUZE FOUND TO BE WARY OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew No 20, 27 Aug 82 pp 33

[Article by Tufiq Ganam: "Israeli Druze Delegation Visits Lebanese Druze; Cowardly Christians Cling to the IDF and Conspire Against the Druze While Pretending To Help IDF; We Did Not Let the Terrorists Enter Our Villages Because We Believe in Our Religion and Protect Our Women"]

[Text] On Thursday, 12 August, a Druze delegation left Israel to visit the Druze of Lebanon. It was the largest delegation to leave for Lebanon thus far. Some 100 Druze dignitaries, young and old, left early in the morning from Rosh Haniqrah and headed north. The first meeting happened to be with a Christian leader, the archbishop of Tyre. At the meeting, cooperation between Christians and Druze was discussed. This cooperation had taken place despite periodic clashes between the two groups ever since 1860. The delegation went from Tyre to 'Alay, a resort overlooking Beirut from a cool summit. The Druze village was festively decorated for the arrival of the Druze from Israel. Thousands waited in front of the beautiful palace of the Arslan family, and the Amir Majid Arslan, an old man, welcomed the visitors with "Ahlan wasahalan," while leaning on his bodyguards. They proceeded to discuss current events in Lebanon. The emir spoke about Druze-Christian cooperation, pointed out the role of the Druze in running Lebanon and expressed the hope that the present crisis between the Christians and the Druze will pass.

The Israeli delegation called on the Druze of Lebanon to cooperate with the IDF and with the Christians to create a peaceful life and a free Lebanon, without terrorists and killers.

From 'Alay the delegation went to (Bisar) to visit the palace of the Malab family. This is a large family with many relatives in the Galilee and in Lebanon. Here the delegation stayed for the rest of the visit. A sumptuous Middle East meal was served--goats and sheep on huge brass trays as well as a large selection of Druze folk dishes, and the meal was accompanied by shouts, "Today is a feast day."

After the meal, the Druze of both countries conducted a dialogue. The question of the deteriorated relations between Druze and Christians was

discussed at length. According to the Lebanese Druze, the Christians are trying to harm them in several ways, mainly in the form of Phalangist volunteers who help the IDF with road barriers. The Christians take advantage of their barrier duty to harm the Druze. They curse at the Druze, threaten them and even open fire. The Lebanese Druze say that the Christians attack Christian neighborhoods, and if they catch a Druze they torture him. As a result, the Druze attack the Christians, and the general feeling is that the Christians would not dare to attack if they did not have the IDF behind them. The Lebanese Druze went on to say that the Christians had done nothing for the IDF and that the IDF suffered many casualties that could have been prevented if the Christians had helped Israel round up the terrorists and throw them out of Lebanon.

The Israeli Druze, to whom these complaints were addressed, preached moderation and asked their Lebanese brothers not to resort to force of arms. The answer was: There is no one to fight. The cowardly Christians do not carry any weight, and others are not interested in harming the Druze.

This answer reflects the self-confidence of the Druze community in Lebanon, and it was repeated during subsequent visits to Druze centers. The head of the Druze community in Lebanon, Muhammad Abu Shaqra, said during the visit to his palace: "We have never allowed the terrorists to enter our villages and towns because we adhere to our religion, and we protect our women and prevent confusion among us by outside elements. This is why our villages did not become a target for IDF guns; not one of our homes was destroyed. We did not cook up this destruction of Lebanon. The one who cooked it has also eaten it. We are a clean community. Not one of us confronted the IDF. Israel's Druze officers mediated between us and the IDF. Relations between us are good." He praised the solidarity of the Druze of Israel and Lebanon and the efforts of the leaders of the community in Israel to prevent conflicts with the Christians.

The Israeli Druze delegation visited, among other places, Jazin and Hasabiyah, and late in the evening it drove back to the Good Fence in Metulah and returned to the Druze villages in the Galilee.

The Israeli Druze delegation I went with found in Lebanon a vibrant Druze community, living in beautiful villages, surrounded by well-kept gardens. The Lebanese Druze lives by the sweat of his brow, not from selling or speculating. He plants trees, works the soil and lives off the soil, in spite of the rocky terrain.

I got the impression that the Lebanese Druze are proud of the Israeli Druze and their ability to influence the government. They are also impressed with the respect the State of Israel shows to the Druze. In Arab countries the Druze do not receive such a treatment. They are considered regular citizens and their contribution is something the Arabs expect, while any setback is immediately attributed to them. They mentioned to me the killing of General Halwah by Asad as a result of the Yom Kippur War.

It should be pointed out that the Druze vilages in Lebanon are very religious, as can be seen in their dress. The urban Druze, living in Beirut, 'Alay and other resort towns are not too religious and dress like everyone else.

Party affiliation among the Druze is clannish. Each family either belongs to the Arslans or the Junblats, the two Druze families who are two separate political parties. Unlike in Israel, where one Druze brother may belong to Likud and the other to Labor, in Lebanon both brothers belong to one party. The Arslans are pro-Christian and are closer to the government, whereas the Junblats are nationalists, pro-Arab and are considered leftists. The Junblats are more popular, but the Druze I spoke to in Lebanon said that the unity of the community is the most important thing to every Druze.

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LEBANON

DRUZE DEPUTY EXPRESSES VIEWS ON ISRAELI RELATIONS WITH JUMAYYIL

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Aug 82 p 21

[Article by Meir Hareuveni: "Druze Parliamentary Deputy from Lebanon Visiting Israel: 'Israel Will Realize It Erred in Putting All Eggs in Bashir Jumayyil Basket'"]

[Text] "Were it not for Israel, Lebanon would have disappeared from the map as an independent country. Israel has only one goal in Lebanon--to see to it that all foreigners leave and Lebanon is made free and sovereign as in the past." These words were said by a Druze Lebanese leader, Qahtan Ma'ruf-Bek (Hamidah), a deputy in the Lebanese parliament who spoke to MA'ARIV while visiting Member of the Knesset (Druze) Amal Nasr al-Din, in the village of Dalyat al-Karmel.

The Druze leader, who lives in the Shuf mountains (in the village of 'Aqlin), believes that a small percentage, no more than five, accepted the authority of Kamal Junblat and his successor when the two cooperated with the PLO in the civil war in Lebanon. "They are not real Druze, they are mercenaries," he says. "The real Druze did not cooperate with the terrorists but fought to make Lebanon free."

The guest from Lebanon hopes that with the help of Israel a new government will be established in Lebanon on the basis of accommodation among the various groups as before.

As for the candidacy of Bashir Jumayyil for the presidency of Lebanon, Ma'ruf-Bek says: "If Israel supports him he will become president." He adds: "Most of the public do not want him to be president. After Israel leaves Lebanon, the government will be in trouble again." He thinks that the leader with the broadest base in Lebanon is Camille Shamoun.

The parliament is meeting today for its first session to choose a president. If Jumayyil does not get the necessary majority, the election will be postponed until next week. "Israel will find out when it is too late that it has made a mistake by putting all its eggs in the Jumayyil basket," the guest says. He praises the prolonged struggle of Major Haddad for the independence of Lebanon and believes that Haddad will receive wide support in southern Lebanon.

"If Israel and the IDF do not take immediate decisive steps to stop the conflict between the Druze and the Maronite Christians in the 'Alay area, a civil war may break out that will not stop in Lebanon but will spread to Israel," cautions Amal Nasr al-Din, Druze member of the Knesset who last week visited 'Alay and spoke with the Druze leadership and the Maronite representation in Juniyah.

Al-Din said that last Wednesday an agreement was reached in Juniyah between the Druze leaders and the Maronites to resolve the conflict between the two groups. It was decided to demand that Israel and the IDF remove the road blocks near 'Alay manned by the Phalangists. Instead, IDF soldiers of Israeli border guards should be placed at those points.

Al-Din was asked to talk to the Israeli Government and to the IDF about this matter. He said that he had sent cables to the prime minister and to the minister of defense and asked for a meeting with the chief of staff, in order to present the demands formulated at Juniyah and bring about the removal of the Phalangists from the road blocks. He added that Druze had been searched at those blocks (and insulted) and that such actions are a source of trouble between the Druze and the Maronites and that the ultimate purpose is to prevent an agreement with Israel and torpedo a settlement between Israel and Lebanon.

Al-Din accuses those elements of inciting a business strike and organizing the violent demonstration last Wednesday and Thursday in 'Alay during which tires were burned, shots were fired and several people were wounded.

The mayor, who tried to calm people, was slapped by the demonstrators. He thinks the disturbances in 'Alay were caused by publication of the Juniyah agreement, and their purpose was to prevent its implementation.

Al-Din also accused Israeli Druze public figures, including "politicians who have fallen out of favor," of inciting the Druze in Lebanon to further their own personal interests.

#### Tyre Fishermen Remained at the Cafe

Last week, Tyre fishermen were allowed by the IDF to resume their fishing. But if you think you are going to find them hard at work, enjoying their occupation, you are mistaken. The fishermen are sitting on the small stools outside the cafe, bitterly disappointed.

"Only four to five boats now go out to sea," says Ali Hamud. "The army limits us to working from 5 in the morning to 5 in the evening. During those hours there are no fish. Fish come at night. At night we are not allowed out. So why go fishing?"

Good reasoning, but so is the IDF's. Many terrorists still hide in the area, even inside Tyre, and the sea is the only escape route for them.

A survey of local occupations in Tyre and environs conducted by the IDF unit for aiding the local population reveals that there are 280 fishermen who live strictly on fishing. Since the fishing season is limited to the summer months, their income and standard of living are among the lowest in town.

According to the same study, the unit commander, Captain Yosi Meiri, has told us that the main occupation in southern Lebanon, agriculture, is in a serious crisis. Most of the workers are Palestinians. The plantations in the area have been controlled by the terrorists. All of the farm owners paid protection fees to the terrorists and fully cooperated with them. Farm workers received good pay, 70 Lebanese lira per day (\$14) and lived well.

It turns out that now the farm owners take advantage of the homeless refugees left in the area and put women and children to work in seasonal jobs at low pay. Another problem is marketing. The principal markets used in the past are now closed to the farm owners.

The study further shows that only two small industries now operate in Tyre, both textiles, each employing 20 women.

Some 650 trained workers were found in Tyre, mostly mechanics and carpenters. Most of them were not trained but learned on the job.

The telephones in town are still out of order because of a lack of communication with the central office in Beirut.

#### Sidon Market--the Largest

The Sidon municipality decided to build a new city wholesale market for fruit and vegetables. The old market on the beach facing the old Crusader castle is full of garbage and has no sanitary means.

The Sidon city engineer, Muhammad al-Ansari, says that the new market will be built at the southern exit, facing Tyre, on the bank of the Sanuq River.

The area covers 50 dunams. The city will first build 100 stores, which will be leased to merchants. Wide roads will be paved and parking for the market will be built nearby. When the job is finished, the new market will be the largest in Lebanon. In the first phase, the city of Sidon will invest 5 million Lebanese lira (\$1 million).

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## MOROCCO

### WRITER EXAMINES ENERGY OUTLOOK FOR NEXT 20 YEARS

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 626-627, Mar-Apr 82 pp 29-30

[Article by Marcel Herzog: "Energy Prospects; the Only Issue: The Nuclear Option and a Hope, Oil"]

[Text] The energy needs of a country like Morocco grow at a greater rate than do those of an industrialized country; for it must face up on the one hand to considerable shortages at the rural housing level and to high demographic pressure (more than 3 percent a year), and on the other to the needs of an emerging and dynamic industry. Morocco's total consumption in tons of oil equivalent (TEP) exceeded 5 million in 1981, with an annual growth rate that varies, according to the period, from 6 to 9 percent.

But it is the figures expressed in absolute values that underline most eloquently the scope of the efforts to be carried out. In 1955, the demand for electric power reached 911 million kilowatt hours. In 1960, some 5 years later, the line of a billion kilowatt hours was crossed for the first time. The annual increase remained static for a while longer: Morocco had just become independent, investors were hesitant, the state had political concerns more pressing than its economic ones. But let us bear this figure in mind: Morocco needed 5 years to increase its production by 100 million kilowatt hours. In another 5 years, in 1965, production had increased by 300 million kilowatt hours; for the 5 years which elapsed between then and 1970, the increase was 700 million kilowatt hours. The 2-million-kilowatt-hour [as published] mark was passed in 1971; the 3-million [as published] mark 4 years later in 1975. Energy demand reached 4 billion kilowatt hours 3 years later, in 1978; 5 billion, 2 years later, in 1981.

The forecasts established by the National Electricity Office for the next 20 years, until the year 2000, are dizzying. These are as follows:

1985	7,330 million kilowatt hours
1990	11,300 million kilowatt hours
1995	17,360 million kilowatt hours
2000	26,700 million kilowatt hours

Thus, to meet Morocco's needs from now until 2000, existing installations must be quintupled. Now, with regard to water power, for example, it is

estimated that 50 percent of the total water resources are mobilized in dams where energy needs compete with those of irrigation. At most, it will be possible to triple present production, that is, barely to reach 4.5 billion kilowatt hours from now to the end of the century.

And it is not only a question of electric power; neither the needs of industry nor of transport, much less those of individuals, are taken into account. In 1981, Morocco imported 4.3 million tons of crude oil; it will have to import more than 11 million tons in the year 2000.

#### Inventory of Resources

Morocco's foremost concern is thus to free itself as much as possible from the crushing burden of importing energy products and to resort as much as possible to local resources. What are these?

As far as oil is concerned, the country is still awaiting a large-scale discovery. Until now, hopes have been disappointed, even though the latest natural gas deposit revealed in the Essaouira basin is comparatively large. It should also be said that oil prospecting has not been carried out in Morocco with maximum resources. The BRPM [Mineral Prospecting and Investment Office] indeed engaged in considerable efforts; it obtained prospecting and drilling equipment; it increased operations on the most varied leases. But it must indeed be recognized that it lacks the sophisticated, constantly improving technical means now being utilized, and we are not speaking of financial means. Today, Morocco has recognized that it cannot operate alone. Agreements have been made with large companies on terms more attractive to them than in the past. Elf has begun prospecting, Mobil is starting in its turn, Phillips Petroleum is in the field, as well as APEX.

Two areas especially hold our attention at present: the Essaouira basin and its offshore area, the Pre-Rif zone. It is perhaps in the latter zone that Morocco will make the discovery it is awaiting. The region presents characteristics identical to those of the great oil basins, but--for there is a but--this area has been subjected to large-scale tectonic upheavals. The oil deposits have been broken open, the oil has leaked out, and that is why we find numerous surface indications throughout the area bounded by the Atlantic and Taza. But, in depth, beyond 3,000--say 4,000--meters, the underground movements have been smaller in scale. It is at this level that prospecting is currently being carried out.

But what we must tell ourselves is that with regard to oil Morocco is nearly a virgin country. Every hope is therefore permitted it.

#### Shale--Mirage or Reality?

On the other hand, Morocco has available sizable deposits of bituminous shale. The major ones have been identified in the Middle Atlas, near Timahdit; in the South Atlantic, near Tarfaya and in the Tangiers area. Other deposits

not yet explored have been identified in other regions and, according to various studies, the bedrock of the phosphate plateaus is probably made up of bituminous shale.

The reserves currently identified consist of about 100 billion tons of shale. Theoretically, there are at least 6 billion tons of oil available there for extraction. It can be imagined, under these conditions, that the shale has aroused the utmost interest. But Moroccan shale is not very rich in oil. It has one quality however: it is self-combustible. A plan has already been decided on to fire a thermal power station at Timahdit with shale. The power of this unit: 1,000 megawatts. First section: 200 megawatts.

At the same time, Moroccan engineers have succeeded in perfecting a system for the extraction of oil by pyrolysis. Their process, which does not require large investments, has been nicknamed T-3, an allusion to the three Moroccan deposits at Timahdit, Tarfaya and Tangiers. The first studies of the T-3 process set as their objective the production of 100,000 tons of oil a year from shale by 1985, with the possibility of doubling this production subsequently.

But things are not so simple when it comes to implementation. In order to produce these 100,000 tons of oil, it will be necessary to extract 3.5 million tons of rocks, which will weigh heavily in every sense of the word. And what should be done with these mountains of ashes that the rains will carry along into the valleys below? In order to extract 600,000 tons of oil--a trifle in relation to the need--more than 20 million tons of shale must be treated; in other words, to achieve this, the means available would have to be equivalent to all of those owned by the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office].

Finally, the plan which would present the fewest drawbacks, but offer the lowest return, would be the American "in situ" process: the shale is treated by pyrolysis within the deposit itself and the oil is pumped out. But in the present state of affairs, in order to treat a million tons of shale, a well must be drilled and 250,000 tons extracted, and the operation thus renewed. The solution would thus be to hook up a thermal plant that would burn the shale extracted "in situ."

#### Water Resources

On 1 January 1982, Morocco had available 23 hydroelectric plants with an installed capacity of 604 megawatts. As we indicated above, current hydroelectric potential is 1.8 billion kilowatt hours out of a total operation of 4.5 billion kilowatts. It is therefore planned to mobilize this cheap energy by the earliest possible date. A first section including 13 installations with a potential of about 2 billion kilowatt hours can be completed between now and 1990. There will remain about 735 gigawatt hours to be provided by means of some 15 installations.

Morocco will also start a program of mini-power stations. Various specialized concerns (Leroy-Somer in particular) have completed small units of this

nature, which are easy to install and capable of supplying the power needed for small areas, say small and middle-size industrial units. These mini-power stations can be installed anywhere with a sufficient river flow rate; the mountain areas are evidently the most suitable.

But what should be done when all these resources are mobilized? The problem of water has already arisen with dramatic sharpness: energy requirements run the risk of overtaking agricultural needs. The only solution is to strengthen Morocco's natural resources: that is, to transform the climate so as to increase the 16 billion cubic meters of water now available each year...when there is no drought. The expansion of agriculture and especially of forests could play a part in this transformation. The example of Tadla, which a half-century ago was synonymous with aridity and torrid heat proves this. Since agriculture, thanks to irrigation, has transformed this vast region, the climate has shown a spectacular improvement...

#### Coal

Coal also is an abundant and cheap, but unfortunately insufficient, natural resource. Jerada anthracite will, however, play an important part, since the thermal power stations that were fired with fuel oil are gradually being reconverted to coal. Production at Jerada, which remained stationary at about 800,000 tons a year, will exceed a million tons (1.2 million tons in 1984).

At the same time, prospecting by geologists has made possible the discovery of a coal deposit near Taroudant and one of lignite near Guercif. But studies are still needed in order to judge the possibility of utilizing these resources.

On 1 January 1982, Morocco had available four thermoelectric steam plants with a total installed capacity of 634 megawatts and a 600-megawatt thermal plant under construction at Mohammedia. Let us note, in addition, that part of the electric power is supplied by seven gas turbines with an installed capacity of 135.5 watts.

#### Various Forms of Energy

Morocco intends to develop renewable forms of energy--and biomass in particular--to the utmost by extensive development of eucalyptus plantations and charcoal production. It also intends to make maximum use of natural energy sources such as solar energy (it is very well situated in this field) and windpower. A Research Center on Renewable Energy was set up in Marrakech with the help of the United States.

Lastly, an original project will be started to the south of Tarfaya, where there is a vast trough some 100 meters below sea level. A canal will bring ocean water to this trough. The fall will fire a 25-megawatt hydroelectric plant. The intense evaporation that prevails in this region will prevent the "sebkha" from filling up again, even making it possible to recover salt and various mineral products.

## Nuclear Energy

But the mobilization of all these resources, oil-bearing, bituminous, coal-bearing, hydraulic and natural, will not be enough to cover the needs envisaged for the next 20 years.

Thus, there is no other solution--unless, let us repeat, there is still the possibility of a major oil discovery--than to resort to nuclear energy. And in this field Morocco is very well placed. It has available significant resources of uranium, since this is contained in phosphates and is relatively easy to extract. As Morocco has some of the most sizable phosphate reserves in the world, it has a practically inexhaustible energy resource.

Extracting uranium requires the chemical processing of the phosphate. Now this processing is being carried out in the Maroc-Phosphore and Maroc-Chimie plants, which from now to 1985 will produce nearly 3 million tons of phosphoric acid and 6.5 million tons in the year 2000. Uranium oxide extraction units will thus be linked with these plants. The first will be completed shortly at Safi. As to the first nuclear power station, studies for this will begin during the current 5-Year Plan; that is, before 1985.

## Electric Power Production

In this connection, the 20-year plan of the ONE [National Electricity Office] gives very interesting specifications on the energy sources that will be retained for electric power production. At present these sources are the following:


Fuel oil	48 percent
Hydraulic	32 percent
Coal	20 percent

In 1985, a quarter of the production (7,330 gigawatt hours) will be provided by imported coal, less costly than fuel oil, whose share will diminish to 27 percent.

In 1990, the shale power station in Timahdit should come into operation, with the greatest share of production being provided by water power.

In 1995, the first 600-megawatt nuclear power station will be put into service. Fuel oil consumption will represent only 7 percent of production, and in the year 2000, not a single drop of fuel oil will be used to produce electric power, more than half of which (51 percent) will be of nuclear origin.

Thus, without inhibition, without fear--but is there another solution?--Morocco will enter forthrightly into the 21st century with a strength in energy that many countries will envy...



9434

CSO: 4519/263

NORTHERN REGION GOVERNOR REPORTS ON SUDAN-EGYPT INTEGRATION

Cairo AL-WADI in Arabic No 40 Aug 82, pp 54, 55

[Article by Northern Region Governor Dr 'Abdallah Ahmad 'Abdallah: "Governor of Northern Region Takes Stock of Integration"]

[Text] [Question] The Northern Region has traditionally been the most important region in Sudan. It has now begun to be viewed as the model in which the vision of integration between the two brother countries will be achieved prior to the extension of integration to the entire country. Tell us about the present status of this integration and the directions it will take in the future.

[Answer] The basis of social, economic, and political integration between Egypt and Sudan in regional government is the Northern Region in view of the geographical and historical connection and ties of kinship and blood that make it easy for the people and the government to incorporate these factors into a tangible framework. This will perhaps be facilitated for the government and the people of the region by virtue of the ties of blood, marriage, kinship, history, and culture. The success of the operation to connect the countries with roads and river routes will, in my estimation, provide the real impetus for the integration process.

The factors that create affinity and integration among the people are formed through continuous contact. In turn, regional government facilitates contacts among the people and lends a popular dimension to the things involved in the process of integration by establishing these projects and executive organizations.

A concentration on this contact at the popular level and a feeling on the part of the people of the two regions in the neighboring provinces that what is happening is substantial--these are the things we are constantly striving toward.

Information Integration

Our programs are based on these foundations and this human dimension.

There is continuous contact between the government of the Northern Region and the organizations in Egypt. We have drafted plans in the fields of culture, information, transport, resettlement, and agriculture. We saw the necessity

of having the press identify the integrated area and highlight various integration-related activities in the region.

With regard to motion pictures, the Egyptian side is slated to prepare a comprehensive documentary that will seek to define the integrated area socially, culturally, and historically.

The two sides have agreed to exchange visits of information teams between the governorate of Aswan and the Northern Region. The teams will exchange month-long visits to Aswan and the Northern Region.

The sides have also agreed to strengthen television transmissions so that they will reach the Northern Region areas within the integrated area.

In the field of transport, the following recommendations were agreed on:

--The Ministry of Transport will continue work on completion of the Aswan-Wadi Halfa Road with the provision that the road will then be extended west of the Nile to Dunqulah-Khartoum. A committee of highway engineers from the two countries will conduct a technical study pertaining to the paving of the road between Qastal and Dunqulah to make it suitable for vehicle traffic.

--Construction of the port of Wadi Halfa to accommodate two new steamers with 2.5-meter drafts to be purchased from West Germany. This is to be completed within 20 months.

--Initiation of a study to determine the possibility of operating shallow-draft steamers between Aswan and Kuraymah during the flood season and Aswan and Dunqulah during the season of lowest water level to strengthen ties within the integrated area.

As is generally known, the Northern Region is rich in the areas of agriculture, fishing, and mining. However, it lacks material and human resources in the form of agricultural inputs, petroleum products, improved seeds, manpower, and expertise. In this connection, an agreement has been reached whereby up to 7,000 tons of fertilizer will be imported from Egypt to Wadi Halfa during this year. In addition, the region will import improved seeds for lentils, soybeans, chickpeas, Egyptian broad beans, and vegetable seeds.

There is also an agreement calling for commercial exploitation of Lake al-Nubah. Initial contacts have been made to form the Egyptian-Sudanese Company for the Exploitation of Lake al-Nubah Fish Resources. The executive measures to announce the proposed company are currently underway.

#### Substantial Integration

The accomplishment of the goal of integration on a substantial material basis is made easier for the region's government more because of its small size and homogeneity than because of huge projects for which it is difficult to provide the necessary funds.



In this context, a program exists within the framework of education and health services in accordance with which the Ministries of Health in Egypt and Sudan have provided medical and health services to the region for limited periods of time as well as intensive training and joint visits. All of these activities were carried out much more fluidly than if they had come through the central government. In addition, the exploitation of resources and energies such as the attraction and utilization of individual savings held by the small cooperatives and the promotion of growth all takes place much more easily than if it had come from a single center.

#### Role of the Political Organization

[Question] Dr 'Abdallah, what has been done with regard to regional establishment in the Northern Region?

[Answer] The political, executive, and legislative structures and organizations necessarily had to be established and the resources to organize and employ them had to be produced.

The political organization at the regional level called out the people and led a consciousness-raising campaign to firmly establish these new concepts. In the executive apparatus, the government provided the region job opportunities for its trained citizens--i.e., the citizens of the region qualified to conduct these executive affairs--at less than the projected cost. The region was also able to provide resources for the construction of buildings much more easily and at a lower cost, thus helping the executive organization to create work qualifications with the technical cadres within the region. These things have the same priority as the establishment process.

We also saw that we could not devote ourselves completely to the establishment process without taking into consideration popular hardships in the daily life of the citizen. We could not be satisfied solely with the establishment process and the formulation of concepts for the future. We were able to realize the importance of service projects and development projects through study, field trips, continual dialogue with the masses, interaction, surveys, and exploratory studies to serve as a basis for the formulation of an expedited program.

The staging of political campaigns for the election of the regional People's Assembly provided an opportunity for further consciousness raising. When the representatives came in, one could perceive that they possessed a high level of understanding of their task within the framework of integration of the organizations. They relay the problems and concerns of their people to their government with clear understanding in light of both the potential for the establishment [process] and public capabilities. They have provided information to the government of the region and have understood their role in functional accounting, oversight, and objective evaluation.

One of the most important achievements is the creation of the structure of local popular government. This structure relies in part on the first, second, and third order [district] councils. However, the exercise of its roles in

all dimensions represents the real meaning of the return of power to the masses. It is hoped that they will translate this power into services, development, and true comprehension of government inasmuch as it is an expansion of the degree of active participation. Therefore, this led to considerable emphasis on building the structure of local popular government and a desire to provide the first order [district] councils of the other areas with the powers and responsibilities set out in the law and to adhere to these tasks and responsibilities.

The government of the region chose the most suitable climate for the people of the region with respect to the development of the region's resources because they know them best. On this basis, the Company of the North, the Charitable Fund, and popular development came into being.

#### Sharing of Responsibility

We can perceive responsiveness and great enthusiasm for the regional government on the part of the masses as demonstrated by participation in government when pioneering leadership with a spirit of initiative is provided. My personal feeling is that the people of the Northern Region are performing a partnership role in constructing the framework of regional government which is just as important as the official effort. In my view, the success of regional government is indicated by the fact that the government continues to be active and to communicate with the masses and wants them to possess all their rights because this is the only way in which the philosophy of shared responsibility can be achieved.

This process that is taking place and the way in which it is taking place are among the advantages of regional government since it is difficult for the central government to reach into remote areas.

Good guidance and insight were actually at the heart of the establishment process. Sincerity without vain hopes and also without frustration were absolutely necessary for the creation of a process of moral incentive that would provide a basis for fostering the concept of regional government in the minds of the people before it became a dearly loved reality.

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